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Abstract  
In this study, the outcome of EU governance and thus Europeanization 
in Albania – in its path to accession - is to be analysed and its results 
explained. Albania, a candidate country to join the EU, has been 
praised for its constructive regional policy and, as a NATO member, is 
shielded from any security threat. Indeed, Albania has not historically 
had any inter-ethnic conflict, given the homogeneous population, nor 
has the country engaged in any direct war with neighbouring countries. 
Furthermore, its path to accession is not further restricted by 
unresolved bilateral issues with any countries in the region or an EU 
Member State. To a certain extent, it provides a clean slate for 
analysing the results of the double level game between the EU and 
gatekeeper elites. Thus, the study can be replicated to other candidate 
countries in the region, following any possible resolution of lingering 
bilateral conflicts. 
In Albania, as the EU has declared a halt to enlargement, has 
Europeanization too, hit the brake? I maintain that the domestic and 
international politics often entwine, and in the case of enlargement 
towards Albania I aim to elucidate when and how. The critical juncture 
and starting point of analysing EU Albania interactions was Albania 
obtaining EU candidate status in June 2014 when the politically lead 
European Commission was declaring a halt to enlargement. One main 
hypothesis is that in the presence of a vague commitment on the part of 
the EU, reforms will pay mere lip-service to Europeanization. I refer as 
well to other determinants of choice that inform the strategies of 
interaction between the EU and Albania. The candidate status sets the 
start of the analysis EU  Albania interactions.  
The methodological approach I employ in this research is largely 
qualitative. I envisage a mechanism of intervening variables in a 
process which yields results of Europeanization in Albania, in order to 
offer an explanation of what happened and why. My resulting theory 
develops process tracing predictions and performs a root cause 
analysis dependent on a causal sequence and links between the 
contributing factors and the root cause(s). I perform this study by 
relying on historical and legal analysis as an inherent part of my 
argument. By explaining the development of EU institutions and EU 
modes of Europeanization vis-à-vis candidate countries, it is possible to 
infer causality through this type of analysis. Moreover, I supplement 
process tracing with other qualitative methods analysing official 
xii 
 
declarations, public speeches, political statements, and press releases 
of the main EU, Western Balkans’ and Albanian actors. I complete the 
analysis with semi-structured interviews with Albanian and EU Member 
States diplomats, along with insights from EU officials and experts both 
in Brussels and Tirana. My field research in Tirana has culminated in 
an original survey on Albanian public opinion, carried out from 5 to 19 
November 2016, regarding the issues of concern for Albania and 
perceptions of the EU in the country. 
The study reveals only lip service is being paid to the concept of 
Europeanization. The domestic adaptation is not based on institutional 
compatibility or understood as ‘command’ and ‘compulsion’ that entail a 
hierarchical, asymmetric, top-down relation. Instead, the domestic 
adaptation is understood as a process to support mobilization for 
domestic reforms that have to be initiated from within, at the domestic 
level. The logic of Europeanization then becomes that of shaping 
beliefs at the domestic level. This study has confirmed that 
Europeanization, before a halt in enlargement, as a process, is 
dependent on socialization, a direct mode of Europeanization under the 
logic of appropriateness. These are largely shaped by their interactions 
where both parties come to have a clear understanding of the direction 
taken by their relation. 
The introduced causal mechanism is valid as there is a weaker relative 
dependence, in the presence of an inward-looking EU marred by 
internal challenges that has imposed a halt - a wait and see approach - 
on considering enlargement as a priority. The vague commitment on 
enlargement serves as an amplifier to strategic calculations on Level II, 
gatekeeper elites. At the same time, alternative flows of investments 
and/or money, coupled with the security shield of NATO, commands 
only a formal adoption of the acquis on the part of gatekeeper elites, 
but not its implementation. The EU on the other hand, will – within the 
limits of its toolbox – maintain a lenient policy to maintain gatekeeper 
elites on the negotiation table. 
Indeed, in Albania, reforms are adopted only nominally to get the 
country just ahead of the curve in its path to accession. Internally, 
Albanians struggle within a competitive authoritarianism where the sole 
concern of gatekeeper elites lies in gaining and keeping privileges by 
overtly resorting to political patronage. Democratic institutions are not 
enough to resist such practices. In fact, competitive authoritarianism 
flourishes in this paradox, where legislative loopholes, enforcement of 
xiii 
 
patronage, co-option and corruption are all skilfully managed so as not 
to inspire a violent domestic dissent or external condemnation. The 
high leverage points to address Europeanization predicaments in the 
country remain to better the economic situation through international 
cooperation so that people are not concerned with making ends meet. 
Thus, setting the ground for better conditions to support a stronger and 
larger involvement of citizens in decision making processes. 
Empowering Civil Society remains a political imperative to answer the 
appeals of European citizens and to address the concerns of Albanians 
that yearn for progress in the path of Europeanization.   
The results of the public opinion survey I conducted in Tirana further 
underlines the bleak socio-economic and institutional situation in the 
country. Albanians struggle to make ends meet and harbour a deep 
mistrust toward their political system, both political parties and 
government. 
The exchanges and interactions between the EU and gatekeeper elites 
have largely resulted with the formal adoption of legislation but no 
effective implementation or track record. Arenas of contestation are 
largely corrupted and thus there is limited room for effective push back 
on competitive authoritarian practices that engulf public life.  
The EU may be entrenched in its internal dimensions and may have, 
for now, lost its appetite for enlargement, but the Albanians do still 
largely regard the EU positively both on political and economic levels 
and are optimistic about its future. Membership of Albania in the EU is 
still seen as beneficial for the country. Issues like Brexit or the 
purported weakening of EU influence in the world seem not to be a 
concern for Albanians. They are aware of the issues the EU is facing, 
like the migrant crisis and terrorism; Albanians have an understanding 
of the economic crisis the EU economy has undergone. The 
perception’s of Albanians on the challenges the EU is facing does not 
seem to be at odds with European results at the EU level.  
More should be done as the linkages of the EU in the region are ever 
weaker, the threat of democratic backsliding within the Union – with 
elections in France, Germany and the Netherlands - plus the 
vagueness of the accession perspective may put into question the EU’s 
role in championing democracy in the wider region. 
The EU has a large set of tools that can be used in the region, but they 
have to be used strategically, coherently and effectively, measuring 
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steps towards the path of accession to be taken not too slowly, nor too 
fast. Postponing accession sine die, may undermine achievements in 
these past two decades and threaten stability in the region. The high 
leverage points – international economic cooperation and empowering 
civil society are good starting points.  
Moreover, the enlargement process should be renewed and rethought 
for the EU to be fully accountable to public opinion, but as well, to 
inspire progress in issues of concern to Albanians, and those 
concerning the wider Western Balkans’ region. In doing so, clarity of 
policy steps is necessary for to make any headway. The EU should set 
short and medium term goals to afford local and national politicians the 
opportunity to confront their constituency with results. The evaluation of 
the progress attained should aim for full transparency, moving away 
from a technical exercise to a politically accountable one. This is 
attainable by putting in place a diligent credible process which by 
setting and holding its ground inspires those reforms domestically and, 
most importantly, inspires their application for the concrete progress of 
society. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Setting the scene and research question  
Europeanization has been understood to “represen[t] a process of 
major structural transformation”1 that illustrates the “structural impact of 
the EU”2. Specifically in the case of enlargement, “external governance 
takes place when parts of the acquis communautaire are extended to 
non-member states”.3 Indeed, in defining enlargement I use the 
definition of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier that refer to it as “a 
process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of 
organizational rules and norms”.4 “Institutionalization” occurs through 
the constant and repeated interaction between interested actors that in 
turn result in being “normatively patterned”. 5 These norms spread well 
beyond their members and embrace the aspiring countries that conform 
to them in what has been termed as “[h]orizontal institutionalization”.6  
The reason for countries adapting to these norms may be two-fold: on 
one hand “to mitigate negative externalities of regional integration”, or 
on the other hand, as a correction of existing structural problems.7 The 
degree of Europeanization is understood “as the domestic impact of, 
and adaptation to, European governance”.8 Thus, in the case of 
enlargement, european governance exceeds the realm of voluntary 
adoption of the acquis communitaire and presupposes consistent 
coordinated efforts aiming at producing mutually accepted and binding 
                                                          
1 K. Featherston and G. A. Kazamias, Europeanization and the Southern Periphery, Routledge, 
New York, 2001, p. 3. 
2 Ibid., p.10. 
3 S. Lavenex, “EU External Governance in ‘Wider Europe’”, Journal of European Public Policy 
vol. 11, no. 4, 2004, p. 691. 
4 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier “The politics of EU Enlargement: Theoretical and 
comparative perspectives” in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds.), The Politics of 
European Union Enlargement, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 5. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 F. Schimmelfennig, “EU External Governance and Europeanization Beyond the EU”, in D. Levi-
Faur, The Oxford Handbook of Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p.1. 
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agreements.9 These I argue, are products of preferences and politics in 
the domestic level as well as the EU governance at the European level. 
Thus, a causal mechanism cannot but take into consideration the EU 
governance and in this research, I attempt to clarify the interaction 
between the latter and the domestic level in Albania and the impact and 
outcome of this interaction. For the purpose of this study, the outcome 
of EU governance and thus Europeanization in Albania – in its path to 
accession - is to be analyzed and its results explained.10 Given a halt in 
EU enlargement, has Europeanization too, hit the break? I cannot but 
agree with Putnam that “[d]omestic politics and international relations 
are often somehow entangled”, in my case study of Albania I aim to 
elucidate “[w]hen?” and “[h]ow?”11  
Specifically, in an attempt to reduce the property space, I will analyze 
European governance frameworks over enlargement vis-a-vis Albania, 
which represents the case of a candidate country whereby the EC 
recognized that the decision to grant to the country the candidate status 
“is also  an encouragement to step up the pace of reforms”.12 Indeed, 
the EU governance towards the Western Balkans has been 
conditionality led, with values, rules and regulations being projected 
under the premises of a possible membership.13 The EU enlargement 
policy has been “[a] political glue that [… holds] the Balkans together” 
but its strength depends on the benefits it entails and the credibility of 
the process tightly linked to the power on the part of EU to deliver on its 
                                                          
9 A. Benz, “Entwicklung von Governance im Mehrebenensystem der EU”, in Inge-borg Tömmel 
(ed.), Die Europaische Union. Governance und Policy Making VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2008, pp. 
36-57; R. Mayntz, "Governance Theory als fortenwickelte Steuerungstheorie?" in G. Folke 
Schuppert (ed.), Governance-Forschung, Vergewisserung über Stand und Entwicklungslinien, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005; F. Scharpf, Interaktionsformen: Akteurszentrierter Institutionalismus 
in der Politikforschung, Opladen, 2000.  
10 Schimmelfennig, “EU External Governance and Europeanization Beyond the EU”, op. cit., p. 5. 
11 R. D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, International 
Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, p. 427. 
12 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, 
SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 2014, p. 1. See as well A. L. George, and A. Bennett, 
Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT 
Press, 2004, p. 210. 
13 See F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to 
the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy vol. 11 
no. 4: 2004, pp. 661-679. 
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promises.14 The EU traction has been largely based in the composite 
formula “of stability, prosperity, security and personal freedoms” and 
the necessary support to state building with the final “possibility of 
joining a powerful and rich regional club.” 15 
In the case of Albania, exogenous factors namely the security threat at 
the time at the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the involvement of NATO 
and EU in the region, set the ground to reconnect to the West as a 
natural rational choice. This move benefited the security of the nation 
and furthered state building, given that the country was in its early 
stage of transition from communism.  
Internally, Albania can count on a homogeneous population with a 
culture of high religious tolerance.16 Albania has had no inter-ethnic 
conflicts or direct war with neighbouring countries. In this the internal 
conditions inherited from a failed communist regime were to set Albania 
apart from former Yugoslav countries in the region. Albania’s 
preoccupation was to rebuild the country and in doing so, political 
elites’ statements suggest that another key concern of foreign policy 
was to provide support for ethnic Albanians living in the neighboring 
countries. This was the Albanian perfect storm when starting the 
journey.17  
The EU has underlined the good neighborhood relations - a 
Copenhagen plus criteria – as a prerequisite to the Stabilization and 
Association process, “past conflicts, [...] the treatment of minorities and 
ensuring equal rights for all citizens remain key challenges to stability in 
the Western Balkans and need to be fully addressed.” 18 Indeed, 
                                                          
14 Schimmelfennig, “EU External Governance and Europeanization Beyond the EU”, op. cit., p. 3.  
H. Grabbe, “Beyond Wait-and-See: the Way Forward for EU Balkan Policy”, European Council 
on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, London, May 2010. p. 2; See as well F. Schimmelfennig and U. 
Sedelmeier “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe” in 
F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds.), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, 
Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2005, pp.1-28. 
15 H. Grabbe, “Six Lessons of Enlargement Ten Years On: The EU's Transformative Power in 
Retrospect and Prospect”, in N. Copsey and T. Haughton (eds.) The JCMS Annual Review of the 
European Union in 2013, 2014, p. 40. 
16 C. Glatz, “Don’t Use God as an ‘armor’ to wage violence, pope says in Albania”, Catholic News 
Service.  
17 George and Bennett, op.cit., p. 180. 
18 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, COM(2013) 
700 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013, p. 15. On Copenhagen ‘Plus’ criteria see S. Blockmans, Tough 
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[s]tabilisation […] is in the EU's own interest” thus “enlargement policy 
continues to be [seen as] a strategic investment in peace, security, 
prosperity, and stability in Europe “19 
Albania has been praised for its constructive regional policy.20 Indeed, 
the EC has underlined that “[r]egional cooperation and good 
neighbourly relations form an essential part of Albania’s process of 
moving towards the EU”. 21 The country is actively involved in a number 
of regional initiatives as the South-East European Cooperation 
Process, the Central European Initiative, the Regional Cooperation 
Council, the Energy Community Treaty, the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement and the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative.22 On a 
particularly strategic matter Albania continued to participate in the 
implementation of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline and Ionian Adriatic 
Pipeline projects.23 Moreover, Albania continues its active participation 
in the US-Adriatic Charter (A5) and in 2014 held its presidency.24 
Furthermore, the country has consolidated its constructive regional 
policy through improving bilateral relations with enlargement and 
neighborhood countries. 25  
Thus, Albania is not further burdened in its path to accession by 
bilateral, unresolved issues with countries in the region or an EU 
Member State. To a certain extent, it provides a clean slate for 
analyzing the results of the double level game between the EU and 
gatekeeper elites. Thus, the study can be replicated to other candidate 
countries in the region, following any possible resolution of lingering 
bilateral conflicts. 
                                                                                                                               
Love: The European Union’s Relations with the Western Balkans, The Hague, Asser Press, 2007, 
pp. 246-7,252.   
19 European Commission, 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, COM(2016) 715 
final, Brussels 9.11.2016, p. 9.  
20 “A short-lived rise in nationalist rhetoric in late 2012 and early 2013 triggered concerns among 
neighbours and other partners but subsided thereafter.” See European Commission, Commission 
Staff Working Document Albania 2013 Progress Report, SWD (2013) 414 final, Brussels, 
16.10.2013, p. 11.  
21 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, 
SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 2014, p. 13.  
22 Ibid.  
23 European Commission, SWD(2014) 304 final op.cit., p.13; European Commission, Commission 
Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 22.   
24 European Commission, SWD(2015) 213 final op.cit., p. 22.    
25 European Commission, SWD(2014) 304 final op.cit.,p. 14; European Commission, 2016 
Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, COM(2016) 715 final, Brussels 9.11.2016, p. 7. 
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In many interviews conducted in Brussels, the EU integration and 
returning to Europe has been portrayed as key to Albania’s identity. It is 
perceived as the rightful home of the Albanians, and as interviews 
conducted for this study have highlighted that Albania does not seek or 
have any other integration alternatives.26 In addition, a senior official of 
the US Department of Justice during an interview underlined that “[the 
USA] support[s] Albania in joining the EU, we cannot have the country 
become a 51st State of the USA”.27 
The Albanian gatekeeper elites have long understood that the way they 
engage in the process of Europeanization “are customs” not simply 
clearly stated rules but shared consciously and publicly.28 Clearly stating these 
rules of interaction may be helpful in removing any uncertainty and this 
may happen after the players have been playing for some time.29 I 
argue that both the EU and the Albanian gatekeeper elites have agreed 
to these tacit rules.30 
In the case of Albania, the continuous interaction with the EU, is 
traceable back to 1990, when the gatekeeper elites exiting from a deep 
seclusion were not fully aware of the rules of international interaction 
nonetheless opened talks with the EU and NATO.31 As Wittgenstein 
reminds us:  
“When do you know how to play chess? All the time? Or 
just while you are making a move? And during each 
move, [do you play] the whole of chess? – And how 
                                                          
26 Senior official 1, Mission of the Republic of Albania to the European Union, interview, 
Brussels, 31 March 2015; Senior official 2, Mission of the Republic of Albania to the European 
Union, interview, Brussels, 31 March 2015; Senior official 1, The Permanent Delegation of 
Albania to NATO, interview, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 20 March 2015; Senior official 2, 
The Permanent Delegation of Albania to NATO, interview, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 20 
March 2015; Senior Official, NATO Headquarters, interview, Brussels, 15 April 2015.  
27 Senior Official of the United States Department of Justice Criminal Division International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), interview, Tirana, 19 July 2016. 
28 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations, Oxford, Blackwell. 1953, p. 199. 
29 N. G. Onuf, World of our making: Rules and rule in social theory and International Relations, 
Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1989, pp. 85-86. 
30 See Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 02 February 
2017.  
31 In 1992, Albania requested NATO membership . See A. Çopani, “The Democratic Process and 
Albanian Security Policy”, NATO Review, no. 40, 1992, p. 23. See also A. Çopani, and C. P. 
Danopoulos, “The Role of the Military in the Democratization of Marxist-Leninist Regimes: 
Albania as a Case Study”, Mediterranean Quarterly 6, no. 2, 1995, pp. 117-134. 
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queer that knowing how to play chess takes so short a 
time, and a game so much longer.”32  
I take as a critical juncture in this study, the candidate status Albania 
obtained in June 2014 at the same time in which the politically lead 
European Commission would declare of a halt in enlargement. One 
main hypothesis is that in presence of a vague commitment on the part 
of the EU, the reforms will be a lip-service to Europeanization. The 
candidate status sets the start of the analysis of the results of EU – 
Albania interactions.  
Domestic actors may well be incentivized to hold on short-term 
achievable goals that allow them to present themselves as bearer of 
concrete results on election dates.33 The description of Featherstone - 
as I showcase throughout the analysis done in this thesis - holds true in 
the case of Albania:  
“With a mistrust of others, it is rational to defend 
accumulated privileges. The government, for its part, 
approaches the social dialogue in a manner that smacks 
of opportunism – reviving the process only when it needs 
to introduce painful reforms, dropping it when it does not 
go the way it wants.[…] The signal given here is that 
difficult policy shifts depend on an external force to 
strengthen the domestic reform process.” 34 
In addition of evaluating context in which they unfold the relative 
dependence and any present asymmetries – useful indicators – that 
only coupled with analysis of past decisions and behaviors inform a 
rational calculation of costs of one’s strategy.35  
The EU has adopted toward candidate countries a “governance by 
conditionality” by projecting its values, rules and regulations, under the 
                                                          
32 Wittgenstein, op. cit., p. 59. 
33 M. Bregu, Chairwoman of the European Integration Committee of the Parliament of Albania, 
EPC, Policy Dialogue, “EU Enlargement to the Balkans: The role of the member states”, Brussels, 
29 September 2015. 
34 K. Featherstone, “Greece and EMU: Between External Empowerment and Domestic 
Vulnerability”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 41, no. 5, 2003, p. 937  
35 G. H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, 1984, 
pp. 471 – 472, 474 - 475 
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premise of membership.36 However, some scholars underline that 
conditionality is not a top-down demand, nor “a clear-cut independent 
or intervening variable and does not fit narrowly positivist framework” 
but a process, results of which are dependent on an interaction of 
domestic and European actors37 much like Europeanization.38  
Thus, the EU and Albania, as a candidate country under the newfound 
circumstances continue their exchanges, based on clear – tacitly 
agreed – directions that inform their relationship – between equals - 
built on negotiating and bargaining.39 The mode of Europeanization 
pertaining to this case, is then socialization - a direct mode under the 
logic of appropriateness.40 Indeed, it serves well the purpose of this 
study - before a fading membership perspective - as of ‘whether’ and 
‘to which extent’ does Albania pursue Europeanization.    
  
1. 2 Methodology and research design  
The methodological approach I intend to employ in this research is 
largely qualitative. In this regard I will be employing the method of 
process-tracing as envisaged by Alexander George and Andrew 
Bennett. Process-tracing “identif[ies] the intervening causal process – 
the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent 
                                                          
36 F. Schimmelfennig, and U. Sedelmeier, “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the 
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy vol. 11 no. 
4, 2004, pp. 661-679. 
37 I define EU actors in the large sense, both EU Member States, and implementing institutions 
involved in the enlargement policy. 
38 J. Hughes, G. Sasse, C. Gordon, “Conditionality and Compliance in the EU’s Eastward 
Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Government”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 3, 2004, pp. 523-551. J. Hughes, G. Sasse, C. Gordon, “Enlargement 
and Regionalization: the Europeanization of Local and Regional Governance in CEE States”, H. 
Wallace (ed.), Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration, London, Palgrave, Macmillan, 
2001, pp. 145-178. 
39 A.  Benz, “Entwicklung von Governance im Mehrebenensystem der EU “, in I. Tömmel (ed.), 
Die Europaische Union. Governance und Policy Making VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2008, pp. 36-57; 
T. Börzel, “European Governance – Verhandlungen und Wettbewerb im Schatten der Hierarchie”, 
in I. Tömmel (ed.), Die Europaische Union. Governance und Policy Making VS Verlag, 
Wiesbaden, 2008, p. 65 
40 See J. T. Checkel, “Why comply? Social learning and European identity change”, International 
Organization vol. 55, no.3, 2001, pp. 553-588. 
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variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”41  
The suggested causal mechanisms serve to fill the gap between law-
like generalizations. “The difference between a law and a mechanism is 
that between a static correlation (‘if X, then Y’) and a ‘process’ (‘X leads 
to Y through steps A, B, C’)”.42 Process-tracing may be used to study 
said intervening steps ensuring thus the authenticity of the general law.  
Utilizing the pre-existing terminology employed by King, Keohane and 
Verba, what George and Bennett refer to as causal mechanisms are 
nothing other than intervening variables, causal capacities, unreal and 
undetectable, that fail to manifest themselves with their observed 
outcomes.43 Falletti and Lynch maintain that causal mechanisms 
“intervene” in a systematic cross-case covariation stated by a law-like 
generalization where ‘X leads to Y’ can be disregarded in absence of 
such law-like generalization.44 This is undoubtedly a different stance 
from causality as conceived by critical realism where systematic cross-
case covariation is irrelevant to a causal claim unless it is performed in 
laboratory conditions.45 
George and Bennett’s approach is critical to the law-like generalizations 
put forth by neopositivists. The authors maintain that no differentiation 
is possible between a causal relationship and a non-causal one. 
Moreover, a law-like generalization is not typically encountered in the 
world.46 They do propose “causal mechanisms” as a solution to this 
conundrum, and with it offer an explanation of what happened and why 
it happened, thus discovering novel insights.  
“[U]ltimately unobservable physical, social, or 
psychological processes through which agents with 
causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or 
conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to 
other entities. In so doing, the causal agent changes the 
                                                          
41 A. L. George, and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2004, p. 172. 
42 George and Bennett, op.cit., p. 141 
43 G. King, R. O. Keohane, and S. Verba, Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in 
qualitative research, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 85-87. 
44 T. G. Falleti, and J. F. Lynch. “Context and causal mechanisms in political analysis.” 
Comparative Political Studies vol. 42, no. 9, 2009, pp. 1146-1147 
45 M. Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming causal analysis, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, 1st edn., p. 198. 
46 George and Bennett, op.cit., pp. 132, 133. 
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affected entity’s characteristics, capacities or propensities 
in ways that persist until subsequent causal mechanisms 
act upon it.” 47 
Hence, disregarding systematic cross-case covariation, George and 
Bennett focus on “ultimately unobservable” series of steps, which 
produce, observed outcomes.48 I recognize that there is a contradiction 
as, on one hand, George and Bennett suggest researchers to be weary 
in using law-like generalizations – but on the other hand, they imply a 
connection between their causal mechanisms and law-like 
generalizations. 
“If we are able to measure changes in the entity being 
acted upon after the intervention of the causal 
mechanism and in temporal or spatial isolation from other 
mechanisms, then the causal mechanism may be said to 
have generated the observed change in this entity. The 
inferential challenge, of course is to isolate one causal 
mechanism from another, and more generally, to identify 
the conditions under which a particular mechanism 
becomes activated.”49  
George and Bennet maintain “that a theory can be derived or modified 
based on the evidence within a case, and still be tested against new 
facts or new evidence within the same case, as well as against other 
cases”.50 Similarly, by following the available evidence, I develop a 
theory - process tracing predictions - about the case study in hand. 
Following the Bayesian reasoning, one of my aims is to define the 
probability of an outcome - Europeanization in Albania - based on 
newfound evidence. 
The degree of Europeanization in Albania, serves as the problem to be 
defined through a causal mechanism as stated above. I thus perform a 
root cause analysis which is dependent on the causal sequence and 
                                                          
47 George and Bennett, op.cit., pp. 132, 133. 
48 George and Bennett’s conception of “observability” (See George and Bennett, op.cit., pp. 143–
144) is admirably nuanced, fully accepting the notion that the boundaries of the observable change 
over time with the construction of more and more refined equipment to augment and extend the 
senses. But there is little sense in their account that any factor will remain undetectable, or that 
such an undetectable factor could ever serve a meaningful explanatory role. 
49 George and Bennett, op.cit., p. 137. 
50 George and Bennett, op.cit., p. 187. 
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links between the contributing factors and the root cause(s). In 
employing process-tracing and proposing a causal mechanism 
concerned with explaining the outcomes of Europeanization in Albania I 
maintain that it is necessary to “consider multiple feedback loops and 
complex causal relations”.51  
Largely focusing on qualitative data analysis, I use process-tracing as a 
means through which I can draw causal relationships between the two 
variables. The independent variables will be the domestic political elites 
in their role of gatekeeper elites on one hand, and on the other hand, 
the use of EU governance in the region.52  
The reason behind the choice of using process-tracing as a means of 
analysis is the consistent lack of a temporal or geographical 
comparisons that could be comparable to the institutional and legal 
integration in the European Union. The Western Balkans are no CEECs 
and the realities in other current candidate states are peculiar to each 
case, where inter-state disputes further increase the risks of 
politicisation of their enlargement process. In this case study, process-
tracing is carried through a  historical and legal analysis, which is an 
inherent part of my argument. By explaining the development of EU 
institutions and EU modes of Europeanization vis-a-vis candidate 
countries, it is possible to infer causality through this type of analysis. 
Moreover, I supplement process tracing with other qualitative methods 
analysis of official declarations, public speeches, political statements, 
and press releases of the main EU and Western Balkans’ and Albanian 
actors. I complete the analysis with, semi-structured interviews with 
Albanian and EU Member States diplomats but as well interventions 
from EU officials and experts both in Brussels and Tirana. My field 
research in Tirana has culminated in an original  survey on Albanian 
public opinion - carried out from 05 November 2016 to 19 November 
2016 in Tirana - regarding the issues of concern for Albania and 
perception of the EU in the country.  
All of the above, by recognizing that interpretations of ‘what they say’ 
and ‘what they mean’ cannot be extrapolated by the broader context. 
The literature has argued that there is a “dialectical relationship 
between context, speech acts, and institutional change”, and where 
                                                          
51 C. M. Radaelli and S. Saurugger, “The Europeanization of Public Policies: Introduction”, 
Journal of Comparative Analysis: Research and Practice, vol. 10, no. 3, 2008, p. 215.  
52  J. Tolstrup, “Gatekeepers and Linkages”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 25, no. 4, 2014, p. 126. 
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there is a shift in context and enlargement perspectives, there is a 
different nuance within what is said and what it meant.53  
In so doing the analysis through process-tracing methods can be 
further legitimized as a proper method of analysis. There are three 
types of methods used by process-tracing research designs: theory-
testing, theory-building, and explaining-outcome.54 Specifically, 
throughout this research I will use both theory-building and explaining-
outcome methods to reason how EU interaction with the gatekeeper 
elites over enlargement affects the outcomes on europeanization 
efforts and develop a theory on ‘when’ and ‘how’ this interaction may 
yield to effective europeanization of the country. Therefore, in the final 
part of this thesis I intend to draw on the findings to build a theoretical 
framework that is important for understanding the impact and outcome 
of europeanization in candidate countries.  
The Europeanization process in Albania “can usefully be conceived as 
a two-level game” where at “the national level” gatekeeper elites seek 
to fulfill their preferences which will grant them political and economic 
power; while at the European level, “national governments see to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments”.55  
Hence, in analyzing the process of Europeanization in Albania I 
consider both levels where the European level - Level I - where 
negotiators seek a “tentative agreement” and domestic level - Level II - 
which “is required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement.” 56 In 
level II the “win-set” is “the set of all possible Level I agreements” that 
would be ratified by constituents “when simply voted up or down.”57 In 
evaluating the impact and outcome of Europeanization in Albania, I pay 
attention to the “strategies” behind a Level I agreement, conditions 
                                                          
53 K. M. Fierke and A. Wiener “Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement” 
in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds.), The Politics of European Union Enlargement, 
London, Routledge, 2005, p. 115. 
54 George and Bennett, op.cit., p.181. 
55 Putnam,  op.cit., p. 434. 
56 Ibid., p. 436. 
57 Ibid., p. 437. A thorough explanation of the concept of ‘win-set’ is offered in K. A. Shepsle and 
B. R. Weingast, “The institutional Foundations of Committe Power,”American Political Science 
Review, vol. 81, no.1, 1987, pp. 85-104. 
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under which “preferences and coalitions” are formed at the domestic 
level - Level II - and implemented by their “institutions”.58  
Like in chess, making a move in the Europeanization board is 
dependent on the moves of the other player(s). Just like in playing 
chess, learning how to make a move is rather straightforward, the 
question is if one is willing to play the game until the end, it certainly 
requires a long-term commitment.  
The gatekeeper elites may hold the momentum of the accession 
process if it is perceived as against their political agenda. The EU has 
served as a guide for systemic reforms but ultimately has failed before 
gatekeeper elites adopting populist agendas filled with nationalistic 
rhetoric.59  
An extensive literature has established the characteristics of a modern 
democracy: free and fair elections where all citizens have the right to 
vote and thus legitimate the work of executives and legislatures, which 
are not, on the other hand restricted by any external influence60; 
political and socio-economic rights including the fundamental rights 
such as freedom of speech and association are guaranteed.61 Even 
democratic regimes may, on occasion pose some limitations on these, 
but those do not result in an unbalanced, discriminatory 
implementation. 
I argue then, that Europeanization just ahead of the curve as seen in 
Albania - and I might add in the Western Balkans region - is firmly 
established in the competitive authoritarianism plaguing the domestic 
level where the sole concern lies in gaining and keep privileges by 
overtly resorting to political patronage.62Democratic institutions are not 
enough to resist such a regime. Indeed, competitive authoritarianism 
flourishes before this paradox: legislative loopholes, enforcement of 
                                                          
58 Putnam,  op.cit., p. 442. 
59 Grabbe, “Six Lessons of Enlargement Ten Years On”  op.cit., pp. 44-45. 
60 See S. Mainwaring, D. Brinks, and A. Pérez Linan, “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin 
America, 1945-1999”, Studies in Comparative International Development vol. 36, no. 1, 2001 pp. 
37-65.  This definition is consistent with what Larry Diamond calls “mid-range” conceptions of 
democracy. See L. Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 13-15. 
61 S. Levitsky and L. A. Way, “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2002, p. 53. 
62 A. Sinagra, “Il futuro della democrazia albanese nel prossimo decennio”, in Scritti in memoria 
di Maria Rita Saulle, vol. II, p. 1537 ss, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2014. 
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patronage, cooption and corruption are all means to an end, skillfully 
managed so as not to inspire a violent domestic dissent or external 
condemnation.63  Yet, it is a fine line that poses a constant threat to 
stability. The conundrum before the autocratic incumbents, is to either 
hold on to power in open violation of democratic rules and risk domestic 
unrest together with international sanctions or allow a change in 
power? 64 Albania will be holding its elections later this year in June 
2017, but as Levitsky and Way remark “succession is not 
democratization”.65 In the case study in hand I go on to analyze “four 
arenas of contestation” in Albania, the elections and the functioning of 
the parliament and the judiciary but as well that of the media.66 The EU 
on its part, has adopted a proportional response with the view of 
limiting adverse consequences on its doorstep.67  
Thus, I perform a root cause analysis on the basis of a causal 
mechanism that is to explain the degree of Europeanization in Albania. 
I maintain and I attempt to showcase throughout the thesis how the root 
causes of this predicament are to be found in the gatekeeper elites and 
the (mis)use of the EU power. In presence of competitive 
authoritarianism and with the EU - increasingly challenged by internal 
crisis and further limited on enlargement by an unfavorable public 
opinion - exerting a policy of stability in the region, gatekeeper elites will 
resort to political patronage that will result in paralyzing the “arenas of 
contestation”.68 This is sustainable due to gatekeeper elites freezing 
arenas of opposition before an unfavorable EU public opinion on 
enlargement and thus an EU adopting an inward looking, wait and see 
approach. The performed root cause analysis has been endorsed in the 
interviews I have conducted with senior diplomats of several EU 
                                                          
63 These dilemmas are presented in an insightful way in A. Schedler, “The Nested Game of 
Democratization by Elections”, International Political Science Review vol. 23, no.1, 2002, 
pp.103–122.  
64 See Levitsky and Way, op.cit., pp. 58-59. 
65 Ibid., p. 59. See as well Ministria e Puneve te Brendshme, “Takimi me Diasporen/Vota e 
emigranteve, paraprihet nga regjistrimi i tyre”, Tirane, 19 Nentor 2016.     
66 Levitsky and Way, op.cit., p. 54. 
67 See Putnam, op.cit., p. 434. 
68 Levitsky and Way, op.cit., p. 54. 
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Member States in Tirana.69 The results of these interview all indicate 
that, the EU seems to have little alternatives at the moment.70  
The high leverage points to address Europeanization predicaments in 
the country remain to better the economic situation through 
international cooperation so that people are not concerned with making 
ends meet and are more involved in decision making processes, which 
brings us to the imperative of empowering civil society and effectively 
innovate the enlargement process so that to answer the appeal of 
Europeans and the people of Western Balkans that want progress not 
just reports in the path of Europeanization.71  
                                                          
69 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, Tirana, 12 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU 
Member State, interview, Tirana, 13 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of 
Embassies, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017; Senior Diplomat 2, EU Member State, interview, 
Tirana, 19 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, 
Tirana, 02 February 2017; 
70 Ibid. 
71 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, Tirana, 12 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU 
Member State, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of 
Embassies, interview, Tirana, 02 February 2017; European Commission, European Commission, 
Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 
10.11.2015; European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, 
SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016.;   Cf. European Commission, Commission Staff 
Working Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 
2014.  
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Should my argument be valid, I illustrate below it is that we would we 
expect to observe in the Europeanization process in Albania. If the 
case does not carry my expectations – then my causal mechanism is 
inadequate. 
Problem:  
o Europeanization in Albania 
Subproblems:  
o Competitive Authoritarianism  
o EU Favoring “stability”  
Root causes:  
o Gatekeeper elites  
(Mis)Use of EU Power 
Intermediate causes:  
Gatekeeper elite gain and keep power and privileges 
Inward looking approach of the EU 
 Immediate causes:  
o Domestic groups pressure on government – Clientelism 
o Minimize adverse consequences of foreign developments  
 
 High Leverage points  
Sub problem symptoms:  
o Numb arenas of contestation;  
o Inward looking, public opinion  
  
16 
 
First and fore mostly, we would observe the endurance of democratic 
institutions but no level playing field among the contenders of political 
power. There are evident deficiencies in functioning of executives and 
legislatures, concerns regarding the conduct of free and fair elections 
and exercise of fundamental rights where while civil and political 
liberties are formally guaranteed and do not have a cost for the State 
the socio-economic and labor rights are not applied which gives the 
gatekeeper elites a powerful tool to tame dissent.72 Thus, while arenas 
of contestation exists they remain non-consequential in effectively 
challenging the elites in power. 73   
The “relative dependence” of the EU and the Western Balkans’ 
countries informed by the needs and capacities to provide for these 
needs both at the EU and domestic level, and existing alternatives to 
the same assistance.74 The more serving and the greater is the number 
of alternatives, the lesser the dependence. Seen from the gatekeeper’s 
perspective “[r]ejecting links with one external actor [is] easier if another 
such actor is willing to help make up the costs of doing so.”75 The 
“degree of strategic interest” is tightly connected to the ‘relative 
dependence’, as it informs the strategy applied by parties to keep the 
other on the negotiating table and “[it’s] resources out of the opponent’s 
hands”.76 In the case of the EU and Albania, factors such as geography 
and a difference in power play a role in these calculations.77 If the 
interest is substantial there will be somewhat a persisting – at least 
formal – leniency.   
In presence of a vague commitment on part of the EU, serves as an 
amplifier of strategic calculations as defined above. In such a case - the 
announced halt in enlargement but maintaining the European 
                                                          
72 See Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez Linan op.cit. pp. 37-65. This definition is consistent with 
what Larry Diamond calls “mid-range” conceptions of democracy. See Diamond, op.cit. pp. 13-
15. On the socio-economic and labour rights See On social economic rights see A. Sinagra, 
Finiamola di prenderci in giro. Liberismo economico e mortificazione delle ragioni del lavoro, in 
Confronto-L’anima dell’Adriatico, n. 9, Edizioni “Confronto”, ottobre 2011, p. 10. 
73 Levitsky and Way, op.cit., p. 54. 
74 Snyder, op.cit., pp. 471 - 472. 
75 Tolstrup, op.cit., p.130. 
76 Snyder, op.cit.,p. 472. 
77 Ibid., p. 472 
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perspective of the Western Balkans - gatekeeper elites will “create an 
uneven playing field” by “legally” harassing, persecuting, or extorting 
cooperative behavior from critics.”78 The EU on its part, will continue its 
wait and see, lenient approach for the sake of stability.  
The interests of the EU and gatekeeper elites are proved to be cofinal, 
and all lead to stability. The EU is somehow entrapped in its relations 
with the region, and concretely in this case study, with Albania. 79   
The EU’s “behavior in the recent past” informs forthcoming steps and 
prospects of the gatekeeper elites.80 The EU - as argued above - has a 
strategic interest to maintain stability in the region of Western Balkans 
and it is an understanding of the gatekeeper elites, that EU conditions 
on the path to integration are likely to be adjusted along the way and 
thus concessions given without full application of demanded reforms, 
under the principle of ‘strict but fair’ approach, then gatekeeper elites 
will continue to do just enough to get ahead of the curve. 
Most of foreign policy is informed by assessing the “audience costs”.81 
“All political actors, democratic or not, must pay attention or the 
preferences and interests of the groups that back them. The cost of 
displeasing your supporters is your audience cost […selecting] 
gatekeeping strategies with an eye toward how […] audiences [or 
public opinion] will react.” 82  
The EU credibility in enlargement has arguably suffered, having a 
larger toolset and ability “to make concessions” to put to use vis-à-vis 
candidate countries such as Albania, and thus a large win-set on one 
hand; 83 and on the other hand with its inability to “deliver” the final 
objective for domestic level that of membership. 84 Hence, the 
gatekeeper elites will proceed in maintaining the balance between their 
‘own’ preferences and those of their constituents, resorting to 
                                                          
78 Levitsky and Way, op.cit., p. 53. 
79 Snyder, op.cit.,p. 474. 
80 Ibid. 
81 See J. D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes”, 
American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 3, 1994, pp. 577-592. 
82 Tolstrup, op.cit., p.129. 
83 Putnam,  op.cit., p.  439. Should there be no concessions to make the risk is that to lead to a 
crossroad or damage relations beyond repair. See as well T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 
Cambridge, Massachussets, Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 19-28. 
84 Putnam,  op.cit., p. 439. 
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patronage. The EU on the other hand, will maintain its wait and see 
approach, before imminent developments in national politics of some 
member states and intra-EU concerns.85  
 
1. 3 Roadmap of the chapters 
The dissertation has five chapters where the first chapter is an 
introduction where I set the research question and research design. In 
studying Europeanization and accession path of a candidate country 
such as in the case study of Albania - before the uncertainty of the 
future of the EU - in the second chapter I review theoretical 
perspectives that have defined the EU integration. I consider it to be a 
stepping stone to build on what the Union has been centered in and 
what could be its future and that of those countries that have the 
ambition to join. Who are at the front row in defining EU policies, what 
is the role of EU institutions?   
The analysis continues with a comprehensive study on arrangements 
and models used in EU enlargment. The analysis highlights that the 
enlargment policy has had at its core, since its inception,  the 
unanimous action of the high contracting parties, confirming, thus, its 
governmental nature. Conditionality, as firstly spelled out in 
Copenhagen, has continued to be applied to applicants,  and to date is 
applied to the Western Balkans and Turkey. I trace the introduction of 
conditionality to the Seville European Council where strengthening of 
administrative and judicial capacities has been viewed as instrumental 
to accepting and implementing the responsibilities deriving from the 
Treaties and the the adoption of the acquis.86 
Thus, the study of EU governance – Europeanization - in Albania as a 
result of the EU enlargement policy is done throughout by means of 
intergovernmentalism lenses. The EU Member States maintain control 
over the enlargement process, with the assumption that they act at the 
                                                          
85 At the time of writing this thesis, France, Germany and the Netherlands are in electoral 
campaign, the UK is undergoing the Brexit talks and the migrant crisis is a constant threat, as it is 
the concern of terrorism.  
86 Cf. Seville European Council Conclusions, 21–22 June 2002, 13463/02, Brussels, 24 October 
2002. p. 5 
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international level (EU level) purposefully on domestic preferences.87 
The negotiating and bargaining thus, is carried by Member States 
following the redlines of national interests by means of trading side 
payments and possible package deals.88 The supranational institutions 
like the EC, having condensed powers delegated by the EU Member 
States, serve as implementing factors and ensure the collective 
enforcement of decisions taken.89 
The conditionality approach has certainly had an impact in 
enlargement, while arguably it has increased the leverage on candidate 
countries, it has often resulted as a non-consequential exercise of 
ticking boxes.90 Moreover, it creates the illusion that once the chapters 
and benchmarks are met the accession is an automated exercise 
devoid of political interference. 
The analysis of the EU rule of law culminates with Lisbon Treaty, 
whereby Article 49 does not assist in bringing clarity on applied 
accession conditionality. Admittedly, it is unclear how one can 
effectively measure compliance of the values and ideals it refers to. 
The analysis further confirms that the Member States are at the 
forefront of the EU enlargement policy internally restricted by public 
opinion that by means of referendum provisions or simply through 
democratic confrontation on the election day has a say on the direction 
of EU policy. Enlargement policy that does not garner much consensus, 
which has inspired a cautious stance on the part of the EU.  
                                                          
87 Cf. D. Wincott, “Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an everyday 
critique of liberal Inter-governmentalism”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 33, no. 4, p. 
601; K. O. Fioretos, “The Anatomy of Autonomy: Interdependence, Domestic Balances of Power, 
and European Integration”, Review of International Studies vol. 23, no. 3 1997, p. 301.  
88 M. A. Pollack, “Theorizing EU Policy-Making”, in H. Wallace, M. A. Pollack and A. R. Young 
(eds.), Policy-making in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 6th edn., pp. 
19-21 
89  See C. J. Bickerton, D. Hodson, and U. Puetter “The New Intergovernmentalism: European 
Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era:The New Intergovernmentalism”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 53, no. 4 2015, p. 717. 
90 Cf. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2013 Progress 
Report, SWD (2013) 414 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013; European Commission, Commission Staff 
Working Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 
2014; European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, 
SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015; European Commission, Commission Staff Working 
Document, Albania 2016 Report, SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016.  
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The theoretical perspectives on integration and the evolutions of 
arrangements applied to enlargement within the EU legal framework lay 
the necessary foundation to analyze the EU modes of governance and 
Europeanization toward a candidate country, in my case study - 
Albania. 
The renewed consensus for enlargement, marks a turn on the degree 
of explicitness or possibility of enlargement. Indeed, following the 
review of the literature on EU modes and rules of governance I make 
an argument of why the governance by conditionality approach is not 
effectively applied in practice. The costs of non-compliance to be paid 
by the gatekeeper elites do not outweigh benefits they garner by 
alternative means. Given the current internal and political predicaments 
of the EU and power to deliver on an already vague commitment, the 
relationship between the EU and a candidate country is one between 
equals.  It develops throughout their interactions where both parties 
come to have a clear understanding of the direction taken by their 
relation. Thus, I argue that the Europeanization mode in Albania has 
shifted away from the hierarchical, asymmetric, direct mode of 
conditionality. The domestic adaptation to reforms is seen in the frame 
of supporting mobilization for domestic reforms to be initiated within the 
country. Thus, I argue, the mode for Europeanization in Albania is that 
of socialization, a direct mode under the logic of appropriateness, 
shaped and developed by interactions where both parties come to have 
a clear understanding of the direction taken by their relation.   
In the third chapter, I table both socio-political developments within the 
EU, as determinants of EU enlargement. The European Commission 
for the first time shifted away from a merely technical to a political 
leadership pioneered by a seasoned politician, Mr. Jean-Claude 
Juncker.  
Before internal concerns there has been thus a declaration for a halt in 
enlargement at least during Mr. Juncker’s EC Presidency term. 
However, these same internal concerns like the migration crisis would 
endow with newfound attention the region of the Western Balkans. 
After a historic consideration of the developments in Albania starting 
from the early ’90 I conclude that geopolitical and geoeconomic 
consideration of stability are determinants of EU enlargement policy as 
applied to the Western Balkans.  
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The research results on the Berlin Process and its agenda further 
confirm to this argument. The Berlin Process has been seen as a 
restart of enlargement process where components of connectivity - 
transport and energy projects -  underline the vision and ambition of 
creating an economic block in the continent and highlight the 
geopolitics and geoeconomics relevance of the region. While the socio-
economic mindset, as marked by my interviewees, has been argued to 
be a novelty, the lack of fundings for the implementation of these 
projects, which remain those of IPA II,  underlines a business as usual 
approach. The Berlin Process, thus, to date, remains a public 
diplomacy exercise, useful to all parties involved.  
In the fourth chapter I delve into the analysis of four arenas of 
contestation and to what extent the legislation in place nominally and 
practically translates the fundamentals first approach to effective 
europeanization in the country. I support my analysis with semi-
structured interviews in Tirana and an original survey conducted one 
week prior and one week after of the latest enlargement package report 
on Albania. 
The results confirm a prevailing lip-service Europeanization in the 
country. Arenas of contestation are largely numb and thus there is no 
room for effective push back on competitive authoritarian practices that 
engulf public life. The EU may be entrenched in its internal dimension 
and may have for now, lost its appetite for enlargement, but the 
Albanians do still largely consider EU and a possible EU membership 
positively. The public seems to be aware of the challenges the EU 
faces and the results are not at odds when compared with the latest 
Eurobarometer results. However, Albanians remain optimistic about the 
future of the EU and seem not particularly shaken by Brexit or the 
purported weakening of EU influence in the world. What is undeniable 
is that “in spite of many differences amongst its Member States, is by 
far the wealthiest and most stable continent in the world.”91 Albanians 
understand that the Union is no heaven, will it, however, be(come) a 
savior from hell?   
                                                          
91 J.C., Juncker, “State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity, 09 September 
2015, Strasbourg, France.  
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In the last and fifth chapter of this dissertation I review the argument 
made throughout and table implications of the findings, empirical, 
theoretical and those relevant to policy. It is clear that enlargement has 
to be resuscitated as a policy with more coherence, strategic use of the 
EU toolbox and with increased ownership not only of domestic level 
actors, but most importantly of citizens lead reforms supporting efforts.  
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Chapter 2  
Enlargement Policy of the EU 
 
2. 1 Theoretical Perspectives on EU Integration 
Enlargement as a foreign policy takes place against a complex 
backdrop that affects the internal and external dimensions of the EU 
presence, which is ever more in limbo between looking inward and 
engaging in europeanization. The domestic considerations within the 
EU have pushed enlargement down the EU policy priority list. I 
maintain that in order to understand the EU stance concerning further 
enlargement is crucial to understand some of the debates, centred in 
low politics1 – economic and social motives – bringing about EU 
integration. These debates are instrumental not only to understand the 
dynamics, interaction and reactions between EU member states and 
europeans but as well to see through critical lenses the motivations 
laying behind new europeans joining the Union. The European 
integration theory sheds light to the current debates, institutions, rules 
and norms dictating europeanization and enlargement towards external 
actors. I argue that in order to understand how europeanization impacts 
external actors, it is fundamental to review theoretically the political and 
institutional unification of the EU, how that is translated in the EU legal 
framework, the treaties, and most importantly what are the modes and 
application of EU governance which engender mechanisms of 
europeanization exercised by the Union, understood as both Member 
States and institutions. How does this unfold in the EU policy towards 
the Western Balkans?  
I maintain that the EU was born and in its core remains an economic 
project. The theories I review are those concerned with socio-economic 
                                                          
1 Cf. table 2.1 Main approaches to integration provided in F. Andreatta, “Theory and the European 
Union’s International Relations”, in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.), International Relations and the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 28. 
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issues of ‘low politics’and that albeit in different degrees see both the 
institutions and the Member States as central actors in devising EU 
policy.2 Following a synthetic analysis below, I argue that for the 
purpose of this study, concerned with the enlargement policy towards 
Albania, as part of the wider Western Balkans region, the enlargement 
policy of the EU can be viewed best under intergovernmental lenses. 
 
2.1.1 Neo-functionalist Theories and EU Integration 
Neo-functionalism represents a theoretical lens through which to study 
EU integration and its effects. Like liberals, neo-functionalists were 
persuaded that ‘low politics’ focused on socio-economic matters 
affecting citizens were true motive of integration.3 Integration, thus 
would come as a result of improving socio-economic conditions and 
increasing opportunities for development and growth for Europeans. 
Neo-functionalism has gained prominence in academic research of EU 
integration and has been increasingly employed by researchers. Its 
pioneers have been Ernst B. Haas and Leon Lindberg who were 
interested in EU integration as a mean through which to create a set of 
hypotheses to be tested in other settings. Integration comes as the 
result of interactions between individuals within a system that facilitate 
agreements favorable to the whole collectivity.4 The process of 
‘functional spill-over’ maintains that integration within a sector would 
lead to integration in additional sectors. The process eventually 
becomes self-sustained promoting the creation of a supranational 
political entity in Brussels.  
A second type of the spill-over process has been defined by George as 
‘political’ spill-over, in which both supranational actors i.e European 
Commission and subnational actors i.e interest groups within member 
                                                          
2 Ibid., p. 24. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See E. B. Haas, “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process”,  
International Organization, vol. 15, no. 3, 1961, pp. 366-392; L. N. Lindberg, The Political 
Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963 p. 123, 
cited in M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, (ed.), Debates on European Integration: A Reader, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; L. N. Lindberg and S. A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: 
Patterns of Change in the European Community, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1970. 
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states, advocate for further integration.5 Haas argued that the 
subnational actors interested in a given sector had to engage with the 
supranational authority in charge of said sector. It would not be long 
until benefits of integration would materialize and cause of shift in 
attention from national to supranational entity, becoming an incentive 
for further integration. On the other hand, the supranational actors such 
as the European Commission would welcome the newfound interest 
and use it in favor of securing advantages for the Union by means of 
new agreements among member states on European policies. The 
‘community method’ in EU policy making emerged from neo-
functionalist perspective. This ‘procedural code’ would dictate 
expectations and behaviour both of the supranational actor, the 
European Commission and that of member states involved in the 
process.6 
Stone and Sandholtz in addressing European integration and 
supranational governance, evaluate the influence on one another of 
three causal factors: economic interdependence between countries; 
organizations’ and institutions’ ability of overcoming pressures and 
capacity to over-rule nation-state regulations; and primacy of the 
market in over-ruling national regulatory regimes.7 This perspective is 
grounded in constructivist approaches which favor norms and 
interaction as primary mode of informing international relations. Indeed, 
it is this frequent interaction and the resulting socialization in the 
beginning of the Union as a sole economic community that facilitated 
this process of comming together. Given the successes of economic 
interactions this theoretical approach recognizes the spillover effect that 
further pushed for integration accross other sectors. Together with 
cross-sectoral integration, supranational interest groups surface and 
their interlocutors will continue to be not only national governments but 
as well supranational structures. This dialogue, once established, 
needs to be regulated at the supranational level and demands 
                                                          
5 S. George, Politics in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991. See as well 
F. Andreatta, op. cit. p. 25. 
6 M. A. Pollack, “Theorizing EU Policy-Making”, in H. Wallace, M. A. Pollack and A. R. Young 
(eds.), Policy-making in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 6th edn., pp. 
17-19. 
7 A. S. Sweet and S. Wayne “European Integration and Supranational Governance”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 4, no. 3 1997, p. 297. 
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codification of said institutions. This is what has happened with the EU. 
Lee McGowan illustrates it best by underlining that the evolution of the 
EU as a supranational political entity came forth with the consolidation 
of the interest groups at the EU level which facilitated integration 
notwithstanding national disagrements.8 Neo-functionalist theoretical 
approaches have faced criticism “mainly because of the lack of 
empirical evidence for its predictions.”9 However, notwithstanding such 
criticism the theory has been used widely to explain the cross-sectoral 
integration in the last decade. Neofunctionalist maintain that states 
delegate part of their sovereignty in favor of ensuring the functioning of 
the pre-existent EU governance defined as supranational legal and 
policy framework. We understand that neofunctionalist approach rests 
on the will of the individual actor to further cooperation. Furthermore, 
the development of foreign policy and mechanisms for exerting an 
effective foreign policy rests on the on public opinion to provide it. 
 
2.1.2 Intergovernmentalism and EU Integration 
Compared to ‘high politics’ theories, like realism and federalism, the 
liberal worldview is certainly better apt to explain the EU integration. 10 
For one, liberals are less stringent, compared to realists, in defining 
actors in the international realm, where international organizations are 
as well recognized as actors. Moreover, liberals do believe there is 
space for cooperation between states and accept the successes 
attained in this by the EU.11 Ruggie et al. underline that liberals shared 
with neo-functionalists the prominence of ‘low politics’ and that of 
cooperation, but they could not dismiss the realist reluctance of ceding 
national sovereignty.12 
                                                          
8L. McGowan, “Theorising European Integration: Revisiting Neo-Functionalism and Testing its 
Suitability for Explaining the Development of EC Competition Policy?”, European Integration 
Online Papers, vol. 11, No. 3, 2007. 
9 M. Godowska, “The Relevance of Neofunctionalism in Explaining European Integration in Its 
Origins and Today”, Journal for Perspectives of Economic Political and Social Integration vol. 
18, no.1–2, 2012, pp. 145–155.  
10 Cf. table 2.1 Main approaches to integration provided in F. Andreatta, op. cit. p. 28. 
11 Ibid., p. 32. 
12 See J. G. Ruggie, P. J. Katzenstein, R. O. Keohane, and P. C. Schmitter, “Transformations in 
World Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas*” Annual Review of Political 
Science, vol. 8, 2005, pp. 271-296. 
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Intergovernmentalism, for one, stands in direct contrast with neo-
functionalist theories. The deepening of EU integration, for scholars like 
Stanley Hoffman and Andrew Moravcsik, relies on the will of sovereign 
states. Moravcsik was among the first to argue that liberal 
intergovernmentalism in Europe was the result of sovereign states 
aiming to further their individual national interests.13 Indeed, Moravcsik 
has argued that the EU “strengthens the state”, more specifically that 
“EC institutions strengthen the autonomy of national political leaders 
vis-a-vis particularistic social groups within their domestic polity”.14  
Under these premises EU integration within an institutionalized legal 
framework is possible through three different steps in 
intergovernmental interaction: defining national preferences; bargaining 
process between sovereign states; the option of institutional choice and 
protection of national sovereignty.15 In the first step national leaders 
compile both domestic  costituencies interests and own interests and 
use these to define their national preferences toward the EU. Contrary 
to what neo-functionalist maintain, national preferences are defined by 
interests of different parties and institutions in member states that 
reflect different economics and are not shaped by participation at the 
supranational level. In the second step the governments take a seat in 
the bargaining table where the relative power of each member state is 
embodied in the final agreement and where there is no space of 
influence for international institutions. This is the point of departure from 
the neo-functionalists who praised the mediating role of the European 
Commission and the celebration of member state’s interest in the 
Council. Intergovernmentalist underline the bargaining power, package 
deal offers and side payments in the EU decision making.16 In the third 
and final step, Moravcsik underlines the importance of institutional 
choice in decision making – opting for QMV or delegating national 
authority to supranational actors like the European Commission or the 
European Court of Justice – in order to assure states abide by their 
mutual commitments. There is an ever present assumption in all of the 
                                                          
13 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to 
Maastricht, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998, p.18.  
14 A. Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, 1993 p. 507. 
15  Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op.cit., p. 18. 
16 Pollack, op.cit., pp. 19-21. 
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three steps above: member states have fixed preferences and act to 
attain those preference within the legal framework of the institutions 
within which they interact.17 
In opposition to neorealist models, Moravcsik juxtaposes “two types of 
general international relations theory often seen as contradictory: a 
liberal theory of national preference formation and an 
intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining and institutional 
creation” 18. It is clear that by combining the intergovernmental 
bargaining with rational state interests Moravcsik comes to the 
conclusion that governments are assumed to act purposively in the 
international arena, but on the basis of goals which are defined 
domestically, thus “the foreign policy goals of national governments are 
viewed as varying in response to shifting pressure from domestic social 
groups”.19 Wincott, criticizes this stance as Moravcsik cannot account 
on where state interests come from.20 Fioretos also maintains that 
preferences are the ‘weakest’ element of Moravcsik liberal 
intergovermentalism. Fioretos argues that it is “not clear how 
governments discriminate between their own preferences and those of 
domestic groups”. 21 It seems as if Moravcsik ignores “domestic 
interdependence between interest groups and governments”.22 
Furthermore it has been argued that Moravcsik’s intergovernmentalist 
bias neglects supranational pressures within the EU by granting 
prominence to interstate negotiations.23 Indeed sociological and 
constructivist institutionalism maintain that institutions could shape 
actors’ preferences more deeply than envisioned by rational-choice 
perspectives. Wincott underlines that it is the supranational character of 
the EU that favors said interstate negotiations. Moravcsik account of 
the EU - at the lowest common denominator – the intergovernmental 
                                                          
17 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op.cit., pp. 19-20. 
18 Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the European Community, op.cit., p. 482. 
19 Ibid., p. 481. 
20 D. Wincott, “Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an everyday critique of 
liberal Inter-governmentalism”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 33, no. 4, p. 601. 
21 K. O. Fioretos, “The Anatomy of Autonomy: Interdependence, Domestic Balances of Power, 
and European Integration”, Review of International Studies vol. 23, no. 3 1997, p. 299 
22 Ibid., p. 301 
23 Wincott, op.cit., pp. 602-603. 
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bargaining process seem to neglect this supranational framework that 
defines the possibilities in interstate negotiations.  
Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, further bring the example of negotiations that 
brought about the Amsterdam Treaty.24 The authors maintain that those 
that had sponsored this legally binding document had vested interests 
in its approval.25  
In researching a pattern of political action of EU member states since 
1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 
maintain that subsequent treaties only confirmed the state of affairs as 
defined in Maastricht and no further political uniformity was achieved. 
They view EU integration as a pure supranationalism, seeing that EU 
institutions and EU governance have “concentrated the powers and 
activities of national governments and national representatives.”26 In 
this view the legislative process in the EU is overly complex due to the 
fact that largely it is rooted outside the supranational character of the 
EU system. Ultimately, Bickerton et al. argue that the progressive 
reform of EU structures is dependent on number of powerful states—
such as Germany and France—at the detriment of its supranational 
character. Therefore, liberal intergovernmentalism understands the EU 
integration as the result of powerful states delegation of powers to a 
supranational entity. Indeed, it is by focucing on the nation-state in the 
international system, that Bickerton et. al. manage to trace a 
progressive economic and political integration within the EU. In this 
view the Treaty of Lisbon is the result of collective cooperation of 
member states in ensuring positive results for all those involved, that 
brings about the need of controlling the outcome. Philippe Schmitter 
maintains that this would be an impossible mission for any nation-
state.27 
2.1.3 Institutionalism and EU Integration 
                                                          
24  A. Moravscik, and K. Nicolaïdis, “Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, 
Institutions”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 37, no. 1, 1999, p. 63. 
25  Ibid. 
26  C. J. Bickerton, D. Hodson, and U. Puetter “The New Intergovernmentalism: European 
Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era:The New Intergovernmentalism”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 53, no. 4, 2015, p. 717. 
27  P. C. Schmitter, “Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of Neofunctionalism”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 12, no. 2, 2005, pp. 255-272. 
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For realists the international system is marred by distrust among states, 
as anarchy reigns and in such uncertain environment states are self-
centered rational players aiming to increase their gain in a zero-sum 
game. 28 Institutionalists share realists’ assumptions, however, consider 
cooperation - given the presence of certain conditions - an adequate 
response.29 
Institutionalists build their argument around the power of institutions - 
conceived as rules, norms, practices, and decision-making procedures 
- in informing expectations and getting around mistrust and uncertainty 
that affects co-operation. This is achieved by repeated, constant and 
long-term interactions which extend the lifespan of the game while 
creating room for socialization and thus provide incentives for 
complying with agreed rules and regulations through which benefits 
may extend beyond a mere do ut des practice in the here and now, to a 
cooperation that may effectively yield diffuse reciprocities. Indeed, 
institutions through the repeated and constant interaction provide 
greater insight on behavior of its members. In this cooperation 
credibility is key, and it oftentimes comes in the form of carrots and 
sticks where compliance is rewarded and defection is severely 
sanctioned. Compliance with agreed set of rules and norms allow for 
greater coordination and efficiency among states as negotiations occur 
within established frameworks and multilaterally with greater 
opportunities for gains and lower transaction costs.30 Institutionalism 
provides a safe home for international law and cooperation debunking 
realism interpretation of the same theoretical assumptions. 
Institutionalism as a tool for analyzing the EU obtained a scholarly 
recognition in parallel with and as a reaction to the introduction of 
institutions within theories like Marxism and neo-realism. In the 1950s-
1970s politics was analyzed outside the framework of institutions 
considered secondary players to other causal mechanisms, as is the 
distribution of power. However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
                                                          
28 A. M. Slaughter, “International Relations, Principal Theories”, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law Online Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 
p. 2. 
29 R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press,1984. 
30 Slaughter, op. cit., p. 3.  
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institutionalism developed with three primary branches, each of which 
conceived institutions and their relevance differently.31  
American political scientist coined rational-choice institutionalism in an 
effort to factor US Congressional institutions in legislative behavior and 
policymaking. While earlier accounts of rational-choice models had 
read politics as a series of simple-majority voting, Kenneth Shepsle 
maintained that the committee system, and what later, within the EU, 
would come to be known as the practice of comitology could be 
instrumental in solidly informing legislative outcomes.32 Scholars such 
as Moe, Kiewiet and McCubbins have studied in detail the results of 
such practice in the agenda setting and the difficulties associated to 
pass on the floor any associated amendment on draft legislation. 
Moreover these studies have ventured in creating ‘principal-agent’ 
models aiming at investigating the conditions under which legislative 
principals are able to restrain the exercise of the delegated powers of 
their respective agents.33 Hence, rational-choice institutionalism 
maintains that institutions are instrumental to maximizing political profit 
of principal actors.  
Institutions exert thus a significant influence in the voting architecture 
while vetoing alternatives as acceptable or unacceptable resulting in a 
“structure-induced equilibrium”; Shepsle continued his studies in the 
same direction concentrating in “equilibrium institutions”, how these are 
structured to secure mutual benefits and how do institutions reform or 
endure over time. 34 Other scholars like Epstein and O’Halloran,35 and 
                                                          
31 J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political 
Life”, The American Political Science Review, vol. 78, no. 3, 1984, pp. 734-749; P. A. Hall, and R. 
C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, Political Studies, vol. 44, 
1996, pp. 936–957. 
32 K. A. Shepsle, “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting 
Models,” American Journal of Political Science vol. 23, 1979. pp. 23-57; K. A. Shepsle 
“Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions” in Herbert F. Weisberg, (ed.), Political 
Science: The Science of Politics, New York, Agathon, 1986, pp. 51-82. 
33 T. M. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 
28, No. 4, 1984, pp. 739-777; R. D. Kiewiet and M. D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
34 Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, op. 
cit., 23-57; Shepsle, Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions, op. cit., pp. 51-82. 
35 D. Epstein, and S. O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to 
Policy Making Under Separate Powers, Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
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Huber and Shipan36 have spearheaded a “transaction-cost approach” 
aiming at reducing transaction cost in devising public policy.  
Rational-choice institutionalism was coined and applied to the 
American context at first, but it did not take long before the same 
approach was applied to the EU. In focusing on cooperation and 
ordinary legal procedure or co-decision scholars maintained that it was 
reductive to conceive decision making as a sole product of 
intergovernmental bargaining. Instead they argued that formal rules 
and procedures have a weight in formulating policy outcomes. 37 
Scholars George Tsebelis, Geofrey Garrett, among others have 
factored in rational choice terms both the functioning and the choice of 
EU institutions, which have been widely used in comparative political 
studies.38 
On the other hand sociological institutionalism have conceived 
institutions in a way that would allow for them to embody, in addition to 
formal rules, as well accepted practices and customs. Scholars 
maintaining this approach define institutions as self-molding actors 
influencing their own preferences beyond what could have been 
observed by rational-choice approaches. 39  
The middle way has been taken by historical institutionalists, which 
have focused on how institutions over a period of time may come to 
control the behavior of the actors who founded them.40 In this view, 
institutions create ‘increasing returns’ as they positively enforce actors 
to obey by their rules, proportionally adapting to a shift in 
circumstances.41 
                                                          
36 J. D. Huber, and C. R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of 
Bureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge, UK., Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
37 F. W. Scharpf, “The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European 
Integration”, Public Administration vol. 66, 1988, pp. 239-278. 
38 G. Garrett, and G. Tsebelis, “An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism”, International 
Organization, vol. 50, 1996, pp. 269–99. 
39 Pollack, op.cit., p. 22 
40 P. A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention In Britain and 
France, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986; S. Steinmo, and K. Thelen, Structuring 
politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis, Cambridge, UK., Cambridge 
University Press, 1992. 
41 P. Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", The American 
Political Science Review 94, no. 2, 2000, pp. 251-267. 
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Hence, policy-making is tightly associated with intertia, or ‘lock-ins’, that 
allow for institutions maintain equilibrium notwithstanding shifts in 
politics. It follows that path-dependence is possible even when casual 
events happening in particular time and space may affect the chain of 
events and decisions that follow. 42 Thus earlier decisions or policies 
influence decision-makers to continue down the path of institutional and 
political legacy even when doing so presents an unsatisfactory result. 
These insights have contributed to the EU integration literature closely 
researching the evolution of European integration.43 Pierson has 
studied in length path-dependence applied to the EU integration 
evolution historically.44 In focusing on the conditions under which the 
European Union further integrated the author explores path-
dependency grounding his study in a rationalist approach. Pierson 
maintains that notwithstanding the primary input and role played by 
member states in devising EU institutions, the former may not always 
be in the position to restrain the morphing of institutions and policies 
they created. A first reason may be found in the behavior of member 
states government, may agree to loss of sovereignty in favor of the EU, 
swayed by short term electoral concerns, typical to democratic 
societies. A second reason may be found in results of institutional 
decisions which member states may be able to correct or not through 
further decisions. A third reason may be found in the shift of 
preferences caused by elections and newly formed governments that 
receives as legacy an acquis communautaire negotiated by in 
accordance with preferences of previous governments. A final reason 
of may be found in the institutional lock-in caused both by top-down 
pressures resisting change and bottom-up support as public opinion 
adapts and partakes in vested interests of continuing down the path of 
established EU policies.  
 
2.1.4 Conclusion 
                                                          
42 D. Acemoglu, and J. A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and 
Poverty, New York, Crown, 2012.  
43 K. A. Armstrong, and S. Bulmer, The Governance of the Single European Market, Manchester, 
UK., Manchester University Press, 1998. 
44 P. Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis”, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, 1996, pp. 123-163. 
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In addition consulting these debates, one can deduct the possibilities 
laying ahead the future for the EU, in a time when finding a balance 
between widening and deepening seems to be more than ever 
necessary.45 In the European level, the deepening voices have come to 
the fore. One EU Member State diplomat in Tirana, when asked on the 
ideal trade-off between widening and deepening, stated “we do not 
know where Europe is going”.46 Europeans perceive the EU to be 
undemocratic, it is important to have this discussion.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the review of the theoretical framework 
provides the starting point in discussing modes of EU governance and 
the extent of success achieved in europeanization in Albania as a case 
study, but more generally in the Western Balkans candidate countries. 
As, briefly discussed above the low politics theoretical lenses, compile 
manners and motivation for EU integration centred on the common 
interest which may as well be the lower common denominator given 
that the EU remains largely an economic project.  
Neofunctionalist theoretical lenses, are adopted mainly to trace the 
economic progress within the EU given both at the functional and 
political sways toward a tighter integration that can benefit all. Indeed, 
neo-fuctionalism portrays the reality of the functioning of the EU internal 
market and monetary and common commercial policy which is an 
exclusive compentence of the EU and where the three causal factors 
analized by Stone and Sandholtz that culminate in the market primacy 
of have made the case for Member States to delegate their authority to 
the EU.47 As a result of the success in market integration the cross-
sectoral integration that ensued opened the way to new dialogues 
between Member States and EU institutions notably sparking different 
degrees of decision autonomy on part of the EU institutions. Based 
thus, ultimateley, on the will of individual actor to delegate its 
                                                          
45 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, Tirana, 12 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU 
Member State, interview, Tirana, 13 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of 
Embassies, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, 
Tirana, 19 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, 
Tirana, 02 February 2017; 
46 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017. 
47 See The European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 26.10.2012, 
OJ C 326 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 3. Cf. Sweet and Wayne op. cit., 
p. 297. 
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sovereignty in favor of pre-existing institutional and legal framework 
and thus further cooperation.    
Institutionalism shares realists concerns of uncertainty in a zero-sum 
game playing field. Nonetheless, in presence of certain conditions 
embraces cooperation. Institutions, by means of repeated and long-
term interactions – known as socialization - have the power to tame 
mistrust and uncertainty facilitating thus cooperation. Institutionalism 
assumes that Member States on the basis of socialization are willing to 
accept a loss today for a potential gain tomorrow. The ‘principal-agents’ 
analyses, when applied to the EU enlargement policy confirm that 
Member States (principals) do take every step of the way the decisions 
for the process to move forward, and even if, say the European 
Commission were to take a political initiative, say to recommend 
opening of negotiations toward a candidate country, said political act is 
only that, a recommendation. 48   
Intergovernmentalism recognizes, just like neo-functionalists, the 
weight of ‘low politics’ and cooperation in EU integration, however are 
reluctant to easily dismiss the issue of national sovereignty.49 EU 
integration relies on the will of Member States to further their national 
interests.50 The assumption is that Member States act purposefuly on 
domestic preferences.51 The national preferences shaped in their 
entirety by the interaction of domestic groups as in constituents and 
interest groups with national government. De facto, leaving no room to 
the supranational level to mold these preferences. The bargaining 
process, thus is carried by Member States, the agreement will be thus 
delineated by and imbued with condensed national interests. Inevitably 
to reach an agreement, in absence of any supranational mediation, the 
bargaining power, possible package deals and side payments drive EU 
decision making.52 Following these premises, norms and institutions 
                                                          
48 Cf. T. M. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization” American Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 28, No. 4, 1984, pp. 739-777; R. D. Kiewiet and M. D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
49 See J. G. Ruggie, P. J. Katzenstein, R. O. Keohane, and P. C. Schmitter, “Transformations in 
World Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas*” Annual Review of Political 
Science, vol. 8, 2005, pp. 271-296. 
50 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op.cit., p. 18.  
51 Cf. Wincott, op.cit., p. 601; Fioretos, op.cit., p. 301. 
52 Pollack, op.cit., pp. 19-21. 
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informed by national representative and national sovereign powers, 
serve as implementing factors and checks on collective enforcement.53 
I maintain, and attempt to prove throughout this thesis and especially in 
the following sections of this chapter, the EU enlargement policy has 
been and remained the intergovernmental policy par excellence. 
Moreover, initiatives like the Berlin Process showcase that certain 
powerful states like Germany and France continue to provide guidance 
and direction to the Union as a whole. 54 
 
2. 2 The EU Rule of Law  
Based on the previously treated theoretical debates and scholarly 
contributions we can argue that EU Member States would agree to a 
supranational legal system and hence enable an EU governance 
provided that the European Court of Justice was to warrant Member 
States’ authority vis-a-vis EU institutions; a common legal system 
would be an instrument for explaining and upholding the treaties and 
legislation produced by the functioning of the institutions;55 furthermore 
the EU institutions and Member States could avail themselves of a 
unified legal system facilitating cooperation and ensure compliance with 
supranational law. How does the Lisbon Treaty satisfy Member States 
conditions? What are the novelties or development brought about in 
matters of enlargement? Which are institutions’ competencies and 
powers in driving enlargement? These are a few questions I attempt to 
provide an answer to in the upcoming pages.  
 
 
 
2.2.1 The Lisbon Treaty: decision making and working of 
institutions 
                                                          
53  See Bickerton, et al. op. cit., p. 717. 
54  Ibid. 
55 K. J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule 
of Law in Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 5. 
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Upon an attentive evaluation, the Lisbon Treaty does not break with the 
past as regards the institutions role and functioning in policy-making 
and in adopting new legislation. Indeed, since the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the Member States devised an institutional 
framework whose core could be amended only upon ratification of all 
Member States as prescribed by their constitutional requirements.56 
The unanimity rule may very well explain why no fundamental changes 
were made to the role and functioning of EU institutions. Indeed 
unanimity has forged the path of compromise between supporters of 
supranationalism and those of intergovernmentalism “the two polar 
forces whose constant cycle of confrontation and accommodation” has 
defined “much of the EU’s institutional and constitutional 
development”.57” Indeed the EU institutional framework mirrors 
compromises between federalists who promote a supranational Europe 
and promoters of national sovereignty that see EU as a result of 
intergovernmental bargaining. 
The Lisbon Treaty main novelties, however, include coding all pre-
existent institutional practices that followed the entry in force of the 
TEU. Grainne de Búrca maintains that the inter-institutional balance 
achieved under the EC Treaty of 1957 had been deeply nuanced by the 
TEU in 1992 and by the formal and informal bodies and customs 
developed in the EU decision making.58 This is why the Convention on 
the Future of Europe brought representatives of the Member States to 
agree on drafting a new treaty – replacing the EC treaty of 1957 and 
the Treaty on the European Union of 1992 - aiming to fill the EU deficit 
                                                          
56 See A. Dashwood, “The Institutional Framework and the Institutional Balance” in M. 
Dougan and S. Currie (eds.), 50 years of the European Treaties: Looking back and 
Thinking Forward, Oxford, Hart, 2009, pp. 2– 4. It could be argued that the EEC’s 
institutional framework is traced back to the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) Treaty, 1951 where it established a High Authority, an Assembly, the Council of 
Ministers and a Court of Justice that served as a base for those of EEC in 1957.   
57  M. Dougan, “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds not Hearts”, Common Market 
Law Review, vol. 45, no. 3, 2008, pp. 617, 692.  
58  De Búrca, Grainne “The Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional 
Analysis” in P. Craig and G. de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1999, p. 55. For a broadly similar diagnosis, see also J.  Peterson and 
M. Shackleton, “The EU’s Institutions. An Overview” in J. Peterson and M. Shackleton 
(eds.), The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 
7. 
39 
 
in democracy, transparency and efficiency.59 After the missed 
opportunity of ratifying the Constitutional Treaty, the Member States 
came to the conclusion “that, after two years of uncertainty over the 
Union’s treaty reform process, the time has come to resolve the issue 
and for the Union to move on.”60 The Lisbon Treaty – contrary to the 
failed Constitutional Treaty – did not replace the founding treaties but 
substantially amended them by including previously reached 
compromises under the failed Constitutional Treaty.61 
To this day the EU decision making is dependent on an “institutional 
triangle” 62 which refers to the institutions created by the Rome Treaties 
in 1957: the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament 
which closely interdependent relations define EU policy making. 
Primarily, the Lisbon Treaty underlines that the Council continues to 
hold a primary role in EU decision-making as it acts upon the directions 
received by the European Council, which the Lisbon Treaty recognizes 
as a EU institution.63  Indeed, the institutional history of the EU ever 
since the Luxembourg Compromise shows Member States are “at the 
heart both of the Union’s legislative process and of its political 
process.”64 In 1986 with the Single European Act the European 
Parliament has seen an increasing role and power in the inter-
                                                          
59 See Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities, Official Journal of the European Communities 10.03.2001 OJ  
C 80, p. 85 and European Council of Laeken, Presidency Conclusions, 14 -15 December 2001, 
Annex I: Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union, in Bulletin of the European 
Union 2001, No. 12, pp. 19– 23. 
60  European Council of Brussels, Presidency Conclusions, 11177/07, 20 July 2007, p. 2. 
61  See e.g. P. Craig, ”The Treaty of Lisbon, process, architecture and substance”, European Law 
Review, vol. 33, no. 2, 2008, p. 158. See also H. Bribosia, “The Main Institutional Innovations of 
the Lisbon Treaty” in S. Griller and J. Ziller, (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty – EU Constitutionalism 
without a Constitutional Treaty?, New York, Springer, 2008, p. 57. Bribosia maintains that this is 
the case as the institutional reforms included to the Constitutional Treaty did not provide the 
grounds for it to be rejected in France and in the Netherlands.   
62  For the first ‘official’ use of this concept, see Report on European Institutions. Presented by the 
Committee of Three to the European Council, October 1979, retrieved 07 July 2015, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/999/. In part V of the report reference is made to a “triangular pattern that has 
already emerged in the years before Direct Elections, with the Parliament seeking to establish 
close and direct relations with the Council as well as Commission” and argues that “this approach 
would be an efficient one in terms of Community functioning, insofar as it would create a more 
complete and stable institutional balance.” 
63  Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union – Title I Common Provisions - Article 4 
TEU, 26.10.2012, OJ C 326. 
64 A. Dashwood,  “States in the European Union”, European Law Review, vol. 23, no.1, 1998, p. 
209. 
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institutional decision making process. Moreover, Member States control 
in the EU institutional framework may be witnessed in the stronger role 
reserved to the national parliaments.65  
Thus, the Lisbon Treaty has confirmed that the legislative and 
executive powers are shared between the (intergovernmental) 
European Council and the Council and the (supranational) European 
Parliament and European Commission.66 How do these interact in 
decision making process regarding EU enlargement policy and more 
specifically which is the procedure and which are the roles played by 
the ‘institutional triangel’ in the accession process? I synthesize below 
the accession process and the steps along the EU ladder, followed by 
the analysis of the power these institutions hold under Lisbon Treaty.   
A country that “respects the values” of the EU and is committed to 
“promoting them” may address its application to the Council which upon 
consultation with the European Commission and having received its 
positive opinion and consent of the European Parliament acting by a 
majority of its members, shall by unanimty grant the candidate status to 
the country.67 Furthermore upon receiving a positive recommendation 
by the European Commission the Council may decide by unanimity 
vote to open negotiations. Before opening said negotiations, the 
European Commission performs a “screening” of the acquis and thus 
measures the level of alignment of national legislation with the acquis 
communautaire and if appropriate set benchmarks to be met prior to 
opening negotiations. Upon the evaluation of the European 
Commission the Council always by unanimity may open a new 
negotiation chapter. Upon satisfactory results the Commssion may 
recommend to provisionally close a chapter. On which the Council 
decides by unanimity. Upon concluding the negotiations for all 
chapters, the terms and conditions, additional safeguard clauses and 
transitional arrangements are embeded into the accession treaty 
between the Member States and the candidate state. Upon European 
Parliament consent and unanimity vote in the Council the accession 
treaty may be signed. Upon signature the treaty is submited by the high 
contracting parties for ratification as prescribed by their constitutional 
                                                          
65 M. Dougan, “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds not Hearts”, Common Market Law 
Review, vol. 45, no. 3, 2008, p. 693. 
66 P. Craig, ”The Treaty of Lisbon, process, architecture and substance”, European Law Review, 
vol. 33, no. 2, 2008, p.158. 
67 Article 98 ECSC, Article 237 EEC, Article 205 EAEC, which were merged in Article O Treaty 
of the European Union in Maastricht and now with Lisbon Treaty Article 49 TEU. 
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rules. 
The European Council is acknowledged as an EU institutions under the 
Lisbon Treaty. Article 15 (1) TEU reiterates “[t]he European Council 
shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development 
and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof” 
clarifying that it will be upon the Council, the European Commission 
and the European Parliament to translate said directions in policy and 
decision-making. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty entrusts the 
European Council with the power to take legally binding decisions of a 
“quasiconstitutional” or “high-politics” nature.”68 On the other hand, the 
role of the Council as defined by Article 16(1) TEU “shall, jointly with 
the European Parliament, exercise legislative and budgetary functions. 
It shall carry out policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down 
in the Treaties.”69  
The European Commission is endowed with the power to “take 
appropriate initiatives” serving “the general interest of the Union”. 70 It 
does so by enforcing the application of the Treaties, and ensuring the 
functioning of EU institutions is in line with treaty provisions.71 
Moreover, Union legislative acts may be adopted only upon a 
Commission proposal, unless otherwise prescribed by the Treaties.72 
As far as it concerns the President of the European Commission Article 
17(6) underlines that s/he shall “lay down guidelines within which the 
Commission is to work”.73 In the following chapter of this thesis I 
explore the politics behind the EU enlargement and President Juncker’s 
political leadership of the European Commission. 
The European Parliament must consent to any new accession by 
majority vote of its members. Moreover, due to its legislative powers 
and most importantly those on financial matters the European 
                                                          
68  M. Dougan, “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds not Hearts”, Common Market Law 
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326. 
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Parliament directly influences the amounts allocated to the Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA).74 Moreover, for the conclusion of a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement, the consent of the European 
Parliament is crucial.75 The European Parliament’s Committee on 
Foreign Affairs is constantly in contact with the Commissioner for 
enlargement negotiations, high-level government officials and 
representatives of civil society. Parliament resolutions on European 
Commission’s country reports and enlargement strategy give a 
considerable input in EU enlargement policy. The European Parliament 
moreover supports the accession efforts of candidates and potential 
candidates by maintaining an open dialogue and bilateral cooperation 
with counterpart’s national parliaments.  
 
2.2.2 Application of the Treaty Procedure - a brief history 
After having reviewed treaty provisions and institutional functioning 
regarding the enlargement policy and accession procedure, I attempt to 
follow with an analysis on the development of the enlargement policy.  
Enlargement does not only extend rights and obligations to new 
member states and citizens but as well introduces new policy and 
institutional needs that changes the EU legal framework. These 
changes have been implemented and agreed on in the Treaties, a 
result of a consistent exchange between Member States and EU 
institutions. These legal developments have answered specific 
demands of each enlargement round. The acquis communautaire, the 
EU member states, their public opinion and the gatekeeper elites may 
all provide a certain input in the EU governance that may result in 
emphasizing certain developments in a given enlargement round. At 
the same time, the applicant profile, EU Member States champions and 
detractors for its possible membership, regional geopolitical and 
geoeconomic plays, all of which may determine the interpretation of 
enlargement rules and their application.  
                                                          
74 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union – Article 14 (1) TEU, 26.10.2012, OJ C 
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75 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - Article 218(6) 
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The Schuman declaration laid the ground for the European project to 
be “open to the participation of the other countries of Europe”. 76 Any 
country in order to be admitted had to be “European” and “willing to 
take part” in the European project. The original Community Treaties 
proposed three enlargement models and procedural arrangements 
mirroring the roles given to Member States and thus, different 
understandings of integration.  
 
2.2.2.1 Enlargement dependent on the Member States 
The first enlargement model was very much dependent on Member 
States who de facto dictated the terms of accession. The Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in its 
Article 98 provided that:  
“Any European State may apply to accede to this Treaty. 
It shall address its application to the Council, which shall 
act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the High 
Authority; the Council shall also determine the terms of 
accession, likewise acting unanimously. Accession shall 
take effect on the day when the instrument of accession 
is received by the Government acting as depository of 
this Treaty.” 
Hence, the enlargement was carried by the ECSC through the Council 
and High Authority without any mention to the Member States or any 
Accession Treaty. Despite the fact that the unanimity requirement 
within the Council would allow any Member State to veto the process, 
the Coal and Steel Community seemed the one to embody the 
prerogative to open the Treaty to other high contracting parties. Once 
the Treaty was opened, the enlargement of the organization was to be 
effective when the instrument of accession with  possibly the terms of 
accession defined by the Council were received by the French 
government. 
A second enlargement model was envisaged by the unrealized  
European Political Community (EPC) which while grounded on the 
                                                          
76 The European Union, “The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950”.  
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above mentioned elements, did include supranational elements. 
Reference is made to the Article 116 (1) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Political Community:  
 “1. Accession to the Community shall be open to the 
Member States of the Council of Europe and to any other 
European State which guarantees the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms mentioned in 
Article 3. 
2. Any State desirous of acceding to the present Statute 
shall address its request to the European Executive 
Council. The latter shall inform the Council of National 
Ministers and the Parliament of the Community 
accordingly. 
3. Accession shall form the subject of an instrument of 
accession which shall form a Protocol to the present 
Statute. This instrument, which shall contain the 
necessary amendments to the Statute, shall be drawn up 
by the European Executive Council with the concurrence 
of the Council of National Ministers. It shall be submitted 
to the Parliament of the Community for approval. 
4. The instrument of accession shall come into force as 
soon as the European Executive Council has 
promulgated it, and the State concerned has deposited 
its instrument of ratification with the European Executive 
Council . . . .“ 
Similarly to Article 98 ECSC, the enlargement procedure under EPC 
did not provide a role for the Member States. Indeed, the Community 
institutions, including the Parliamentary organ were to evaluate and 
approve the enlargement to other high contracting parties. Moreover, 
this time around, substantive conditions of admission were introduced. 
Article 3 EPC makes reference of the need to comply with “[…] the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, together with those of 
the protocol signed in Paris on 20 March 1952, are an integral part of 
the present Statute”. 
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It should be noted that the above mentioned process was never used 
by EPC as it never expanded, worthy of note is the fact that the same 
ECSC was enlarged in the context of enlargement of European Atomic 
Energy Community (EAEC) and the European Economic Community 
(EEC) established by the Rome Treaties for a third integration model, 
as Article 237 EEC, and similarly article 205 EAEC recite: 
“Any European State may apply to become a member of 
the Community. It shall address its application to the 
Council which, after obtaining the opinion of the 
Commission, shall act by means of a unanimous vote. 
The conditions of admission and the amendments to this 
Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an 
agreement between the Member States and the applicant 
State. Such agreement shall be submitted to all the 
contracting States for ratification in accordance with their 
respective constitutional rules.” 
The enlargement procedure envisaged in both EAEC and EEC differed 
from the previous devised mechanisms. Firstly, the EEC and EAEC 
Treaties presented the novelty of “member[ship] of the Community” 
much like the EPC Treaty. Thus suggesting the need and effectively 
introducing a political commitment on the part of the applicant. This 
requirement seemed to be missing from the previous ECSC Treaty. 
Secondly, the role of Member States is clearly spelled out in Articles 
237 EEC and 205 EAEC where both Member States and applicant(s) 
were active part in the negotiation and acceptance of the terms of 
admission. On the contrary in Article 98 ECSC the terms of admission 
were effectively an executive decision taken by the Council, with 
practically no involvement of Member States or applicant(s). 
Ever since the Rome procedure has been the standard mechanism 
applied to membership. However, Member States were to build on it 
with additional requirements. An example of it can be seen in the UK 
accession to the EEC where the Council of Ministers noted that “one 
Member State  considered the re-establishment of the British economy 
must be completed before Great Britain’s request can be considered”.77 
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A Member State, thus, could halt the enlargement process by invoking 
an additional argument despite the positive opinion of the Commission 
affording the opening of negotiations.78 Moreover, in the Hague Summit 
(1969) the representatives of the Member States agreed that: 
“In so far as the applicant States accept the Treaties and 
their political finality, the decisions taken since the entry 
into force of the Treaties and the options made in the 
sphere of development, the Heads of State or 
Government have indicated their agreement to the 
opening of negotiations between the Community on the 
one hand and the applicant States on the other. They 
agreed that the essential preparatory work could be 
undertaken as soon as practically and conveniently 
possible; by common consent, the preparations would 
take place in a most positive spirit.79” 
Each round of enlargement further enforced the above mentioned 
principle, whereby the applicants, in addition of accepting the Treaties 
and their political ideals, had to translate and implement the acquis 
through sound administrative and judicial system. Indeed the Seville 
European Council underlined that “[t]he candidate countries must take 
all necessary measures to bring their administrative and judicial 
capacity up to the required level”.80 Indeed any difficulty and delay to do 
so on part of the applicant would be overcome by means of transitional 
measures embeded in the Accession Treaty.81 
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2.2.2.2.The Member States and the acquis: towards an 
enlargement policy 
While Treaty provisions did set the basic rules for enlargement, 
Member States were never shy to introduce ad hoc additions to said 
rules to be applied on a specific enlargement round. In addition of being 
largely molded by Member States, rules defining enlargement - such as 
in Article 237 EEC -  were firm regarding the adoption of the acquis. 
The Member States representatives in The Hague would underline:  
“[t]he European Communities remain the original nucleus 
from which European unity has been developed and 
intensified. The entry of other countries of this continent 
to the Communities — in accordance with the provisions 
of the Treaties of Rome — would undoubtedly help the 
Communities to grow to dimensions more in conformity 
with the present state of world economy and technology.”  
Lastly, in the enlargement procedure as envisaged by the EEC, the 
applicant was in charge in preparing and fulfilling the substantive 
conditions for acceding to the Communities. 
The EU, taking into consideration previously adopted substantive 
conditions, further fleshed out accession requirements to determine the 
norms for enlargement. The European Council already in 1978 
expressed that “respect for and maintenance of representative 
democracy and human rights in each member State are essential 
elements of membership in the European Communities.”82 It was 
followed by the Declaration on Respect of Democracy and Human 
Rights of 1983 in Stuttgart.83These declarations came after a Common 
Declaration on Fundamental Rights signed in 1977 by the presidents of 
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the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council.84 
These new norms were specifically used for the Central Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) but since have been the stepping stone 
for enlargement used vis-à-vis the Western Balkans, Turkey and until 
March 2015 towards Iceland. 85 
Following on the European Commission suggestions86,the European 
Council in 1993 defined the Copenhagen criteria, based on which the 
EU membership was dependent on 
“stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy 
as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union. Membership 
presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union”. 87  
These criteria were then to be transposed in the framework of the 
Treaty provisions, in Article O of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
signed in Maastricht: 
“Any European State may apply to become a Member of 
the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, 
which shall act unanimously after consulting the 
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Commission and after receiving the assent of the 
European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute 
majority of its component members. The conditions of 
admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which 
the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall 
be the subject of an agreement between the Member 
States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be 
submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in 
accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.”88 
The criteria were further clarified in the 1995 Madrid European Council, 
where it was underlined that a mere political commitment to the acquis, 
as requested by the Hague Summit in 1969, would not suffice to secure 
accession. In addition, the candidate countries had to pay attention to 
their administrative capacities so that to ensure effective 
implementation of the acquis. 89 
Nonetheless, in the previous year, in the Essen European Council in 
order to launch the pre-accession strategy these norms were further 
developed. The European Council confirms associated countries “can 
become members of the European Union if they so desire and as soon 
as they are able to fulfil the necessary conditions”. 90 These had been 
laid “on a comprehensive strategy […] for preparing these countries for 
accession to the European Union” geared towards building “ structured 
relations which encourage mutual trust and will provide a framework for 
addressing topics of common interest”.91 
Furthermore, the European Commission had proposed a further 
consolidation of the pre-accession strategy, which was agreed during 
the Luxembourg European Council in 1997. 92Thus, the EU “accession 
partnerships and increased pre-accession aid” became an integral part 
                                                          
88 See C. Hillion, “The Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis”, in A. Arnull, and 
D. Wincott (eds), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003, p. 403; F. Hoffmeister, “Earlier enlargements”, in A. Ott, and K. Inglis 
(eds) Handbook on European Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process, T.M.C 
Asser Press, 2002, pp. 90–91. The Single European Act had previously accommodated the 
European Parliament’s desire to take a role in the enlargement process. Indeed, in article 49 TEU 
we encounter the conditionality set on EU values as defined in Art 6(1) TEU. 
89 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Madrid 15–16 December 1995.  
90 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Essen, 9–10 December 1994.  
91 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Essen, 9–10 December 1994. 
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of the accession process - defined through short, medium and long-
term accession priorities which applicants had to attain.93The new 
strategy introduced monitoring of the applicants who “[would] proceed 
at [their] own rate, depending on [their] degree of preparedness”.94  
It could be argued that since, the EU and its Member States have used 
the carrot of membership to gain influence in the candidate countries, 
to stir them into complying with burdensome structural reforms. The EU 
advocacy went as far as to involve European state building by pushing 
into the EU acquis and accession conditions, rules and principles of 
other regional organization. 95 The transformative power vested in the 
enlargement policy made of the EU a normative power in Europe. 
Enlargement delineated a model for member state, and - at the same 
time - underlined what was normality or the role in which the EU had 
been “catapulted into”.96 
As mentioned above, the norms of enlargement go far beyond the EU 
acquis. Thus, the pre-accession approach has raised some criticism of 
possible double standards, affecting the credibility of norms and values 
advocated by the EU. Ultimately, raising questions on the effectiveness 
of its normative power.97 The Lisbon Treaty may as well serve as an 
                                                                                                                               
92 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, 12 and 13 December 1997. 
93 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, 12 and 13 December 1997. 
94 On the pre-accession strategy, refer to P. Nicolaides,  “Preparing for Accession to the European 
Union: How to Establish Capacity for Effective and Credible Application of EU Rules” in M. 
Cremona (ed), The Enlargement of the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 
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95 H. Grabbe, A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central 
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University Institute, 1999; A. Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern 
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96 See H. Sjursen, Enlargement in perspective. The EU’s quest for identity, RECON Online 
Working Paper 2007/15; K. E. Smith, “The conditional offer of membership as an instrument of 
EU foreign policy: reshaping Europe in the EU’s image?” Marmara Journal of European Studies 
vol. 8, no.1-2, 2000, p. 33; J. Pelkmans, and A. Murphy, “Catapulted into leadership: the 
community’s trade and aid policies vis-à-vis Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Integration, 
vol. 14, no.2-3, 1991, p. 125. 
97 The flaws of conditionality in the enlargement context have been pointed out by large amount of 
scholarship, refer to: A. Albi, “Ironies in Human Rights Protection in the EU: Pre-Accession 
Conditionality and Post-Accession Conundrums”, European Law Journal, vol. 15, no.1, 2009, p. 
46;  
D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2008. 
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attempt to compensate the gap between the applied accession 
conditionality and membership obligations. The eligibility requirement 
established in Article 49 TEU, refers to “the values referred to in Article 
2” of the TEU, which includes “respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” Nevertheless, a 
full alignment of the two was not completed. 98 
 
2.2.2.2.1 The EU institutions role in enlargement  
The development of the accession process, including the country 
specific pre-accession strategy, underlines the strong role played by 
the European Council – read Member States – who would delegate 
their powers to the European Commission so that to implement the pre-
accession strategy and monitor the applicants progress. It is in this 
context, post-Copenhagen, that a paradigm shift is observed in 
enlargement as a policy: the EU is actively involved in assisting 
countries to prepare for accession with the European Council assisted 
by the European Commission to apply the EU governance. 99 Indeed, 
the pre-accession strategy inherently comprised a close cooperation 
between the European Commission, the Council and the European 
Council in defining, refining and implementing enlargement in line with 
the EU requirements. An example of this close cooperation can be 
seen in concluding an Accession Partnership (AP). The European 
Commission drafts the individual partnership document highlighting the 
priorities of the candidate country and the conditions on accession 
based on the Copenhagen Criteria. The Council then shall adopt the 
AP by qualified majority voting and only then it is submitted to the 
                                                          
98 See U. Sedelmeier, Ulrich, “After Conditionality: Post-accession Compliance with EU law in 
East Central Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 15, no. 6, 2008, p. 806; D. 
Kochenov, “A Summary of Contradictions: An Outline of the EU’s Main Internal and External 
Approaches to Ethnic Minority Protection”, Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review, vol. 31, no.1, 2008, pp. 1-51; C. Hillion, “Enlargement of the European Union: The 
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Fordham International Law Journal,  pp. 715-740. 
99 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Essen, 9–10 December 1994; Commission of the 
European Communities ,The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe For Accession, COM (94) 320 final, Brussels, 13 July 1994; 
Commission of the European Communities, Follow up to Commission Communication on ‘The 
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Europe for Accession’, COM(94) 361 final, Brussels, 27 July 1994.  
52 
 
candidates.100 Following the EC drafting and Council approval, the EU 
adopts a top-down approach - as the partnering country has no other 
option than to accept the partnership agreement in its entirety as no 
negotiation on it ever takes place.101 As a follow up, candidates’ 
progress in fulfilling the roadmap of priorities is transmitted to the 
European Council annually by the European Commission.102 These 
reports, reportedly inform the Council decision on and if - moving forth 
with the negotiations. However, following talks in the Brussels bubble, it 
is very rare that the European Commission does submit a 
recommendation (with a given content) to the Council without being 
‘instructed to’.103 While the European Council may have become a 
constitutive power, the European Commission became equally powerful 
in defining a prospective EU member state: politically, from an 
economic standpoint, legal framework, and administrative capacity. The 
intimate involvement of institutions was more evident than ever in the 
accession negotiations. Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that the 
Treaties provided only for Member States and the applicant state to be 
involved in these negotiations.104  
In an attempt to summarize, the-post Copenhagen EU enlargement 
encompasses substantive conditions, and non-EU norms that come 
together to allow the EU to engage actively and normatively in (EU 
Member) state building. This newly formed EU cosmos allowed for 
greater role and impact of the EU institutions as opposed to the state 
driven or ‘business as usual’ enlargement. Effectively enlargement 
became a common policy of the EU both in the substance and through 
the scope of the institutional framework engaged in it at all levels of EU 
governance. In the Treaties said policy and competences of the Union 
and Member States in the matter have not been spelled out neither has 
there been any debate concerning it. Its successful management relies 
                                                          
100 Council Regulation 622/98 ([1998] OJ L85/1); for a recent example of an AP, see Council 
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on close cooperation between institutions and Members states, 
cooperation that has seen its lowest level in the last years.105 
 
2.2.3. Renewed consensus for enlargement 
Following the big bang enlargement round and the unsuccessful 
Constitutional Treaty both the EU institutions and Member States 
revisited their position on EU enlargement through a “renewed 
consensus for enlargement”. 106   
In its 2006 Enlargement Strategy, the EU underlined that it “honors the 
commitments made to the countries already in the process, but is 
cautious in assuming any new commitments”.107  
The EU has used conditionality as an answer to the rising mistrust and 
dissatisfaction on the handling of its expansion. Conditionality has been 
set to apply already in the phase of the opening of the negotiations for 
accession. Upon receiving the European Commission 
recommendation, the Council defines the benchmarks to be met by the 
candidate for opening and closing of a particular chapter. 108 Failing to 
meet pre-established benchmarks may cause the suspension of the 
negotiations either by not opening a chapter or re-opening a 
provisionally closed one. The European Commission clearly states the 
                                                          
105 See J. Kelley, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaption in The new 
European Neighborhood Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44, no.1, 2006, pp. 29-
55; A. Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve 
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107 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, COM (2006) 
649 final, Brussels, 08.11.2006, p. 15.  
108 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007: Including 
annexed special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members, COM(2006) 649, p. 10. 
According to the “Benchmarks are a new tool introduced as a result of lessons learnt from the fifth 
enlargement. Their purpose is to improve the quality of the negotiations, by providing incentives 
for the candidate countries to undertake necessary reforms at an early stage. […] In general, 
opening benchmarks concern key preparatory steps for future alignment (such as strategies or 
action plans), and the fulfilment of contractual obligations that mirror acquis requirements. 
Closing benchmarks primarily concern legislative measures, administrative or judicial bodies, and 
a track record of implementation of the acquis. For chapters in the economic field, they also 
include the criterion of being a functioning market economy.” The substance of such benchmarks, 
and thus the evaluation of their attainment, is not public as it was suggested to further 
transparency. 
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link between conditionality and accession negotiations as “[t]he pace of 
negotiations depends on the pace of reforms on the ground” and 
maintains that ”the negotiations offer countries the opportunity to 
demonstrate their ability to complete the necessary reforms and meet 
all membership requirements”.109 Moreover, the candidates are to 
adopt all of the growing amount of European acquis - both ‘hard-law’ 
legislation and principles as defined by the European Court of Justice 
case law 110 - before accession. 111 In addition of underlining that 
enlargement policy was to be driven by a method of ‘strict and fair 
conditionality’, as exemplified in the 2006 Enlargement strategy, the EU 
sought “ways to foster public support for further enlargement, to 
address the enlargement challenges and to ensure the EU’s integration 
capacity [for] a renewed consensus on enlargement”.112 Which have 
been the results?  
The conditionality driven pre-accession approach has affected the 
enlargement procedure. Firstly, it increased EU leverage on the 
candidate comply with membership requirement. Nevertheless, this has 
been seen as a ‘tick the boxes’ exercise where at least formally reforms 
are adopted but where there is little to no substantial qualitative 
improvement in the domestic system. I delve concretely on the 
fundamentals for Albania’s progress in the accession path in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis. Secondly, conditionality applied to the opening or 
closing of the chapters has further limited the scope of negotiation 
between the parties as envisioned in Article 49(2).113 It further raises 
expectations of candidate countries that once the chapters are opened 
and closed, accession should be granted. Moreover, the number of 
chapters has grown up to 35 and proportionally so the benchmarks 
required to be met. All of the above mounts to additional difficulty for 
the candidate countries and possible delay in the way to accession. 
Thirdly, the process in itself is highly politicized and politically charged 
as the approval of the benchmarks and their fulfillment is dependent on 
                                                          
109 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007: Including 
annexed special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members, COM(2006) 649, pp. 5-6.   
110 More recently, there is been a shift to the ‘EU acquis’ notably in the context of enlargement. On 
this concept, C. Delcourt, “The acquis communautaire: Has the concept had its day?”. Common 
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the unanimous approval of the Member States, which continue to 
control the process.114 Moreover, the absorption capacity has been 
trumpeted as a further reason for Member States to consider or not EU 
further enlargement. 115 The commitment and respect of the acquis by a 
candidate country is purportedly an inherent assurance for the widening 
of the Union not to affect the scope of its deepening. Indeed the 
absorption capacity has been considered the fourth criterion as defined 
by the Copenhagen European Council, as “the Union’s capacity to 
absorb new members, [and keep] the momentum of European 
integration is in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate 
countries”. In the Corfu European Council the Member States 
underlined the need for an institutional reform to adapt the Union to the 
accession of the Central Eastern European states.116  
Indeed, the absorption capacity has inspired several treaty changes 
and to this day remains a paramount condition for enlargement. On one 
hand, the Amsterdam Treaty was received with criticism as 
unsuccessful in meeting enlargement needs.117 On the other, the 
provisions introduced by the Nice Treaty were barely sufficient to open 
the possibility of enlargement.118 However, the argument for institutional 
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reform was forcefully raised at the time of ratification of Lisbon Treaty, 
where the absorption capacity became condicio sine qua non for 
enlargement. 119 Public opinion has been a centerpiece in the 
enlargement decision. In this thesis, I do pay a particular attention in 
chapter four to the Albanian public opinion on the EU and European 
public opinion vis-à-vis enlargement. The acceding countries must be in 
the conditions to fulfill “obligations of Union membership and the Union 
must be able to function” both of these aspects are crucial to further 
communication efforts and earn Europeans’ support on EU 
enlargement.120In matters of enlargement, legitimacy and economic 
sustainability have come to be evaluated jointly to the absorption 
capacity. The special report on the Union absorption capacity as 
prepared by the European Commission with inputs of the European 
Parliament and upon request of the European Council states: 
“The EU’s absorption capacity, or rather integration 
capacity, is determined by the development of the EU’s 
policies and institutions, and by the transformation of 
applicants into well-prepared Member States […] 
Integration capacity is about whether the EU can take in 
new members at a given moment or in a given period, 
without jeopardizing the political and policy objectives 
established by the Treaties. Hence, it is first and foremost 
a functional concept.” 121 
Accordingly, the European Council concluded that “[a]s the Union 
enlarges, successful European integration requires that EU institutions 
function effectively and that EU policies are further developed and 
financed in a sustainable manner”.122Moreover, the European Court of 
Justice maintained that Article 237 EEC defines:  
“[A] precise procedure encompassed within well-defined 
limits for the admission of new Member States, during 
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Hillion (ed.), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach, Oxford, Hart, 2004, p. 23. 
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which the conditions of accession are to be drawn up by 
the authorities indicated in the article itself; thus the legal 
conditions for such accession remain to be defined within 
the context of that procedure without it being possible to 
determine the context judicially in advance [leaving the 
ECJ unable to] give a ruling on the form or subject-matter 
of the conditions which might be adopted.” 123  
The European Court of Justice has indeed validated the political nature 
intrinsic to enlargement where Member States have free reign. The 
literature has considered this decision to be an instance of “political 
question doctrine”.124 Interviews conducted both in Brussels and Tirana, 
indicate the need to open the debate over the future of the Union, 
possible institutional arrangements that may as well affect membership 
as we have known it to this day.125 
The EU has thus coined several labels for third countries in their path to 
accession. Indeed, a third country is ‘eligible’ upon meeting the 
substantive conditions set forth by the Treaties. An eligible country may 
apply to the Union to become a ‘potential candidate’ upon preliminary 
assessment of the European Council that the country has the 
perspective to become a Member State.126 A potential candidate 
becomes a ‘candidate’ upon positive evaluation by the European 
Council and positive opinion of the European Commission with the 
possibility to open negotiations. Moreover, a candidate becomes an 
‘acceding’ state upon signature of the Accession Treaty and open to 
ratification of the high contracting parties.127 Upon conclusion of the 
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ratification process the applicant becomes a Member State. 128 
Reading Article 49 TEU may be misleading in understanding the 
procedure of decision-making concerning the evaluation of a candidate 
country. It may suggest that the Council takes its decision upon 
consulting the European Commission and the European Parliament. 
However, the decision-making procedure starts with the Council 
requesting the European Commission to present its Opinion on the 
application for membership of a candidate country. 129  
In the case of Albania, the Commission’s Opinion on the country’s 
application was published only after the consultation held in the 
German Parliament, applying the amended ratification procedure 
prescribed under the Lisbon Treaty, following the judgment of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht accepting the Lisbon Treaty as compatible 
with the Basic Law.130 It acknowledged that while the EU has the 
structure of a federal state, its decision-making is dependent on 
international law, hence the EU abides by “the principle of the equality 
of states”. Thus in absence of democratic mechanisms respecting the 
above mentioned principle of equality that would allow the European 
people voice their will, “the peoples of the European Union 
[represented by] Member States, remain the decisive holders of […] 
Union authority”. 131 The judgement states the German Government 
should consult with the Parliament as 
“an amendment of the Treaty law can be brought about 
solely or decisively by the institutions of the European 
Union - albeit under the requirement of unanimity in the 
Council -, a special responsibility is incumbent on the 
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national constitutional bodies in the context of 
participation. In Germany, this responsibility for 
integration must on the national level comply with the 
constitutional requirements”. 132 
Indeed, this requirement has been extended to various stages of the 
enlargement process as in the case of the application submitted by 
Albania. While the consultation with the German Parliament is not 
binding for the government, it is preferred the two reach a common 
position.133 In absence of such agreement the enlargement may halt. 
While this requirement may further increase the bargaining power of 
Germany it may inspire similar domestic conditions in other Member 
States.134 Upon the German approval “[t]he Council decided to 
implement the procedure laid down in Article 49 of the Treaty on the 
European Union. Accordingly, the Commission [was] invited to submit 
its opinion”.135 
Another founder Member State of the European Union, France, has 
been cautious on further enlargement. Since 2005, the French 
Constitution provides that every future enlargement has to be approved 
by a referendum, which can be superseded by a 3/5 majority vote in the 
parliament to ratify the accession treaty. Thus, confirming both the 
political nature of enlargement and the weight of public opinion.136  
The analysis above exemplifies how each Member State singularly 
acquires the prerogative to evaluate an application even before the 
European Commission and the European Parliament can submit their 
views on the matter. It begs the question whether this practice may be 
acceptable in the view of Article 49 (1) TEU according to which the 
Council expresses its views upon receiving the opinion of the European 
Commission. Moreover, the Council has established conditions for the 
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preliminary assessment and transmitting the application to the 
European Commission. Hence, in the case of Serbia the European 
Commission was asked to submit its Opinion only after the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence137 and upon evaluation of Serbian reactions to it. 138 
All of the above further gives an opportunity for Member States to 
interpret, eventually slowing the process and have the upper hand in 
resolving lingering bilateral issues during pre-accession with candidate 
countries. 139 Admittedly, this is not a fair approach, as an EU Member 
State diplomat in Tirana put it, nonetheless, it is a practice used by all 
Member States.140  
 
2.2.4 Conclusion  
The European project originally was laid to be “open to the participation 
of the other countries of Europe”. 141 Nonetheless, soon - what became 
known as the EU – developed its own models and arrangements to 
enlargement. As I make the case throughout this section, while the 
adopted models for enlargement were three, effectively only two were 
ever used. All of them refer to ‘unanimous action’ within the Council 
and in the Treaty of Rome, the third model adopted and used to this 
day, clearly makes reference to the Member States and their 
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involvement in enlargement.  
However, ever since the Seville European Council, the applicants are 
asked take on additional measures to align their administrative and 
judicial capacities to the required level, as instrumental to effectively 
accepting and implementing the responsibilities defined in the Treaties 
and the acquis.142 This is one of the many possible examples of the 
proactive involvement of Member States to build on the adopted model 
with additional criteria that were increasingly adopted and applied to 
specific enlargement rounds. Already in 1978, the European Council 
would insert as conditions the respect of democracy and human rights 
which were clearly spelled out in the Europea Council in Copenhagen 
and to date are applied to the Western Balkans and Turkey. 143  
The European Union since the European Council in Essen had 
delineated a comprehensive strategy for assisting associated countries 
in their path to EU accession. 144 This support took the form of an 
accession partnership (AP) agreements and related aid to meet the 
defined priorities.145 It could be argued that with these AP agreements, 
the EU started its transformative quest and set its state building 
ambitions vis-à-vis aspiring applicants.  
The approach the EU had set based on achieving benchmarks and 
conditions has had an impact in enlargement. While arguably it has 
increased the leverage on candidate countries, it has often resulted as 
a non-consequential exercise of ticking boxes as we will see in the 
case study of Albania reforms are adopted but not heeded. Thus, 
remaining a lettre morte. Moreover, it creates the illusion that once the 
chapters and benchmarks are met the accession is an automated 
exercise devoid of political interference. The unanimity rule, is 
applicable in the approval of all the benchmarks and closing of 
chapters, affording to Member States control on the lengthy process 
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that have since brought the number of chapters to 35.146  
The politics applied to enlargement has been excused on the ground of 
the fourth criterion of Copenhagen, the absorption capacity of the EU. 
Originally, this was intended as an institutional arrangement to 
accommodate all Member States and maintain the proper functioning of 
the Union. However, with time this has gained another valence as it is 
assessed together with legitimacy and economic sustainability. Even 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Mattheus v Doego have signed 
on the political nature of enlargement and the free reign that Member 
States have on the matter.  
Following the big-bang enlargment the EU in its renewed consensus for 
enlargement would be cautious in taking on new commitments and tie 
any development to progress achieved by the single aspiring 
countries.147 
The Lisbon treaty has been seen as an improvement of the founding 
treaties and had no purpose to replace them. Indeed, Lisbon confirms 
the unanimity rule and thus tables no substantial change to the 
functioning of the EU institutions. Theoretically, it is in line with the 
selected intergovernmental lens through which to view enlargement 
towards Albania, and more generally towards the Western Balkans. 
Institutions, while formally coming to the front row of enlargement still 
are functional in implementing decisions taken by Member States.148 
The Treaty revision made in Lisbon served to codify existing practices 
whereby the EC, the EP and the Council form the institutional triangle 
upon which close relationship EU policy making is dependent. 
Referring specifically to enlargement, Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty 
does not assist in bringing clarity on applied accession conditionality. 
Admittedly, it is unclear how one can effectively measure compliance of 
                                                          
146 See European Commission, Iceland Negotiating Framework: Principles governing the 
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147 Cf. European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007: Including 
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the values and ideals it refers to. Thus, the EU has been severely 
criticized of raising the bar and of adopting double standards that 
ultimately undermine the credibility of norms and values advocated by 
the EU. So much so, as in the recent years, questions have been 
raised on the effectiveness of EU normative power both for its Member 
States and aspiring ones.149  
In conclusion, the EU member states remain at the forefront on 
enlargement. The public opinion is equally at the forefront of these 
political decisions be that through referendum provisions or simply the 
democratic confrontation on the election day EU Member States are 
reluctant to move forward with a policy that does not garner much 
consensus. The vague commitment on the part of the EU, since the 
renewed consensus for enlargement, and even more so with Juncker’s 
leadership of the EU Commission has allowed gatekeeper elites to 
further disengage from reforms. The EU engagement remains 
anchored to the geopolitical and geoeconomic strategy of the Western 
Balkans region, as we will see in the chapter three. All of the above 
have determined the interpretation of enlargement rules and their 
application.   
 
2.3 EU modes and rules of governance 
 
2.3.1 EU governance and its application to enlargement 
Following the development of enlargement as a policy and the direction 
given by Member States and the implementing role given to the EU 
institution I attempt to analyze and compile the EU modes of 
governance through which the EU yields mechanisms of 
Europeanization in external actors, most notably candidate countries. 
The term ‘governance’ which I use in here is the one used in the field of 
international relations most notably by Rosenau to introduce the idea of 
political order in the international realm under anarchy.150 The actors 
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interacting in the sphere of international politics bring about regulatory 
and persuasive policies that overcome the limits posed by anarchy. 
Institutionalization is part of this process and whenever the EU projects 
its formal rules and principles beyond the geographical scope of the 
Union, and thus expands its normative influence, the EU wields its 
governance.151 
European governance and Europeanization are like the input and 
output of what the EU is and what the EU does. The EU exerts its 
regulatory policy affecting the conduct of “public and private actors 
across a great variety of integrated policy areas” which results to a 
certain degree of Europeanization understood “as the domestic impact 
of, and adaptation to, European governance”.152 The point of departure 
for the analysis is again the EU regulatory policy.153 
European governance, especially in the case of enlargement, exceeds 
the realm of voluntary adoption of the acquis communautaire, instead 
presupposes consistent coordinated efforts aiming at producing 
mutually accepted and binding agreements.154The EU follows its 
internal mechanisms to sollicit europeanization namely hierarchy, 
market and network. 155 The EU is the promoter of its own model of 
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regional integration funded on “intensive multilateralism”;156 indeed, by 
power of example in contributing within international organizations 
advances the practice of multilateralism.157 The EU draws on its own 
experience, also, when committing to peace and prosperity  especially 
in its immediate neighbourhood. 158 Moreover, constitutional values of 
EU member states such as rule of law, democracy and human rights 
remain a fundamental point in the EU foreign policy agenda.159  
The EU has further supported these values by promoting development 
and doing so by contributing to the transnational markets’ regulation 
following a ‘neoliberal’ path of opening market opportunities and hence 
economic liberalization.160 The EU regulatory framework has, thus, 
expanded its reach and with it the EU policy-making with the rules and 
norms which inform it.161 
The European governance and its outputs in europeanization have 
been studied extensively within the framework of enlargement policy - 
in the words of the European Commission -  is EU’s “most successful 
foreign policy”.162 The enlargement policy exemplifies the normative 
power and the the EU traction on candidate countries.163 
                                                          
156 W. Wallace, “Europe after the Cold War: Interstate order or post-sovereign regional system?”, 
Review of International Studies vol. 25, no. 5, 1999, pp. 201-223. 
157 K. V. Laatikainen and Smith, K. E., “Introduction. The European Union at the United Nations: 
Leader, partner or failure?”, in K. V. Laatikainen and K. E. Smith (eds.), The European Union at 
teh United Nations:Intersecting Multilateralisms, Basingtoke, Palgrave, 2006, pp. 1-23. 
158 M. Farrell, “From EU model to external policy? Promoting regional integration in the rest of 
the word”, in S. Meuner and K. R. McNamara (eds.), Making History: European Integration and 
Institutional Change at Fifty., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 299-315. 
159 I. Manners, “Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies vol. 40, no. 2,  2002. pp. 235-258. 
160 S. R. Hurt, “Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union 
and ACP States and the end of the Lomé Convention”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no.1, 2003. 
pp. 161-176. 
161 G. Majone, (ed.), Regulating Europe, London, Routledge, 1996; J. Orbie, “A civilian power in 
the world? Instruments and objectives in European Union external policies”, in J. Orbie (ed.), 
Europe’s Global Role, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008, pp. 1-33.  
162 Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Sourthern neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final, 
Brussels, 11.3.2003, p. 5  
163 H. Grabbe, The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in 
Central and Eastern Europe, New York, Palgrave Macmillan 2005; F. Schimmelfennig and U. 
Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University 
Press, 2005. 
66 
 
Scholars have increasingly centred their attention to the candidate 
countries and the contextualised enlargement policy.164 In doing so, 
they have distanced themselves from more traditional parcours in 
foreign policy analysis and have embraced the institutionalist 
component of the EU actorness.165 The EU - seen under traditional 
analytical foreign policy lenses - has been criticized on many levels 
from lacking the operational mandate and competences, and dubbed 
incoherent and inconsistent in its foreign policy approach.166  
Nevertheless, the EU governance is understood as institution building, 
rules’ projection and regulatory policies. This change of perspective is 
noticeable in a shift on the object of study. Contrary to the traditional 
state centric foreign policy analysis, the governance approach focuses 
on definite groups of norms and regulatory policies and their external 
projection.167 On the EU realm scholars such as Héritier and Tömmel 
have understood the governance approach as a criticism of the 
supranational binding norms.168 Beyond the EU, however, it has gained 
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prominence for having extended EU authority. 169 Scholars like Michael 
Smith170 and Sandra Lavenex171 have identified a spectrum of EU 
governance based on shifts in regulatory and organizational 
boundaries. Thus, “external governance takes place when parts of the 
acquis communautaire are extended to non-member states”.172  
These range from the adoption in full of the acquis communautaire to a 
more selective one. The enforcement of these agreeements is 
proportional to the commitment adopted and goes from judicial and 
political enforcement to bona fide principle of conduct. 
Indeed, “governance by conditionality” has been the means of 
projecting EU values, rules and regulations beyond its territory under 
the promise of future membership.173 However, under Juncker 
Presidency of the EU Commission, the enlargement option seems less 
clear and the credibility of EU conditionality is at stake. In Juncker’s 
words “ongoing negotiations will continue, and notably the Western 
Balkans will need to keep a European perspective, but no further 
enlargement will take place over the next five years.”174  It is time thus 
to explore as well other modes of Europeanization such as socialization 
or externalization vis-à-vis candidate countries. 175 
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2.3.2 Mechanisms of Europeanization 
Direct modes of Europeanization are those in which the EU proactively 
projects its model, its regulatory policies and norms beyond its 
borders.176 On the other hand indirect modes of europeanization occur 
as either the result of a proactive role of third parties or the EU just by 
‘being’ causes casual externalities.177 The logic of consequence 
following the rational paradigm foresees that europeanization occurs by 
means of introducing benefits that mold actors’ utility considerations 
and preferences. 178 On the other hand the logic of appropriateness 
maintains that Europeanization comes as a result of the exposure to 
the EU model, its rules and norms, which by virtue of their recognized 
legitimacy command the alignment of external actors.179 
The EU proactively projects its model, its regulatory policies and norms 
beyond its borders by setting them as conditions for external actors to 
be met so that to be entitled to benefits and not face sanctions. The 
benefits under the EU conditionality package include market access, 
membership prospects and financial and development aid. On the other 
hand, possible sanctions include withdrawal of such benefits or 
prolonged delay in obtaining such benefits in the first place.  
This exchange in the form of do ut des is based on formal binding 
agreements hence the provision of the carrot and the stick where 
compliance is rewarded and any infringement strictly sanctioned. The 
authority originating from these agreements would not be enforceable 
without the consent of the subjects, the external parties.180 Indeed, the 
impact of Europeanization is far more noticeable when its domestic 
adaptation appears to be more likely such as in cases where European 
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policies “imply incremental rather than fundamental departures from 
existing arrangements at the domestic level.” 181  
This hierarchical relationship presupposes an asymmetric power 
exerted by one of the parties. Norms, values and regulatory policies 
have to be adopted in full, as discussed in the previous sections, 
external actors do not have an opportunity to negotiate these terms. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier underline that clarity on the modes of 
enforcement pertaining to a hierarchical relationship are at the 
foundations of a top down reform process build on external 
incentives.182 Other authors have referred to these modes of foreign 
policy and externalities as “compulsory impact”183 or “compliance” 184 or 
simply of ‘positive’ integration.185  
Conditionality as a mode of Europeanization is proportionally 
compelling to the benefits found under the EU package, the credibility 
of its processes and the enforcement of norms. Thus it is dependent on 
the EU material power and its capability to wave it strategically. Its 
material power is based on its market power, which is instrumental in 
obtaining leverage by developing and consistently enforcing linkages 
between market access and strengthening rule of law and human 
rights.186 Additionally, the sacrifices to be sustained by third countries 
should be outweighed by benefits coming with alignment.187  In the 
history of enlargement credibility has been dependent on the consistent 
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reference and applicability of conditionality throughout the process and 
by means of power on the side of EU to deliver on its promises upon 
external actors meeting the requested conditions. 188  
The traditional analysis of foreign policy focuses onto conditionality as 
the main path to inducing europeanization. To be noted, these 
conditions set and agreed by the parties are not strictly political but 
purportedly hold a legal relevance enforceable through the European 
Court of Justice, cognizant of  possible limits posed by 
extraterritoriality.189 Especially before the case of transposition of the 
acquis communautaire the EU internal legal authority is extended 
outside EU territory.190   
Socialization condenses all persuasive efforts of the EU vis-à-vis 
external actors where its model, norms and rules are valid and 
legitimate. This direct mode of Europeanization under the logic of 
appropriateness is increasingly effective if it fits with the domestic 
conditions of external actors, which identify with the EU model and its 
values and under premises of a relationship between equals are further 
strengthened by consistent exchanges. 191 Indeed early cross-national 
research focusing on EU governance concluded that results differ 
depending on the mode of Europeanization and on the domestic 
realities it is applied to.192 
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These exchanges are based not as much in finding policy solutions 
than in clear directions, that were agreed upon and govern their 
relationship.193 This relationship develops by means of negotiating and 
bargaining.194 In terms of EU governance vis-à-vis external actors, 
Europeanization occurs by means of a consistent horizontal 
coordination of rules and norms.195 A definite depart from the 
hierarchical mode of conditionality, this mode of Europeanization is 
concerned with questions of ‘whether’ and ‘to which extent’ do external 
actors comply. It is concerned with paving the way for wider policy 
reforms.196  
Externalization as a mode of Europeanization occurs indirectly affecting 
preferences of external actors either as a result of their proactive role in 
adopting EU rules and norms or by virtue of the EU “presence” which 
may cause casual externalities. 197 Moreover, given the scope of EU 
integration, market size and EU institutional power the cost of deviating 
from such rules and norms would be high.198 The key trigger for 
externalization to occur is ‘competition’ which provides an 
institutionalized regulatory framework of interaction between various 
actors. The regulatory framework depends on mutual recognition of 
demand and supply of goods and services in the Single Market, which 
leads to a voluntary adoption of market regulation.199 
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Imitation is an indirect mode of Europeanization in which external 
actors identify with the EU values and under the premise of the logic of 
appropriateness, adopt those in an attempt to provide solutions to own 
problems. Emulation, contrary to socialization occurs without a 
purposeful action on the side of EU. 200 
 
2.3.3 Conclusion  
In the review above I enlist the EU modes and rules of governance and 
their domestic impact resulting in different degrees of Europeanization. 
Ultimately with the aim to delineate the scope of Europeanization in 
candidate countries, and pave the theoretical ground for the empirical 
observations in the case of Albania.  
At the centre of the matter remains the EU regulatory policy and the 
comprehensive strategy for enlargement, we referred to in the previous 
section, that results in binding agreements. The EU has founded these 
agreements after its own practices such as multilateralism, its own 
democratic values, and its recent history of fostering peace and 
prosperity. Increasingly the EU has used its internal mechanisms of 
hierarchy, market access and networks to achieve this.  
The governance approach has been seen under different angles by 
scholars as I illustrate above, however it is undeniable that it has been 
a clear tool to extend EU authority. The EU has projected its model to 
external actors dangling carrots as incentives of compliance. The 
sanctions, however possible, are as usual subject to political 
considerations. 
The hierarchical relationship formed throughout repeated interactions in 
time that in the case study in hand, I argue the modes of enforcement 
or compliance are ever so blurry in presence of lesser incentives and 
greater alternatives with lesser strings attached available to gatekeeper 
elites. Conditionality, as a means to Europeanization, in the case study 
of this thesis, is thus put into question. Even more so, when in the 
stage of candidate status, aspiring countries have already access to EU 
                                                          
200 F. Schimmelfennig, “EU External Governance and Europeanization Beyond the EU”, in D. 
Levi-Faur, The Oxford Handbook of Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 3. 
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market. Which are then the options left the EU has to incentivize rule of 
law and human rights? Credibility of the process driven by conditionality 
alone has been undermined, as mentioned, by a high politicisation of 
enlargement and inability to guarantee the desired result of 
membership. The costs of non-compliance to be paid by the 
gatekeeper elites do not outweigh benefits they garner by alternative 
means. 
I argue that in the case of Albania, the mode of Europeanization in the 
country is that of socialization, to the degree that it fits with the 
domestic conditions in the country. For the reasons outlined above, the 
relationship between the EU and a candidate country is one between 
equals, given the current internal and political predicaments of the EU 
and power to deliver on an already vague commitment. The 
relationship between the EU and a candidate country develops 
throughout their interactions where both parties come to have a clear 
understanding of the direction taken by their relation. I maintain thus, 
that the questions with which in this case study are ‘whether’ and ‘to 
which extent ‘does Europeanization occur in Albania.  A deeper 
evaluation on its results in Albania will be done in the chapters ahead.  
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Chapter 3  
The politics behind enlargement 
Ever since the end of the ’90 enlargement policy towards the Western 
Balkans has been that of “securitization” where it was considered that 
the region required a extraordinary political heavylifting.1 In 2014, with 
the leadership of Jean-Claude Juncker at the European Commission, 
the position maintained by the EU towards the region was spelled out, 
not unreasonable or unrealistic given that none of the candidate 
countries would have been ready before 2019. However, the stance 
has largely been interpreted as a halt to enlargement and possibly a 
disengagement from the region where europeanization was left largely 
in autopilot.The EU is battling with the migrant crisis and that of Brexit 
which as I will show make for the most prominent concerns among 
citizens. In the matters of security and the support in facing the migrant 
crisis the Western Balkans countries acquired newfound attention on 
the part of the EU. What is the relevance the region acquires before an 
ever changing multilateralism? The pillars informing the Berlin Process 
agenda hint to the geo-economic value the region has for the EU, be 
that in inviting cooperation for forming a regional market, with particular 
attention given to connectivity and energy projects. My argument is that 
the diplomatic exercise cannot make up for lacking in policy 
engagement.  
 
 
 
3.1 Juncker's European Commission Presidency 
In 2014 the provisions of Article 17 (7) TEU, for the first time, were 
applied in an attempt to bring more legitimacy to the work of the 
                                                          
1 A. Higashino, “For the sake of 'peace and security'? The role of security in the European Union 
enlargement eastwards”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 39, no. 4, 2004, pp. 349-350. 
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European Commission (EC) and to the whole EU decision making 
process. Indeed, prior to the European Parliament elections, political 
parties were asked to nominate their candidates for the EC presidency 
(or “Spitzenkandidat”), the candidate of the political party winning the 
most seats was going to be nominated by the European Council with a 
qualified majority vote. 2 The EC President, for the first time, received a 
direct democratic legitimacy and was hence invested with an 
opportunity to lead politically the Commission in solidum with the 
appointed Commissioners putting forth the general interest of the 
Union. 3  
Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker elected pursuant rule 117 of European 
Parliaments Rules of Procedure that states “the President shall request 
the candidate to make a statement and present his or her political 
guidelines to Parliament“ had all intentions to lead a political 
Commission. In this line, he introduced his program “A New Start for 
Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 
Change” in which Mr. Juncker acknowledged the financial difficulties 
and the severe hit accused by the EU following the on-going crisis 
which risk undoing “decades of European integration”. 4 Mustering his 
long experience in public service within the EU bubble, Mr. Juncker had 
understood the need of focus in a Union that cannot afford being “often 
ill-prepared” in face of “global challenges”.5 The divide between the 
Europeans and the EU institutions is evident, “[o]ne has to be really 
deaf and blind not to see this”. 6  
In view of this newfound democratic legitimacy and opportunity to lead 
a political Commission, it is necessary to analize the content of 
Juncker’s political guidelines and its meaning for enlargement countries 
                                                          
2 While according to Article 214 (2) TEC the European Parliament “approved” the EC candidate 
for President with the Treaty of Lisbon Article 17 (7) TEU the European Parliament “elect[s]” the 
candidate introducing thus a political accountability between Parliament and EC. With the Treaty 
of Nice introduced a major change in the decision-making process of the European Council as it 
waived the requirement of unanimity and instead introduced that of qualified majority, abolishing 
de facto the veto power that each Member State previously had on a given candidate. 
3 See J.C., Juncker, State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity, 09 September 
2015, Strasbourg, France. 
4 J.C., Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 
Change, 2014, p. 3. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 17. 
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and for the purpose of this thesis, the meaning it has for the Western 
Balkans and more specifically for Albania who obtained the candidate 
status around the same time of the EP elections, in June 2014. My 
argument is that Junker’s political clout allowed him to put in words - at 
an especially critical time for Europe – the position maintained by the 
EU towards the Western Balkans. Indeed, Juncker’s declaration 
underscores a vague commitment on part of the EU to assist 
Europeanization of the Western Balkans that coupled with past actions 
may only inform steps and prospects for the future of the gatekeeper 
elites in these countries.7 Indeed, the EU vague commitment is evident 
in the “paradox [where] the process seems to approach realization 
[without] a calendar” may push the domestic actors to hold on short-
term achievable goals that allow them to present themselves as bearer 
of concrete results on election dates.8 
Given, the EU’s behavior vis-à-vis the Western Balkans in the context 
of enlargement, domestic actors are straining on the leash to “create an 
uneven playing field” and obtain “cooperative behaviour from critics” 
effectively consolidating a competitive authoritarian regime.9 Simon 
Mordue, Director for Strategy and Turkey in European Commission, DG 
Near remarked that in the enlargement countries “there is not a cross 
party consensus in working toward the EU agenda”.10 In the name of 
stability, the EU will continue to deliver concessions, even if unsatisfied 
with the degree of progress in key reform areas. Thus gatekeeper elites 
will do just enough to get ahead of the curve. EU continuing to engage, 
as a Senior diplomat of an EU Member State in Tirana admits “what 
other choice do we have?”.11 
All the while, Mr. Juncker confirmed that his efforts would be directed at 
“restor[ing] European citizens’ confidence” focusing on achieving 
concrete results on key policy areas.12 These ranged from focusing on 
                                                          
7 Snyder, op.cit., p. 474. 
8 M. Bregu, Albanian Parliament, Chairman of the Committee for EU Integration, EPC, Policy 
Dialogue, “EU Enlargement to the Balkans: The role of the member states”, Brussels, Belgium, 29 
September 2015. 
9 Levitsky and Way, op.cit., p. 53. 
10 S. Mordue, Director for Strategy and Turkey in European Commission, DG Near, EPC, Policy 
Dialogue, “EU Enlargement to the Balkans: The role of the member states”, Brussels, Belgium, 29 
September 2015.  
11 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 02 February 2017. 
12 Juncker, A New Start for Europe op.cit., pp. 3-4. 
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enhancing a positive environment for entrepreneurship with the view to 
vigorously facilitate growth and more jobs; promoting and facilitating the 
“digital single market”; strategise and diversify energy supplies with “a 
new European Energy Union”; focusing on relaunching and utilizing in 
its fullest the potential of the EU internal market which cannot fully be 
developed without “[a d]eeper and [f]airer Economic and Monetary 
Union”. These priorities could be summed up with bringing about more 
“Europe in this Union” and summoning more “Union in this Union” 
inevitably, thus, putting the EU first, and adopt an inward-looking 
approach.13  
“For the European Union, and for my Commission in 
particular, this means two things: first, investing in 
Europe's sources of jobs and growth, notably in [the] 
Single Market; and secondly, completing our Economic 
and Monetary Union to creating the conditions for a 
lasting recovery.” 14 
Following a careful consideration of the above, one cannot dismiss that 
security within the EU - fighting organized crime and terrorism and 
guaranteeing fundamental rights - is essential to enjoy the prosperity 
and opportunities in a renewed environment of democracy and a more 
effective and responsive common foreign policy.15 Evidently, the once 
most successful foreign policy of the EU, enlargement, does not appear 
to be among Mr. Juncker’s political priorities. In addition, the reshuffling 
and change in the name of the portfolio of ‘EU Commissioner for EU 
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations’ further 
underlines a departure from enlargement being a priority policy to a 
negotiation exercise for the Union.  
On one hand, Mr. Juncker has acknowledged the successes of the 
enlargement policy in uniting Europe, nonetheless, he believes that it is 
time “to take a break from enlargement so that we can consolidate what 
has been achieved among the 28” thus “under [his] Presidency of the 
Commission, ongoing negotiations will continue, and notably the 
Western Balkans will need to keep a European perspective, but no 
further enlargement will take place over the next five years.” 16  
                                                          
13 Juncker, State of the Union 2015, op.cit. 
14 Ibid.   
15 Juncker, A New Start for Europe op.cit., pp. 6-12. 
16 Ibid., p. 12. 
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There is a need to “anticipate events” and to “identify common 
responses”, and doing so “in partnership between the Union institutions 
and the Member States, in line with the Community method”.17 
However, in business as usual fashion of negotiations in Brussels, EU 
priorities not necessarily match those of Western Balkan people’s, at 
least, in the exercise of giving and taking just enough, so that no 
adverse foreign policy developments may ensue. Instability in the 
Western Balkans would be a detriment to complying with many 
priorities set in Juncker’s political guidelines. Especially as the internal 
and external challenges the Union faces have proven to require 
Western Balkans’cooperation and alignment with the EU priorities. I 
concede that focus on key policies is certainly necessary; nonetheless, 
concrete results cannot be delivered with an inward approach where 
minimal foreign policy efforts are put on the EU’s doorstep which 
comprises enlargement as well as neighbourhood countries. Rather, I 
argue that the solution may only be found through a truthful evaluation 
of the weight of the Western Balkans in the Union both in the present 
and for the future, by turning away from business as usual and 
appeasement of petty demands of domestic elites. It is essential that 
the EU embraces its revolutionary potential and restores the rules - 
which had been distorted - in the Brussels negotiation tables. The 
future of 18 million people in the Western Balkans cannot serve as a 
currency to pay for stability and status quo. 
 
3.1.1 Eurobarometer 
The latest Eurobarometer of May 2016, brings to the fore that the 
economic situation remains a top concern together with unemployment 
taking the third and fifth place at EU level respectively.18 However, 
since 2011 the mentions of economic situations as a concern for the 
EU have decreased by 40%. Security is the top concern with migration 
and terrorism mentioned respectively by 48% and 39% of Europeans 
interviewed. 19 
                                                          
17 Ibid., pp. 11,13. 
18 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, pp. 6, 8.  
19 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 4. 
80 
 
At national level within the Member States, concern over 
unemployment remains high at 33% and since 2012 has been the 
highest issue of concern and has seen only an 18% improvement since 
2013.20  
Europeans put at the first place of their personal concerns rising prices 
and inflation, costs of living marked by 26% of them.21 Followed by 
pensions mentioned by 16% and health and social security marked by 
15% of respondents. 22 Household financial situation and 
unemployment are, with 15% and 14%, at the fourth and fifth position 
on Europeans personal concerns. 23 
As far as it goes to the level of trust Europeans place in the EU, only 
33% answer affirmatively, while trust in their national parliament is at a 
bare 28% and trust in their government gathers only 27% of positive 
answers. Nonetheless, since 2015 the proportion of Europeans trusting 
the national institutions has risen, with 65% trusting the national 
parliament and 68% trusting their government but the proportion of 
Europeans trusting the EU remains at a meagre 45%.24 
The hope on a positive future for the European Union is maintained by 
50% of Europeans, which has reached its lowest levels since 2013 
Eurobarometer, which used to gather 53% of affirmative answers.25 
Economic situation and unemployment - as above - are among top 
concerns for Europeans where 47% believe “the worst is still to come” 
and other 41% believe that “the impact of the crisis on jobs has already 
reached its peak”. The optimism among Europeans has reached the 
lowest point since 2013.26 The free movement of people, goods and 
services within the EU and peace among Member States of the EU 
                                                          
20 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 8.   
21 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 13. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid., p. 14.  
25 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 19.   
26 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 24. 
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attracts 56% and 55% of Europeans consents as successes achieved 
by the EU. 27 
 
3.1.2 Concurring Issues 
 
3.1.2.1 Migration crisis 
Referring to the public opinion above, and key concerns and challenges 
faced at the EU level among which immigration and terrorism are key 
issues, one cannot deny that part of the solution (or problem dependent 
upon how it is managed) are the Western Balkans. As an EU expert on 
organized crime recalls “security within the EU it is closely linked with 
the fight of organized crime and terrorism in the Western Balkan 
countries”.28 The region’s proximity to the EU makes of it a buffer zone 
and it has proven an ally in managing the migration crisis.29 In the 
words of Stefan Gehrold, Director of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
(KAS) European Office:  
“With the term Balkans route and images of thousands of 
refugees crossing the countries of the region, the 
Balkans returned to Europe’s headlines and gained 
public attention worldwide […they] became the primary 
transit route for refuges towards the West and therefore 
they’ve been affected with unforeseen political, 
humanitarian and organisation challenges.” 30 
Indeed, for the first time in decades, the Western Balkans imported a 
crisis that was not theirs, as refugees crossed from an EU Member 
State Greece to a non – Member State such as the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia to Serbia onto other EU Member States. 
Following several interviews with the well-informed technocrats in the 
                                                          
27 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 39. 
28 EU Expert on organized crime, Albanian State Police Directorate, interview, Tirana, 19 July 
2016.  
29  See Juncker, A New Start for Europe op.cit.,p. 10. 
30 S. Gehrold, Director of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) European Office, Friends of 
Europe, “Balkan Partnerships: Strengthening the Regions’ ties”, Brussels, 16 February 2016. 
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Brussels bubble, I understood that the EU had long considered all the 
options, including paying court to all possible players. Brussels has 
hosted a number of high level meetings regarding the migration crisis, 
most notably, the Valetta summit focused on the cooperation with third 
countries (Africa) and a Meeting on the Western Balkans Migration 
Route where the EU and Western Balkans’ leaders agreed on 17-point 
plan of action.31 It appears to be a programmatic document with a 
declaratory commitment as the Western Balkan countries pledge to 
respond “temporar[ily]” to refugee needs, reiterate their commitment to 
exchange informations that are nonetheless dependent on limited 
capacities of national authorities.32 Moreover, this 17 point plan and in 
line with international refugee law, allows national authorities to refuse 
entry to any national “who do not confirm a wish to apply for 
international protection”. 33 Notably refugees consider the Western 
Balkans as a transiting route towards the wealthier EU. Hence, 
according to sources in Brussels, Albania, as early as October 2015 
was considered, an option in the Balkan route: to re-direct the influx of 
refugees in the Adriatic.34  
All the while Italy and Greece continue suffering a huge pressure - as 
entry points for migrants originating from the Middle East. The 
European Council agreed to relocate an amount of 40.000 persons to 
be distributed amongst different Member States.35 The Dublin 
Regulations – the European legal framework on asylum - is under 
strain as it no longer responds in an efficient manner to the needs of 
EU Member States but also of asylum seekers. The crisis has been 
depicted as one that had torn the EU appart:  
“not only several countries bear the burden of the system 
- Greece, Italy as entry points and Germany, Austria and 
Sweden as final destinations - but also the deadlines to 
                                                          
31 See European Council, “Valletta Summit on migration”, 11-12 November 2015; Leaders’ 
Statement, Leaders’ Meeting on refugee flows along the Western Balkans Route. 
32 High Official, Albanian State Police, interview, Tirana, 06 December 2016.  
33 See European Council, “Valletta Summit on migration”, 11-12 November 2015; Leaders’ 
Statement, Leaders’ Meeting on refugee flows along the Western Balkans Route. 
34 Officials, the EU, interviews - EC DG Migration and Home Affairs, the Council of European 
Union Foreign Affairs C.11 Working Party on the Western Balkans Region, European Parliament 
DG for External Policies of the Union 15 09 2015 – 15 February 2016.  
35 European Commission, Relocation and Resettlement: EU Member States urgently need to 
deliver, Press Release, Brussels, 16 March 2016.    
83 
 
get an application processed are slow and also it entailed 
many dramatic family separations.”36  
In the case of the Western Balkans instead, this crisis has been dubbed 
an opportunity, Commissioner Hahn agreed that “[t]his crisis has 
openend the window, in the way that much more people, politicians, are 
looking to the Western Balkans”.37 Underlining that the “commitment to 
EU enlargement, and to the conditions it involves, is therefore a long-
term investment in Europe's own security and prosperity" highlighting 
the need for an “increased cooperation” towards which the EU remains 
invested.38 Nonetheless, in an EU – Western Balkans gathering, Ivan 
Korcok, Slovak State Secretary for Foreign and European Affairs 
warned that the EU once again may send mixed messages to “the 
Western Balkans, who are subject to very strong criteria if they want to 
make progress towards the EU” while the EU itself is “starving for 
stability”.39 
In calling out the vagueness of the EU politics, Albanian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Ditmir Bushati demanded “more certainty and more 
clarity” when referring to the Western Balkans enlargement process 
and “a little bit more soul and political determination coming from the 
European Union, because there is a feeling that we are being called on 
in times of crisis […] we need to also discuss, with a little bit more of a 
strategic tone, the near future of our relations.” 40  
Shada Islam, Director of Policy at Friends of Europe, in line with the 
argument I build across this thesis, reminds that the process is “two-
way street” and a ‘double level game’ where all the parties involved 
have to show a “degree of determination” on Europeanization.41 
                                                          
36 EU Official, Expert on Migration, interview, Brussels, 03 December 2015.   
37 J. Hahn, EU Commissioner, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 
Friends of Europe, “Balkan Partnerships: Strengthening the Regions’ ties”, Brussels, 16 February 
2016. 
38 European Commission, Press Release, “Western Balkans and Turkey: enlargement process key 
to strengthened economic and political stability in the region”, Brussels, 10 November 2015.  
39 I. Korcok, Slovak State Secretary for Foreign and European Affairs and Plenipotentiary of 
Slovakia’s Presidency of the Council of the EU, Friends of Europe, “Balkan Partnerships: 
Strengthening the Regions’ ties”, Brussels, 16 February 2016.  
40 D. Bushati, Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Friends of Europe, “Balkan Partnerships: 
Strengthening the Regions’ ties”, Brussels, 16 February 2016. 
41 S. Islam, Director of Policy at Friends of Europe, Friends of Europe, “Balkan Partnerships: 
Strengthening the Regions’ ties”, Brussels, 16 February 2016. 
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In this context, it was reported that Ms. Federica Mogherini, EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy visited Albania in 
early March 2016 to discuss the country’s progress on the path of EU 
integration and praised Albania for its constructive stance in the region 
and for “fully aligning its foreign policy with that of the EU”.42  Ms. 
Mogherini as well commended the country’s “contribution in facing [the 
Union’s] security challenges”.43 Thereafter, Minister Bushati and Ms. 
Mogherini signed on behalf of  the Council of Ministers of the Republic 
of Albania and the European Union respectively, the Agreement on 
security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified 
information.44 The signing of this agreement was done at the time when 
refugees were crossing from Greece into the region to reach northern 
EU member states. In the Western Balkans, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia has been among the countries directly affected 
by the crisis. The increased tensions rising at the border of Greece and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lead a closure of the 
Balkans route, with Serbia as well closing its borders. Arguably the 
decision to close the border between Greece and  the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia had come as a result of the then imminent 
parliamentary election which were then posponed to December 2016. It 
all warned that the migrant crisis had well gotten out of hand.45 
Subsequently, Mr. Tahiri, Albanian Minister of Interior, had mentioned 
the existence of a contingency plan should there be a need to open the 
border to refugees.46  
On one hand, the cooperation and readiness shown by the region has 
made a case for arguing the ‘ally’ card in addition to that of ‘stability’ 
and prompting technocrats in Brussels to (re)consider the success of 
enlargement policy. However, as regards to migration and progress - or 
                                                          
42 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Albania, Press Release “EU High Representative Federica 
Mogherini visits Tirana”, 05 March 2016.  
43 Ibid. See collaboration between Albania and the EU in the field of security, Minister Bushati 
and High Representative Mogherini signed the 'Agreement between the European Union and the 
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on security procedures for exchanging and 
protecting classified information.  
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Albania, Press Release “EU High Representative Federica 
Mogherini visits Tirana”, 05 March 2016.  
45 Sinisa Jakov Marusic, “Macedonia MPs Vote to Delay June 5 Elections”, Balkan Insight, 18 
May 2016. 
46 Edison Kurani, “Avramopulos for the refugee crisis: “Albania will not be on its own in this”, 
Independent Balkan News Agency, 18 March 2016. 
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lack thereoff - in getting ever closer to the EU, it is telling that in 2014, 
the same year Albania was granted the candidate status and Juncker’s 
political leadership of the European Commission would mark a halt in 
enlargement, Albanian citizens made for 16,950 asylum applications to 
the EU. The asylum application toward the EU would reach 67,950 in 
2015 and at the end of 2016 Albanian citizens would have filed 20,650 
asylum applications to the EU. 47 On the other hand, can the EU focus 
on Western Balkans on the face of refugee crisis? In the words of 
Simon Mordue, “if anything, [Europe was] reminded about the 
importance to move forth with the shaping and forming stability in our 
neighbourhood.”48 The sudden reminder that the EU project cannot be 
complete without the integration of the Western Balkans might result 
shocking for ‘euro-skeptics’ and those suffering from a ‘chronic’ 
enlargement fatigue. 49  
The EU and the Western Balkans are having an arranged marriage and 
will have to make it work. Much will depend on the way the EU will 
choose to maintain and strengthen the links with the region. Key in 
achieving this will be an optimistic outlook in accepting flaws that were - 
and some would argue still are – common to the region and the EU. It 
is time to show more, more in terms of structural funds to support these 
candidates and potential candidates in getting ever closer to joining the 
EU. Most importantly, accept that in the complex Balkan’s scene 
individuality of each and single country has to be taken into account. 
‘Integrate to integrate’ can be a good marketing motto but may 
oversimplify a reality that historically has all but ever been simple. The 
region ultimately may define the results in the multi-crisis game at hand 
- Brexit being a new addition - which cannot altogether be delinked 
from the European future.  
 
                                                          
47 See as well Eurostat, “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex. 
Annual aggregated data (rounded)”. These compared to the 122,065 asylum applications from war 
torn Syria in 2014, and 368,350 asylum applications for 2015, to the 285,325 asylum applcation in 
2016.  
48 S. Mordue, Director for Strategy and Turkey in European Commission, DG Near, EPC, Policy 
Dialogue, “EU Enlargement to the Balkans: Taking stock and moving forward”, Brussels, 18 
November 2015.  
49 E. Bushi, “The Western Balkans and the EU: An Arranged Marriage”, The Huffington Post 
Politics, 09 March 2016. 
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3.1.2.2 Brexit 
Mr. David Cameron, the now Former UK Prime Minister, ran his 
electoral campaign on the promise to hold a referendum that would 
determine the future of the UK in the EU. Brexit was equated with 
regaining national sovereignty over UK policies and “the promise of a 
brighter future for Britain” – a promise that seems fading when looking 
beyond populist chants. 50 In the months of talks leading to the 
referendum, the UK obtained several concessions from the EU 
including protection of the pound currency and reassurance that British 
contribution was not used to “to bail out countries in the eurozone.” 51 
Upon British demands, the Union recognized competitiveness as “[its] 
essential objective.”52 Most importantly, the British gained a seven 
years moratorium on intra-EU migration that as Premier Cameron’s 
would put it “preven[t] the abuse of free movement and preventing our 
welfare system acting as a magnet for people to come to our country.” 
53 In promoting and obtaining this additional concession the British de 
facto obtained a halt in EU political integration stressing the need for 
enhanced role of national parliament so that to “never be forced into 
political integration with the rest of Europe”.54Juncker would motivate 
enhancing the role of national parliaments as a means to “bring[ing] the 
Union closer to the people” where better results may be achieved 
acting together and facing “tremendous foreign policy 
challenges”.55 Arguably euroskepticism and sedimented grievances are 
at the origin of calls for the referendum and its results.  
The UK, while an important economy for the EU, represents around 
25% in total EU trade flows.56 To this date is unclear whether Theresa 
May’s government will receive the green light to trigger article 50 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, and effectively leave the EU, however should this 
happen the market power leverage of the EU would drastically 
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diminish. Nonetheless, caution has informed many EU partners 
economic strategy. Some like the BRICS have viewed the Union with 
some suspicion since 2008 and a possible Brexit may only weaken the 
Union’s “strategic importance”.57 Nontheless, Mr. Juncker would ensure 
EU partners that “the continued existence of the European Union is not 
under threat”.58 
It is now, on the UK’s hand to decide ‘if’ and ‘when’ following the article 
50 TEU to formally notify the European Council of its decision to 
withdraw from the EU. Unless there is a formal notification on part of 
the UK talks on the withdrawal cannot formally start.59 
Currently the issue of Brexit contributed to an inward looking EU and 
raises perplexities of the people in the Western Balkans regarding the 
perspective of integrating in a house that is burning down that has 
shown double standards may not be after all, the solution to all their 
problems. In his “State of the Union” addresses Mr. Juncker has 
maintained a rigorous silence on EU enlargement, which caused quite 
the uproar among Western Balkans’ scholars.60 Nonetheless, since 
2014 the halt, or autopilot on enlargement has been rationalized and 
watered down by the EU bubble technocrats and Brussels diplomats 
with the  purported argument that none of the countries seated on the 
negotiating table can possibly deliver the burdensome membership 
criteria by 2019.61 On the other hand borrowing the words of Mr. 
Juncker himself, this “credible and honest European perspective” may 
well be in an attempt to feed some stability in what has been dubbed 
“[t]he tragic European region” to prevent the surge of “the old demons 
of the past”.62 In the next section I explore the ‘stability’ argument as a 
determinant of EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans. 
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3. 2 The determinant of EU enlargement towards the 
Western Balkans 
 
3.2.1 The possibility of enlargement 
In this section I explore the stability argument as a determinant of the 
EU’s enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans focusing on 
Albania. My argument is that the EU had had historically security 
concerns that pushed for its involvement in the region will an end goal 
of obtaining stability.  
I begin by critically assessing the backdrop against which the EU 
promised enlargement to the Western Balkans. The cost of 
engagement is outweighed by the cost of exclusion – instability – in the 
Union’s doorstep.   
The EU promise of enlargement refers to “a process of gradual and 
formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms” 
where “horizontal institutionalization” maintains that interactions among 
actors are regulated by EU norms that progressively develop even after 
the country is member of the organization.63 Nonetheless, the literature 
has agreed that where decision making elites highlight a sense of 
urgency pertaining to an issue that require exceptional measures or 
“securitization”; when the same is moved in the normal political agenda 
resorting to “desecuritization” and where these moves are accepted by 
the public, the full circle of “securitization” is completed.64 While the 
“international pressure [is] a necessary condition” for Europeanization 
in Albania, the positive public opinion on a possible EU membership 
has made the EU integration a common denominator at the top of 
every political party’s agenda, at least formally.65 Nonetheless, I argue 
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that each step undertaken in the enlargement process informs the next. 
Stability in the Western Balkans remains a common EU interest. 
Keeping the process alive is a small prize to pay to minimize possible 
downfalls in the EU doorstep. However, stability at all costs has given 
to gatekeeper elites in these two decades a wide room of manoeuvre 
and allowed them to hold on the last shred of legitimacy without 
delivering effective reform. Indeed, reforms have been equalled to 
doing just the bare minimum to justify getting a step closer to the 
enlargement process game. 
On the one hand, the EU, within the enlargement process, has used its 
norms to mold state authority in the region, facing competition of vested 
interests of various international actors.66 On the other hand, 
gatekeeper elites have used the EU values as premises to justify policy 
decisions that effectively have been instrumental for consolidating their 
grip on power by progressively rendering null any arena of 
contestation.67  
The Albanian gatekeeper elites have long understood that the way they 
engage in the process of Europeanization “are customs” not simply 
clearly stated rules but shared consciously and publicly.68 Clearly stating these 
rules of interaction may be helpful in removing any uncertainty and this 
may happen after the players having been playing for some time.69 
Thus, I argue, the Europeanization process then “can usefully be 
conceived as a two-level game” where at “the national level” 
gatekeeper elites seek to fulfil their preferences which will grant them 
political and economic power; while at the European level, “national 
governments see to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic 
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments”.70  
EU, as part of its Wider Europe policy, has had as its paramount goal to 
secure peace and stability in the region.71 Prosperity of the Union is key 
to enlargement, and while accessing countries receive much support a 
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contribution is expected, just like in any other partnership. However, 
making a step toward including all the Western Balkans could be 
explained in the measure that the exclusion from the process, as it has 
been proven in the past, would wage instability at the Union’s door.72 
Furthermore the material costs - of one day enlarging toward the 
Western Balkans - are contained, especially given the possibility of 
limiting obligations through bilateral agreements or post-accession 
transitioning periods, while geopolitically the gains may be 
considerable.73 
In the Western Balkans borders, have proven to be transient and often 
leaving outside parts of people that in the newly found home were to 
constitute a minority.74 In the early 90s the Albanian government was to 
receive increasing economic support aimed at fostering development 
and thus contain the potential effect of the Albanian factor to the severe 
Yugoslav crisis.75  
3.2.2 A purgatory of sorts in Albanian foreign policy  
In the midst of Balkan chaos, crumbling and inflamed from Zagreb to 
Pristina, Albania seemed a safe-haven; a bridge for stability and 
cooperation among the various nations inhabiting the small peninsula 
at the heart of Europe. The Albanian political elite arguably has 
continued from early 1990s until today to pursue the same foreign 
policy line. Security concerns, at first, prevailed: “Albanian foreign 
policy concentrated on preserving the country’s territorial independence 
[…] from Albania’s hostile Balkan neighbours”.76 Then, as today, the 
immediate need of shielding the country from the potential 
consequences arising from the conflicts in Yugoslavia could not and 
cannot be divided by reportedly another major goal: having the rights of 
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ethnic Albanians acknowledged and respected. However, the domestic 
elite “has often lacked the ability to put forward a united vision of the 
national interest”.77 The country had been longing for freedom and 
democratic reforms for more than 45 years, it was time to put these 
reforms in place, and for this, the Albanian elite made use of all the 
help they could get.  
The dowry of the little country has been a heavy one dictated by history 
and enforced by geography. Its outside borders are surrounded largely 
by ethnic Albanians, citizens of governments with often opposing 
interests to those of Albania. Co-existing in a heated area marked by 
history of “grievance[s] and greed” has required an impressive ability of 
maintaining equilibrium of interests, perceptions, needs, wishes and 
political will, both regional and international.78 Accomplishing this heavy 
duty would not have been an easy task for anyone, even less so for the 
Albanian political elite exiting the dark ages of the most hermetic type 
of communism. Indeed, in terms of foreign policy Albania had not had 
any relations with the West. It consumed relations with Yugoslavia in 
1949, separated from the USSR in 1961 and it could not hold on either 
to the Chinese, leading a solitary existence until the first wave of 
democracy.79 
Albania was thus affected by nearly fifty years of communism, with both 
its politics and socio-economic areas in disorder due to the lack of 
pluralistic participatory culture that marked the bumpy long road ahead. 
The economic growth had come to a stop, where agriculture and 
industry had halved their output in the first years of the 1990s; “ inflation 
is running at 300 per cent and unemployment is estimated at over 50 
per cent of the working force”.80 Reforms proposed by the Albanian 
Party of Labour in the 1990s were superficial and failed at fooling the 
international community into accepting the country among its midst.81 
The foreign embassies in Tirana were occupied by hudreds of 
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Albanians seeking to flee the country given the continued violence 
shown by Alia’s government.82 The European Parliament was forced 
into action on 12 July 1990 when it condemned the government for 
violating the rights of its citizens as prescribed by the Helsinki 
Declaration, while congratulating European countries for the support 
given to the refugees.83 The resolution called upon the Foreign Affairs 
Ministers to pressure the Albanian government in finding a peaceful 
solution to the crisis.84 The humanitarian aid and the opportunity to 
reconnect to Europe were pre-requisites upon the democratic efforts 
that were to be made in the respect of human rights and in the 
upcoming elections.  
The Democratic Party leadership sought, on its part, immediately a 
partnership with the United States (US). As early as 1992, Sali Berisha 
visited the White House where he expressed to George H.W. Bush the 
readiness of Albania to be a valid ally in defending US interests in the 
Balkans while acknowledging that the support of the US was crucial in 
performing the radical reforms the country was in need of.85 Indeed, 
Albania appeared, since early 1990s, as it has today, a full member of 
NATO, to have been a valid ally in mitigating the repercussions of the 
fall of Yugoslavia, while fostering stability and peace in the Balkans.86  
The West, especially the United States, purposefully supported the 
newly formed democratic government in strengthening its grip in the 
region, with the aim of solving the unrest inherited from the past and 
prevent Albania from being dragged into the Yugoslav saga.87 Indeed, 
Berisha was cherished by the international community, forced between 
a rock and a hard place; on one side, the fall of Yugoslavia, in which 
                                                          
82 Ibid.  
83 European Parliament, “Resolution of 12 July 1990 condemning the behavior of communist 
government”,  
Official Journal of the European Communities, C 231, 17 September 1990.  
84 Ibid. 
85 E. Biberaj, Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy, Bouder, Colorado, Westview 
Press, 1998, p. 232. 
86 See J. Pomfret, and D. B. Ottaway, “U.S., Albania Form ‘the Weirdest Relatioship’” 
Washington Post, 20 November 1995. 
87 J. Pettifer, “Albania: The democratic deficit in the post-communist period” in G. Pridham and T. 
Gallagher (eds.), Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans, London, 
Routledge, 2000, p. 240. 
93 
 
they wanted to avoid flaming in the Albanian factor, and on the other, 
the lingering phantoms of communism, the “increasingly authoritarian 
tendencies”.88 On its part, the US, within a five-year period from 1992 to 
1996, disbursed $200 million to facilitate reform implementation and 
meeting humanitarian emergency faced by the country.89 
The relationship Albania has with EU has been dictated very much by 
the perceived direct dependence Albania has had towards the EU 
particularly on economic assistance; on the other hand the EU 
perceived assymetry in strategic interest towards the Western Balkans 
- informed by geopolitics and geoeconomics - imposes the EU 
engagement in the region. Even more so when in presence of 
competitors able to provide for the country’s needs that influence the 
direct independence as referenced above. Thus the gatekeeper elites 
know far well that the EU has no option left but to engage as walking 
away from the negotiation table is not credible.90 
The EU, as well, has been significantly involved in the country since the 
first days of transition, with the humanitarian operation Pelikan that was 
to continue until 1993, supported by the European Commission (EC) 
aid mounting to 2 million ECU.91 Albania was among the first 
beneficiaries of European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection Department (ECHO) founded in 1992, when it first opened 
an office in Albania in 1997 to aid in humanitarian relief. ECHO’s 
activities intensified, peaking in 1999, as it assisted the country when it 
faced a humanitarian emergency where nearly 500,000 Albanian 
Kosovan refugees sought shelter in Albania.92 The estimated aid 
Albania received through ECHO amounted to nearly 142 million euro 
and helped the country in facing both internal crisis and those 
originated by regional spill-over.93 
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The Copenhaghen Council had encouraged and invited all Central and 
Eastern European Countries to continue their efforts in modernizing 
economies.94 The EC maintained that “the economic and political 
conditions required” have to be met in order to ensure that a country is 
“able to assume the obligations of membership”.95 In short, 
Copenhaghen required that a candidate country could account for a 
sound institutional structure that could serve democracy in respecting 
human rights and rule of law, as well as have in place a functional 
market economy able to contribute and cope with competition of the 
common market.96 
The 1992 agreement on trade cooperation was to mark the relationship 
between Albania and the EU, with Albania being the first SEE country 
to conclude a trade agreement with EC.97 By means of this agreement, 
Albania could benefit from the financial aid provided by PHARE.98 
Towards end of June 1993, the indicative program PHARE 1993-1994 
was signed by Mr. Ruli and Sir Brittan.99 The good will in striving 
towards their required standards, and most importantly the will for 
maintaining progress in reforms, persuaded the Commission to extend 
further the application of PHARE to Albania with regards to sectors 
involving restructuring and privatization of businesses, provide further 
support to the private sector including the modernization of the financial 
system and development of job market and social sectors.100 In June 
1995, the European Investment Bank granted a loan of 10 million ECU 
to support financing for small and medium enterprises in the industrial 
sector, tourism, energy and environment.101 
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However, the pro-US stance of the government caused some tensions 
with the opposition, which, for the sake of domestic power play, had 
every incentive to demonize the foreign policy conducted by the newly 
erected democratic government. Former communists under new labels 
and symbols were in the opposition, and not surprisingly saw the West 
and the US as the enemy and thus was resistant to the democratization 
path that the country had undertaken. The official argument of the 
opposition was that with Albania favoring the relations with the US, the 
government was jeopardizing the European future of the country by 
adding to the already hefty burden inherited by the country, which 
furthered security concerns.102  
With fellow democrats entering in the White House, the relations 
between the two countries further flourished: the memorandum of 
understanding on military was signed in October 1993 by which 
furthered cooperation and offered training opportunities to Albanian 
officials both in Albania and in the United States.103 The US Secretary 
of Defense, William Perry and Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph 
Nye, in a state visit to Albania, praised the Albanian contribution 
towards stability in the Balkans, especially in the constructive role it 
played in hindering a spill-over of Bosnian troubles to Kosovo.104 
Through these steps, Albania turned its focus towards seeking and 
concluding bilateral agreements with NATO members from United 
States to Turkey.105 Soon after, in 1992, Albania requested NATO 
membership.106 In February 1994, Sali Berisha went personally to the 
NATO Headquarters to sign the Partnership for Peace Agreement.107 
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Security concerns and fear to be left aside and alone amidst the rogue 
of falling Yugoslavia, Albania’s decision to strengthen its ties with 
NATO and its allies was certainly advantageous, and NATO itself could 
count on the small but valuable partner. Indeed, as of June 1995 
Albania offered its air and port facilities to NATO. In a meeting of 
defense ministers of NATO allies and Partnership for Peace countries, 
the country reiterated that NATO membership continued to be its final 
aim.108 In addition, public opinion in Albania looked favorably both at full 
membership of the country in NATO (84% approval rate), and for 
receiving NATO forces in the country (70% approval rate).109  
Moreover, the Policy of Security and Defense of the Republic of 
Albania, the new military doctrine of the country, considers use of arm 
forces for defense as a final resort while assuring to respect the 
principle of inviolability of existing borders so that no territorial claim 
would be advanced vis-à-vis neighboring countries.110 
In 1991 the Macedonians would gain their independence as a 
sovereign state, due to a consensual agreement with no reprisals 
between Macedonians and the Yugoslav National Army.111 However, 
among its neighbours the independence of Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia was not accepted due to disputes that persist today, 
Albanians have been the only one to recognize the Macedonians.112 
The independent state of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
was instrumental to Albania’s security as it served as a divisor between 
the unfriendly Serbia and Greece; not to mention that, in case of further 
dismantling of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, it would 
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further worsen the already precarious conditions of ethnic Albanians 
living in the country.113 The Albanian President Berisha, would have by 
far preferred the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an 
“independent” interlocutor rather than one governed by Milosevic.114 
Indeed, within the room of maneuver Berisha had in influencing the 
ethnic Albanians living in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
the message conveyed was the one of integration and participation 
within the state structures that would both ensure representation of 
Albanians needs and secure the stability of the newborn Macedonian 
state. Moreover, the good neighborhood attitude towards the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was shown by Albania in facilitating 
access of goods in overcoming the Greek embargo.115 
Weary about the possible alliance of Serbia and Greece that was to 
include Bulgaria, at the direct expense of the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, pushed Tirana to swiftly establish good relations with 
Sofia. Berisha and Zhelev, signed an agreement in 1993 that would 
foster greater trust and mutual support among the two nations.116 
Following this foreign policy line, further cooperation agreements on 
military were signed with Bulgaria, Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia as Albania hosted the meeting of defense 
ministers from the region at the end of March 1996, aiming to sow the 
seed of mutual security, understanding and cooperation.117 
Furthermore, in early 1998 Fatos Nano, Albanian Prime Minister, met 
his Macedonian counterpart Branko Crvenkovski, were in Tetovo, 
largely inhabited by ethnic Albanians, Nano called for a European 
future for all the Balkans and their people, wherever they live.118 
Indeed, “Albania appeared to be everything that Serbia was not”, with 
increasing “economic progress, a Western policy orientation, and a pro-
NATO stance in the Balkans”.119 
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Nevertheless, the instability from the disintegration of Yugoslavia was 
only at its beginnings: Kosovo in 1998 had, with its 500 000 refugees, a 
severe impact on Albania. 120  
The fate of the Albanians within the Albanian State borders was to be 
challenged as well. The pyramid schemes emergence and their 
attraction exemplified that the path to undertake in institutions and state 
building was still a long one. The schemes offered a get rich quick 
formula with returns as high as 50 per cent of the invested capital. 
Capital flow was possible largely because of unlawful activities during 
the Bosnian war in evading the restrictions imposed on Yugoslavia, the 
non-existent banking services provided for no other investing 
alternatives of remittances, and perceptions of Albanians were such 
that post-communist period allowed for effort-free profits, like it did in 
the wealthy West.121 
Any attempt to prevent the chaos that was to follow as a result of these 
schemes’ collapse, would have required an abrupt halt of the 
miraculous mechanisms that enriched many (and was to impoverish 
many more). It would have resulted in disastrous results at the 
upcoming 1996 parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, the chaos was 
at best only postponed carrying with it even worse results: police and 
army were in disarray, central government was overthrown and arm 
depots were wide open for anyone needing firearms.122 Under these 
internal challenges, the Albanian parliamentary elections of 29 June 
1997 were short of a miracle. It took an uncompromising effort from 
both international and Albanian side to organize them, and the result 
favoring the socialist coalition was not challenged as it was considered 
to represent the true expression of the citizens’ will.123 Of equal 
importance was the evaluation process, in which the international 
community approached the process and delivered the results in 
unison.124 
In 1999 the Commission would take a further step towards 
enlargement, this time towards South East Europe were a renewed 
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association agreement was to be put in place with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Albania.125 These 
agreements aimed at the establishment and consolidation of 
democracy, rule of law, prosperity and stability in the region, while 
offering a prospect for full membership.126 Their possibility was formally 
introduced during Cologne European Council and implemented under 
Stabilization and Association Process.127 The Commission’s Composite 
Paper highlighted that the Kosovo crisis was a paramount threat to 
Europe and that in light of this “the enlargement process […] is calling 
for resolute and courageous action”.128 Romano Prodi, then President 
of the European Commission, underlined that the “hard line” stance 
towards countries who had made considerable efforts, would “become 
disillusioned and turn their backs on us. Their economic policies will 
begin to diverge, and an historic opportunity will have been lost - 
perhaps forever ”.129 
Enlargement, comprising South East Europe, was introduced as an 
exceptional measure, the only one that could save Europe from an all 
too well known history that could repeat itself. 130 The EU’s effort were 
to be channelled through “the Stability Pact” and “focus the maximum 
international effort” materialized in “an economic development fund, 
managed jointly by the EU and the countries of the region, destined for 
big infrastructure projects and institution building.” 131  
The early 90s have been a wake up call for Europe and its leaders, 
awaken with yet another war at their doorstep. Albania’s borders, then 
like today, were shared with States where part of the population was 
made of ethnic Albanians and the same potential mixture of minorities 
is present accross the Balkans. Albanian governments, across political 
spectrum have called to unite the Albanians wherever they live, in 
                                                          
125 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
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127 See European Commission, EU-Western Balkans Summit—Declaration, Press Release 
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Europe. This is what Fatos Nano, then Albanian Prime Minister said in 
its visit to neighbouring Macedonia, and this is today what reportedly 
Albanian government seeks for all Albanians in the region and beyond.  
 
3.3 The Berlin Process  
The Western Balkans political elites have acknowledged the halt in 
enlargement in the face of the multi-challenges the Union faces today. 
Its inward looking approach and the vague commitment toward 
supporting europeanization in the region leave an opened question on 
the perspectives and future for the Western Balkans people. Even more 
so, as I am to demonstrate in the following chapter, before an 
increasing distrust towards the political elites, followed by an ever so 
common lip-service to democracy in adopted reforms set to remain 
lettre morte. Before these warning signes of a U-turn in democratization 
in the region and before the risk of loosing momentum and fueling 
instability the EU embarked in a public diplomacy exercise the Berlin 
Process. Envisioned as a process to start on the symbolic 2014, 
centenary of the start of the WWI and end by 2018, hundreed years 
after the end of WWI.   
 
3.3.1 Western Balkans’ Summit Berlin 2014  
Following the halt in EU enlargement, the Berlin Process was 
conceived as an effort to keep the European perspective alive by 
confirming the EU political support to the Western Balkans. The first 
meeting took place in Berlin in August 2014, the attendees where 
political representatives from countries of the Western Balkans plus 
Slovenia and Croatia as well as Austria and France as forthcoming 
hosts of the Summit. The Berlin Process was born as a complementary 
process to enlargment, to ensure “a speedy progress” in answering 
people’s demands for “a prosperous [economic and political] future”.132 
The Western Balkans need to continue the reform path and with the 
Berlin Process the EU is set to support the countries in their path to 
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common press conference by Angela Merkel, German Federal Chancellor, Edi Rama, Albanian 
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economic development, forge new ties and stronger cooperation that 
could ensure a landmark transformation and sustained stability. Indeed, 
in the meeting the representatives of States pledged, through an 
inclusive process, to continue “reforms aimed at increasing legal 
certainty […], to uphold and reinforce the independence of their 
judiciary, and to work more intensively together across borders in 
regional and bilateral structures”.133 Mr Edi Rama, Albanian Prime 
Minister, speaking on behalf of the SEECP underlined the role of the 
EU in maintaining peace and stability in “a region [formerly] known for 
war, genocide, ethnic cleansing” [that is committed to undertake] the 
changes needed to ensure that the EU sees [the Western Balkans] as 
reliable partners” [and prepare for the] possibility of enlargement” 
whenever the region and the EU “show[s] is ready”.134 The Western 
Balkans’ people are willing to start on a new leaf and build on trust and 
maintain peace, the EU can offer both its assistance and its experience 
in achieving this. The 2014 EC Enlargement Strategy viewed the 
process as “instrumental for encouraging reforms and agreeing realistic 
priorities for core connectivity investments [and] resolve […] bilateral 
issues”.135 As Barroso put it “the closer [the countries of the Western 
Balkans] are to each other, the closer they are to the EU”, which should 
serve as a reassurance to the region regarding its European 
perspective and believes the approach is adequate “to defend the long 
term prosperity” but as well “defend European stability”.136 By initiating 
this process Chancelor Angela Merkel linked her political fate to the 
advancement of the Western Balkans in attaining their European future. 
Historically, starting from the ’90, Germany has engaged with the 
Western Balkans especially in the aftermath of conflicts putting forth 
efforts for stabilisation and strengthening the rule of law and assisting in 
                                                          
133 See Western Balkan’s Heads of States and Governments, Final Declaration by the Chair of the 
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building a market economy.137 The current challenge is to adequately 
channel the EU support to the Western Balkans and help transform 
these odd neighbours into a region. Chancelor Merkel emphasized that 
“[a]ll states in the Western Balkans should have the opportunity to join 
the European Union if they fulfill the accession requirements”.138   
The three pillars of the Berlin Agenda centre around diplomacy, 
economy and connectivity ‘soft measures’: resolution of existing 
bilateral disputes, connecting the region and its people through 
sizeable infrastructure projects. Given the geoeconomic relevance of 
the Western Balkans it is not surprising that one of the points agreed in 
Berlin is active participation in the energy policy where cooperation 
within the Energy Community for South East Europe is seen as 
instrumental to ensure in a sustainable manner energy security, and 
efficiency.139  
Equally significant is bringing people closer to one another, 
instrumental in this are exchange programs designed for the youth with 
a view of building bridges and eradicating possible lingering mistrust 
among its people. It may argued that these ambitious goals can be 
attained only if governments and civil society come together and 
contribute to consolidating transparent and efficient practices of 
decision-making and ensure people’s effective participation. 
 
3.3.2 A double and parallel restart for enlargement  
While the start of the Berlin Process comes at a demanding time for 
both the EU and the Western Balkans, it is not a novelty: other 
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103 
 
initiatives have previously centred in building participatory societies 
through economic and societal development.140 It has been for long 
time understood that the advancement in democracy, market economy 
and improved people to people relations is condition sine qua non for a 
sustained stability and prosperity. The EU policies, towards the 
Western Balkans, including enlargement, have adopted a regional 
approach ever since the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1996.141 The 
European Council in June 2005 would further underline the EU belief 
that the “future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union” 
recalling that “regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations” are 
an integral part of the EU policy.142 
The Stability Pact, it may be argued was a precursor of the Berlin 
Process, with the ambition of bringing together more different countries, 
regional and international organizations “to develop a shared strategy 
for stability and growth in south-eastern Europe”.143 The EU had then 
introduced the Stabilization and Association Agreements for the 
countries of the Western Balkans.144 These agreements were 
instrumental to foster an all rounded cooperation in policy and socio-
economic issues. The Stability Pact grasped the attention of the 
international community as it showcased how the Western Balkans, 
until then known as a powder keg could flourish free of conflicts, 
strengthening its economic and human capital. More recently, the Brdo 
process pioneered by Croatia and Slovenia is earnest in shining the 
light on the importance of stability and peaceful resolution of inter-state 
disputes and concentrate efforts on development by co-financing 
strategic projects of common interest for both the EU and the region.145 
It appears then that the Berlin Process is not a novelty, neither in 
                                                          
140 Other regional initiatives include the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), South East Europe 
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approach nor in prospected results. Some studies have questioned its 
added value as “the Berlin Agenda priorities appear to be to a certain 
extent a ‘repackage’ of the Union’s normative approach to membership 
[...] and of the regional competitive and growth strategy (SEE 2020)”.146 
The economic crisis and austerity policies have been quite taxing for 
the enlargement strategy, which has been seen to loose traction in the 
region which has suffered a regression in democratization, reaching 
levels recorded in 2004. 147  Therefore the process centered in both the 
economic and social development of the region serves as “a double 
and parallel restart for […] enlargement” benefitting both the Western 
Balkans and the EU.148 The process however, seems to be ever 
developing, as it was admitted by an EU Member State senior diplomat 
in Tirana, “the [only] added value, perhaps, is political - a timely public 
diplomacy exercise of gathering the region’s representatives together 
and show the EU interest”. 149 Admittedly, “thinking about socio-
economic needs” is perhaps its added value.150 The EU, arguably, by 
doing this may want to gain back some leverage over its Western 
Balkans partners. It was clear then, it is clear now: “the europeanisation 
of the region is fundamentally in [EU’s] own interest” losing momentum 
may ultimately cause “the balkanisation of European politics.” 151 As 
another senior diplomat in Tirana would confirm me, the Western 
Balkans are indespensable allies to create an economic block before 
other competitors such as China, Russia and the US. 152  
 
3.3.3 Western Balkans’ Summit Vienna 2015 
In the second Western Balkans summit in 2015 hosted in Vienna the 
most prominent issues remained good governance and connectivity 
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with the ambition to bring closer the region and its people. It has been 
acknowledged that “more efforts are needed to accelerate domestic 
reform processes” in an effort to provide solutions to people’s concerns, 
by facilitating development and preserving stability in the region.153 The 
representatives of the Western Balkans during a high-level meeting 
hosted in Brussels in April 2015 had exchanged views on the 
connectivity agenda. The points they agreed upon are directed at 
implementing concrete infrastructure plans in the region, centred on the 
identified three corridors connecting the region with the EU.154 The 
proposed projects are fully aligned with South East Europe Transport 
Observatory SEETO, Treaty establishing the Transport Community and 
the Priority projects of Energy Community (PECI)155. These will abide 
by the “soft” measures as are rail reform implementation, road safety, 
Intelligent Transport System (ITS), harmonized procedures for border-
crossing, and implementation of Integrated Border Management 
(IBM).156 In the energy sector, regional soft measures concentrate 
around market development, cross-border balancing and capacity 
allocation.157 The end results of these efforts are removing obstacles to 
intra-regional trade, have proper regulatory frameworks in place and 
reap the benefits of an open regional market. Indeed, the Western 
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Balkans’ leaders committed to “identify and address […] all relevant 
measures [for] immediate connectivity benefits […] and at a reasonable 
cost”.158   
Investments in infrastructure are seen as source of employment and 
economic growth for the region in addition of bringing the countries and 
the people of the region closer to one another and to Europe. It is of 
outmost importance that “the process [is beneficial] to [Western 
Balkans’] citizens still before accession”.159 The projects agreed upon, 
in addition to connecting the region and its people, with the required 
EUR 7.7 billion investment in the next 15 years, would yield an increase 
in GNP of 1% and recruit to the workforce 4% of the region’s manpower 
or simply put, employ 200 000 people.160 The witnessed increment in 
growth in Albania and Kosovo was largely a result of investing in 
infrastructure. 161 We can argued thus, that these measures may in 
short-medium term improve the region’s economy and in the long run 
strengthen its competitiveness.       
The EU and a few International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are backing 
the investment needed to implement these projects. The Albanian 
delegation’s Working Paper on the Berlin Summit identified and 
proposed possible investment resources to tap into for the required 
investments. These included national contributions, Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance (IPA) funds, funds from the EC Connecting 
Europe facility162, alongside with possible bilateral assistance and 
investments from IFIs.163 The EU channels most of the funding through 
the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) where IFIs, 
bilateral aid and WB countries gather and direct the funds to strategic 
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investments in the region.164 In addition the EC has approved a fund of 
EUR 1 billion under IPA II dedicated to connectivity and technical 
assistance.165 The pre-accession assistance is viewed as a solid 
investment both for the future of the region that has european 
aspirations and that of the Union. Membership has its privileges and its 
obbligations and the EU funds are supporting enlargement countries to 
take on those obbligations. The four energy projects and six transport 
projects in the region which were agreed upon are expected to cost 
616.6 million of which only 33% or 205.7 million are grants of IPA II 
Multi-country program.166  
In the Vienna Summit, ensuring a better and brighter future for the 
youth has been recognized as the basis for ensuring ever growing 
sustainable growth and stability for the region.167 Following up on 
commitments taken by the Joint Declaration on Youth Cooperation and 
the Positive Agenda for Youth in the Western Balkans, adopted during 
the Brdo Summit on 23 April 2015, the Western Balkans’ leaders 
agreed to establish in a wide cooperation with the civil society, under a 
region wide ownership, the Regional Youth Cooperation Office of the 
Western Balkans based on the Franco-German model.168 Empowering 
youth as a catalyst for “lasting political, economic and social stability of 
the region” is consistent with the regions’ european ambitions.169 
Accordingly, the Positive Agenda for the Youth in the Western Balkans 
reflects on available resources and tools that facilitate learning from the 
european experience for better chances of employability and for 
eradicating the malaise of historical distrust.170 By intensifying 
exchanges within the region, people may build bridges of trust and 
cooperation founded on “common and mutual interests” that can in turn 
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give vigour to the regions efforts to further reforms and progress by 
upholding fundamentals of equality and solidarity.171 In this view the 
people of the region look favorably to using exhange programs both 
intra-region and with the EU. The Western Balkans’ leaders commit to 
strengthen the capacity of existing programs like CEEPUS (Central 
European Exchange Program for University Studies) and look forward 
to establishing National Agencies on Erasmus + programme.172 
Furthermore, the participating States pledge to make a better and 
increased use of european funds on youth empowerment notably by 
relying on the Education Reform Initiative of South Eastern Europe 
(ERI SEE) particularly for capacity building and exchanges in research 
and education173.  
The representatives of Albania and Serbia signed a bilateral 
memorandum of understanding on the margins of the Berlin Summit on 
a youth exchange initiative between the two countries, which was 
subsequently embraced by others in the region.174 The Working Group 
on Regional Youth Cooperation gathers civil society and government 
representatives from all the Western Balkans, which - with the 
assistance provided by the Franco-German Youth Office - have laid 
down the framework of the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO). 
175  
The initiative has been welcomed especially for its inclusiveness of all 
relevant actors and consequent regional ownership.176 The CSOs have 
been vocal in underlining one of the most significant goals of RYCO is 
to give voice to those who are “overlooked”, those who are 
disenfranchised and abused. Empowering these youngsters, 
concentrate efforts on building capability.177 A region wide cooperation 
may not yield the desired results if it does not tap into the existing 
resources at the grassroots, not only local structures but as well civil 
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society. Should this be followed through, the initiative may propel 
Western Balkans societies in the path to EU integration.178 The EC 
Enlargement Strategy for 2015 confirms this perspective as it 
advocates for “[a] stronger role for civil society organisations and a 
much more supportive and enabling environment” to further the 
necessary reforms.179 An effective participation in decision making is 
vital in holding the government accountable, fosters a better 
understanding of the EU promoted reforms and their benefits and 
support institutional efforts in mending fences.180  
The Berlin Process has been instrumental in affording to the civil 
society the opportunity to have their say at a high-level political 
gathering. The Civil Society Forum held on the margins of the Western 
Balkans Summit in Vienna made for an improvement on the debates 
within the Summit.181 The CSOs were vocal on concrete measures 
directed to address challenges regarding regional cooperation, high 
unemployment and freedom of expression and called on the 
institutional support of the governements on existing successful efforts 
in the region.182 In a first of its kind debate held with Sebastian Kurz, 
Edi Rama, Johannes Hahn, Igor Crnadak and Igor Luksic 
representatives of civil society debated about the pressures the regions 
was under as the refugee crisis in the Balkan Route unfolded. The 
CSO’s reiterated that government lead efforts on regional cooperation 
should include as well existing successful CSO’s initiatives across the 
region.183 Civil society can offer a useful contribution as well in matters 
of economic development and has expressed its goodwill to be 
included from early on, in decisions of the National Economic Council. 
The CSOs voiced as well their concern on freedom of expression. 
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Further efforts should be put forth to ensure the independence of public 
broadcasters and regulatory bodies, as it has been assessed, the 
region has a long way ahead to ensure transparent, merit based and 
free from political meddling hiring in the media outlets.184 Strong 
concerns remain on media outlet’s ownership, which remains opaque 
to the general public.  
In the Final Declaration of the Vienna Summit, representatives of the 
Western Balkans’ welcomed the involvement of civil society as “an 
additional important element of the Berlin Process.”185 The Forum 
hosted in Vienna was followed by the one held in Belgrade, in May 
2016.186 In Belgrade it was noted that democratization in the Western 
Balkans is undergoing a steady regression.187 The CSOs reiterated 
their goodwill in providing fresh ideas and to work hand in hand with 
government authorities to ensure effectiveness of reforms by employing 
novel instruments for monitoring and consultation.188 The message was 
clear, the path to the EU integration without consistently involving the 
civil society is a mere lip service to the EU and to the people of the 
region.  
Furthermore, the CSOs have attained concrete results in facilitating 
reconciliation in the region. They can build coalitions with one another 
and media outlets to sensitize people and government alike, and play a 
remarkable role in the resolution of disputes.189 This service is of 
particular importance as the region cannot, get ever closer to the EU 
with unresolved disputes which in addition of being a concrete threat to 
the stability of the region,  take attentions and energies away from the 
reforms needed for EU integration.190 This is why good-neighbourhood 
relations were added as ‘Copenhagen plus’ criteria.191   
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In Vienna the Western Balkans’ Leaders in the Declaration on Regional 
Cooperation and the Solution of Bilateral Disputes, convened “not [to] 
block [each others’] EU path” and to peacefully resolve any issue of 
contention and overcoming the shadows of the past. 192 In this pursuit 
the attendees commit “to make full use of the EU macro-regional 
strategies for the Danube and the Adriatic-Ionian regions as well as of 
the OSCE, the Central European Initiative”. 193 Moreover, the Vienna 
Summit was successful in capitalizing on the above mentioned 
declaration as two agreements putting an end to border disputes were 
signed between Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Montenegro and Kosovo.194 It is no question that overcoming of intra-
state disputes is responsibility of the parties involved, however, as it 
was shown in Vienna, the EU can and should be more actively involved 
in mediating resolution and ensure thus that these do not spill over the 
EU integration path of the region.  
   
3.3.4 Western Balkans’ Summit Paris 2016 
The enlargement process remains the goal of the region, and in the 
summit in Paris, leaders from the region and their counterpart 
underlined the importance of rule of law, fundamental right, fighting 
corruption and organized crime.195 These issues are followed 
attentively by France, indeed interviews conducted with French officials 
confirm that the Commission’s negotiation approach known as 
‘frontloading’ - where chapters 23 and 24 concerned with rule of law, 
fundamental rights and freedom and security are to be opened first and 
closed last - was originally proposed by France.196 Harlem Désir, 
Minister of State for European Affairs in various meetings held with 
Western Balkans high officials noted that while France support the 
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enlargement to the Western Balkans, necessary reforms directed to 
ensuring rule of law and fundamental rights are to be implemented.197   
The French President François Hollande underlined the European 
perspective of the Western Balkans, as building Europe without the 
Western Balkans can be only a bleak attempt to deny the historic 
realities of Europe, particularly those of the World Wars.198 Hollande 
reaffirmed his country’s support to enlargement provided that the 
countries comply with the necessary reforms.199 The participation of 
François Hollande at the Brdo Summit lent a much-needed political 
support to enlargement.200 Thus, the Brdo Summit underlines the 
importance of Western Balkans’ ownership in getting ever closer to the 
EU. Thus, it followed naturally that in 2016, France offered to host the 
third Western Balkans Summit in Paris. 
In the Ministerial Conference held on 24 May 2016 in Paris, the 
representatives of the Western Balkans together with Croatia, Slovenia, 
Germany, Austria and Italy and in presence of Commissioner Hahn and 
Alain Le Roy Secretary-General of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) discussed the agenda of the Paris Summit.201 Mr Désir 
confirmed France commitment to supporting the rapprochement and 
good neighbourhood relations of countries in the region.202   
In 2016 Paris Summit the representatives of the region in the format of 
heads of state and government together with ministers of economy and 
foreign affairs met with their counterpart from Croatia, Slovenia, 
                                                          
197 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, “Albania – Meeting 
between Harlem Désir and Klajda Gjosha, Minister for European Integration”, 28 October, 2015, 
Paris, France; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, “Albania – Visit 
by Harlem Désir, Minister of State for European affairs”, 30 March 2016, Tirana, Albania; French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, “Western Balkans - Harlem Désir’s 
participation in the Bled Strategic Forum”, 5-6 September 2016, Slovenia; French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International Development, “Albania – Visit by Harlem Désir”, 7-8 December 
2016, Tirana, Albania. 
198 AFP, “Hollande participe à un sommet inédit des pays des Balkans”, Le Point, 25 July 2013.  
199 Ibid.   
200 STA, T.M. “Ex-YU Presidents Agree to Continue Brdo Process”, The Slovenia Times, 03 July 
2013.  
201 See French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, “Albania – Meeting 
between Harlem Désir and Klajda Gjosha, Minister for European Integration”, 28 October, 2015, 
Paris, France, ; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, “Participation 
of the Foreign Ministers of the countries to the 2016 Paris Balkans Summit”, 24 May 2016.  
202 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, “Western Balkans – Harlem 
Désir’s participation in a forum”, 30 May 2016. 
113 
 
Austria, Germany, Italy, the EU representatives as well as 
representatives of the host France.203 Once again the attendees 
highlighted the re-found vigour in intra-region cooperation facilitated by 
the Berlin Process and the Brdo process. The concentration of efforts 
around a clear agenda on “transport, energy, and people to people 
contacts” have been widely appreciated. In Paris, the participants could 
discuss the developments achieved under the projects approved in 
Vienna 2015 summit and the implementation of the required soft 
measures instrumental in streamlining rules and procedures and thus 
facilitating the progress of infrastructure projects.  
New investments on the railway and a programme on hydropower and 
energy efficiency were approved where the EU pledged other EUR 150 
million in grants.204 Prime Minister Rama expressed his satisfaction 
“that the seriousness shown by the Albanian government in the 
programming of this phase” reaped results as one of the approved 
connectivity projects is rebuilding the railway in Albania.205 The energy 
sector projects together with the adopted road map on building a 
regional market for electricity are seen as instrumental for economic 
development, and regional market integration with the view to merge it 
with the EU market. The EU and the Energy Community will be 
following the progress in their implementation. In this CEFTA and 
especially the additional Protocol 5 on Trade Facilitation is seen as a 
catalyst of these regional market integration efforts.206  
In the Paris Summit the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) 
was formally established as the Western Balkans representatives 
signed the agreement on youth cooperation framed after the Franco-
German experience.207 This office core work will be education in 
democratic values, cultural diversity, and promote exchange programs 
with the end result being bringing Western Balkans’ youth together, 
focusing on similarities while cherishing their diversity. These 
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commitments follow on the Positive Agenda for the youth of the 
Western Balkans that together with the increased opportunities offered 
under the umbrella of Erasmus + ensure better perspectives for young 
people in employment.208 The representatives agreed that “the RYCO 
would provide a major contribution to the reconciliation and the 
European future of the region”. 209 However, to date the Regional Youth 
Cooperation Office is not working. Malaise over the proposed Secretary 
General, a Serbian national from the Kosovan counterparts persist. 
This despite a gentleman agreement that given that the headquarters 
are in Tirana, the Secretary General should be Serbian and the Deputy 
Secretary General Kosovan. 210  
Paris maintained the tradition started in Vienna encouraging CSOs of 
the region to contribute to the works of the summit.211 The Western 
Balkan Sustainability Charter and its implementation took primary 
stage, growth can be sustainable and the CSOs seize the opportunity 
to call on Western Balkan’s governments to follow through on 
commitments taken in COP21and pursue a sustainability agenda to 
create jobs and growth.212  Moreover, CSOs applaud the signature of 
RYCO agreement and suggest that Croatia and Slovenia join these 
regional efforts and Erasmus + should extend to the whole region.213 
However, the civil society was quick to warn that these suggested 
initiatives should by no means serve as an excuse for any possible 
reduction of funds directed at youth activities in the region.214  
Stability of the region is important for its people and for the EU, the 
steady steps taken toward reconciling the region have been welcomed 
by the EU. The Vienna Declaration on Regional Cooperation and the 
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Solution of Bilateral Disputes of August 2015 was followed up by 
another conference “Western Balkans: Energizing the Enlargement 
Process by Solving Bilateral Disputes” in April 2016.215 Participants 
agreed that it is crucial to galvanize the political commitment attained in 
Vienna by identifying tools, mechanisms that best can serve the 
purpose of facilitating economic development and growth in the region 
and take stock of the progress made in this direction. The EU 
integration path goes hand in hand with good neighbourhood relations 
in the region. The lingering disputes in the region regard border 
demarcation inherent to former Yugoslavia, but as well political 
disputes regarding statehood and identity like the name dispute 
between the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece. 
Disputes where an EU member State is involved charge the resolution 
efforts politically and if these intersect with the enlargement accession 
negotiations, heighten arguments of a political blackmail which 
contributes to lessening the EU leverage and cast a shadow on the 
transparency of the enlargement process. Albanian Foreign Affairs 
Minister Bushati underlined that countries in the region are aware that 
“open bilateral disputes have at best slowed down the accession 
process or at worst prevented it from going forward”.216 These 
intertwined issues are further aggravated by heated interethnic 
relations in the region, which make any intra-region mediation 
impossible due to lingering distrust of possible hidden agendas. Civil 
society has pushed that existing mediation effort in the region include 
the active participation of Bulgaria, Romania and Greece and that the 
EU engages more actively by appointing a coordinator within EEAS on 
bilateral disputes.217 Practically, it has been suggested that these can 
be overcame by connecting “dispute resolution mechanisms [with] 
economic development mechanisms” that highlight the mutual 
importance of the two. 218   
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Stability remains an important reason of political engagement in the 
Western Balkans, many interviews conducted both in Brussels and 
Tirana confirm it. It is understood however, that “preserving the status 
quo will not hold”. 219  The Berlin Process was initially a political one, 
however it became clear to everyone that “without connectivity the 
process would not work”, the EU has always have the sense that if we 
do not engage others will. 220 The substance in reforms is lacking, from 
one year to the other – indeed the last two years – even the once 
known ‘progress reports’ are now called ‘country reports’ as “there is no 
progress”. 221  
Indeed, in the case of Albania, France is eager to see implementation 
of adopted reforms starting with the vetting law. 222 In an official visit for 
launching the Regional Youth Cooperation Office, French Minister of 
State for European Affairs Mr Harlem Désir confirmed to Prime Minister 
Rama the French support on enlargement towards the Western 
Balkans, underlining the importance of chapters 23 and 24.223 A 
significant political signal for the region is the visit of François Hollande 
in Albania and Serbia scheduled in March 2017. It will be the first time a 
French President to visit the country of the eagles.  A senior French 
Diplomat in Tirana, confirms that the message France wants to transmit 
is that of a stronger international cooperation “France is here, France is 
with you”. 224 
The results achieved, as mentioned above, serve as “proof that the 
Berlin Process meant as an accelerator of the EU” [has yielded] 
practical and political effects of cooperation”.225  However, more critical 
voices, like the Chairwoman of the  European Integration Committee of 
the Parliament of Albania, Ms Majlinda Bregu,  would like to see in this 
“very nice and beautiful political willingness” more economic backing as 
it is lamented that the main financial support comes from existing 
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instruments such as IPA II.226The expectation was that the EC, IMF and 
EBRD would be more resilient in finding new means to instil growth and 
facilitate development in the region. The efforts put forth by the EU and 
a few IFIs to strengthen the market economy of the region seem to be 
far too little. 227 The criticism stands, as it is confirmed by a senior 
diplomat given that the process started as a political one and many 
efforts to bring in investors were not successful, the only substantial 
economic support remains that of IPA II funds and existing bilateral 
donations. 228   
 
3.3.5 Towards Trieste 2017 
On the 12 of July 2017, it will be Italy’s turn to host in Trieste the 
Western Balkan Summit. It was announced by Italian Foreign Affairs 
and International Cooperation Minister, Mr Angelino Alfano before the 
Commissions for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber and Senate. 229 Italy 
has always been an avid supporter of enlargement in the Western 
Balkans. In the enlargement policy toward the region, Italy has seen the 
potential of instilling peace and stability by means of incentives to 
resolve prolonged disputes. The many possibilities that would unfold for 
Italy as a result of  integration of the region in the EU with the foreseen 
advantages in economy and security and the geographic rebalancing 
within the EU between north and south. 230  
Preparations are underway and at the time I am completing the writing 
of this thesis the agenda seems to be centred on rule of law and 
justice, freedom and security, as well as instilling growth by facilitating 
new investmenst on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
strengthening cooperation in fighting corruption.231 These themes are 
among the most important goals Italy seeks to attain through 
enlargement policy in the region. In interviews conducted the above 
mentioned themes were salient. Italy follows with attention the 
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implementation of the justice reform, fighting corruption and organize 
crime in the view to strenthen, thus a common area of freedom, justice 
and security by encouraging synergies between the regional and EU 
integration.232  
On the 23 of January 2017 in a meeting held in Tirana gathering the 
Italian Ambassadors in the region the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation, Vincenzo Amendola with Envoy 
Extraordinary of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation Mr Michele Giacomelli, exchanged views on the current 
situation in the region, expectations and possibilities to further the 
regional cooperation in view of the upcoming Summit in Trieste. 233 
Minister Alfano reminded that this is an occasion “to further strengthen 
the strategic partnership between Italy and the countries in the region, 
that should be done in parallel to the efforts within the UN Security 
Council”. 234 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The EU enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans has been 
motivated by strategic interests. The costs of engagement have always 
been outweighed by the costs of a resulting instability. Moreover, 
starting in the beginning of the ’90 - as supported by interviews and the 
relaunch of enlargement by means of the Berlin Process – the Western 
Balkans have been seen as an important piece of the European puzzle. 
Either the EU would engage, or else other would and are engaging 
through investments and thus political leverage in the region. In Albania 
alone the spike in Chinese investment has caused some alarm.235 The 
new domestic and as a result foreign policy developments of allies like 
the US and raising populist demands in European countries that 
threaten regime changes across Europe do on one hand, pose the risk 
of undoing “decades of European integration”236 and on the other, 
                                                          
232 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, Tirana, 13 January 2017. 
233 Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Interantional Cooperation, “Alfano interviene in 
videoconferenza degli Ambasciatori Italiani dei Paesi dell’aerea adriatico-balcanica”, 23.01.2017. 
234 Ibid.  
235 M. Tanner, “Russia Never Went Away from the Balkans”, Balkan Insight, 08 Febraury 2017; F. 
Mejdini “Chinese Buy Rights to Oil Fields in Albania”, Balkan Insight, 21 March 2016; G. 
Erebara “Chinese to Builld Albanian Highway to Macedonia”, Balkan Insight; Senior Diplomat, 
EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU 
Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 02 February 2017. 
236 Juncker, A New Start for Europe op.cit., p. 3. 
119 
 
reaffirm the importance of the region before the changing 
multilateralism.  
Nonetheless, the Juncker’s European Commission Presidency, served 
to solidify nearly a decade of ambiguity in the EU policy toward the 
Western Balkans that started with the renewed consensus for 
enlargement. As it has argued by international studies there has been 
an alarming regress and no progress in the region. Maintaining 
momentum is certainly less costly than facing instability or hostile 
interests in the EU doorstep. For it to happen there should be goodwill 
and interest on both parties on the path of Europeanization. 
Disengagement from the region is not an option for the EU, however 
the tools for Europeanization are much more dependent on the 
interactions between the parties by means of socialization, and not on 
concrete leverage. The interactions of both parties have informed the 
choices and policy decisions they both have had. Arguably, at the 
moment to the detriment of the future of 18 million people living in the 
Western Balkans.   
The rules of negotiation in Brussels have been adapted throughout 
these two decades and there is clarity on all parties involved that the 
EU is forcefully inward looking and the countries of the region know that 
there is no simple automatism in the enlargement process where public 
opinion limits the course of action.237 There is a growing understanding, 
that the ambiguous relationship is being revived in times of need like 
the migration crisis. However, as much as the government have been 
lenient towards EU requests, it is noteworthy to point at the increasing 
numbers of asylum applications from the region. Important figures if 
compared to those of war torn Syria that are telling on the situation in 
the region. Yet, it seems that once again we are living in a conundrum 
similar to the end of the ’90 when the then President of the EC Prodi 
warned against maintaining a “hard line” or else be ready to see these 
countries “turn their backs on [the EU]”.238  
The region should be seen as more than just a ticking bomb - a threat 
of instability - indeed the several connectivity projects and those in the 
field of energy, recognize the geo-economic value the region has for 
the EU. However, efforts put in place are little more than those of a 
diplomatic exercise. Funds for the approved investment projects are 
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coming from the same budget and no new investments have been 
assured.   
On one hand, in order to reach concrete results in connecting the 
region through a region wide market the relations between countries 
and any lingering bilateral disputes should be resolved. The Berlin 
Process brought about some progress in this direction but much more 
needs to be done. The long-term tool for strengthening young 
generations connection to one another, the Regional Youth 
Cooperation Office, was conceived in the first Western Balkans summit 
in Berlin 2014 and it is yet to start its activities. 
On the other hand, new investment from China, Russia and the political 
influence of the US concretely presents a threat to the project the EU 
has in forming in the continent an economic block. Indeed, the 
preparatory agenda for the next Western Balkans summit in Trieste 
highlights the focus on small and medium enterprises, underlining the 
attention towards instilling growth in the region.    
The Berlin Process has been a pragmatic reminder for both the EU and 
the Western Balkans about the importance of cooperation and its 
ultimate goal was to serve as a reassurance of their European 
perspective.  
Nonetheless, more should be done as the linkages of the EU in the 
region are ever more weak, the threat of democratic backsliding within 
the Union – with elections in France, Germany and the Netherlands - 
plus the vagueness of the accession perspective may put into question 
the EU role in championing democracy in the wider region.239 The 
Western Balkans are thought to be governed by an elite whose main 
interest is clinging to power, this state capture weakens trust in 
democracy and risks to encourage the rise of populism “offering simple 
solutions to complex political and social problems”.240 The context is 
further burden by raising socio-economic concerns and weak 
democratic traditions that clash with a rising authoritarianism.241   
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In the next chapter I attempt to analyze and assess  progress in 
reforms in Albania since receiving the candidate status and recent 
developments in the public opinion. What is undeniable is that “in spite 
of many differences amongst its Member States, is by far the wealthiest 
and most stable continent in the world.” 242 The question is now if both 
parties the domestic gatekeeper elites, and the EU will move from 
preventing the ‘worst case’ to achieving the ‘best case’. 
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Chapter 4  
Empirical observation on the EU Enlargement Policy  
The case of Albania 
 
4.1 Fundamentals first 
Starting from early 2000, the EU came up with a “Programme for the 
Prevention of Violent Conflicts”, with a view to ensure “[a] coherent 
early warning, analysis and action”.1 The warning indicators for 
potential instability are to be found in the Constitution which guarantees 
the respect of  human rights by means of ensuring the rule of law.2 In 
addition, indicators like freedom of expression, peaceful co-existence 
among different communities, a steady economic situation, social and 
regional disparities are seen in the geopolitical context.3  
Accordingly, already in 2013 Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle 
suggested a change of course in the EU enlargement towards the 
Western Balkans where the conditions to be met were going to be 
centred in five “fundamentals” namely the rule of law, strengthening 
economic governance, support for democratic institutions, respect for 
fundamental rights and ties between the enlargement countries and EU 
member states.4 Arguably, this shift in policy was dictated by lesson 
learnt in the last decade of EU enlargement and “fundamentals first” 
emerged as the main theme of  2013 Strategy paper.5 The EC has 
since adopted a novel modus operandi with an increased focus on and 
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frontloading of rule of law.6 
What novelty does the 2015 enlargement package introduce? Simon 
Mordue, European Commission, DG Near, Director for Strategy and 
Turkey, highlights that the EC has revived the “fundamentals first” 
approach by introducing a multiannual overarching strategy evaluation 
grid covering the European Commission term.7 The enlargement 
package does not only focus on progress attained but for the first time 
provides a roadmap of issues to be tackled in the short and long term. 
Effectively carving a roadmap to better preparing the countries to take 
on membership obligations. Moreover, the evaluation scales are now 
harmonized to facilitate comparison and promote transparency on the 
path of accession process. Nonetheless, Mr. Mordue admits that “all 
assessment include subjectivity” and the EC “in line with our aim of full 
transparency” has decided to “include a detailed annex on [each 
country’s] report” which was result of a close collaboration with other 
international organizations such as the OSCE, Council of Europe and 
IMF. 8 
The environment where we are working has changed, not how many 
and how fast but how seamless integration is going to be and the EC, 
in the words of the Director for Strategy for Enlargement is focusing on 
“three to four reforms in the upcoming 18 months and make the 
process more political.”9 This “political frontloading” comes as a result 
of lessons learnt from past enlargement rounds, reforms and possible 
resolution of conflicts takes time thus starting as soon as possible with 
these thorny issues gives leverage to the EU in pushing a clear reform 
agenda domestically. The EU Member States are cognizant that the 
path to full compliance is a steep one thus among my interviewees 
there were expressed suggestions of being more fair than strict on 
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these. 10   
These fundamentals have been part of long processes and should be 
tackled early on in the process so that to secure concrete results, to be 
clear these processes do not entail only setting up laws and institutions 
but most importantly an enforcement track record.11 
Ms. Bregu, Chairwoman of the Committee for EU Integration in the 
Albanian Parliament underlined the need for the enlargement process 
to become “more innovative” stressing the need for “more decision and 
less rhetoric”. The stability in the region and each in each of our 
countries, good standards of democracy and good governance are 
crucial. In order to find an answer to enlargement all of us should not 
“insist that the answer must come from the EU Member States”. 12 If 
there is lack of standards the Western Balkans should move and so 
should the EU keeping the process going and not wait for the EU to 
digest enlargement.  
In the following chapter I adopt the theoretical framework envisaged by 
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way to evaluate the developments in 
Albania, since obtaining the candidate status.13 A modern democracy is 
based on free and fair elections where all eligible citizens have the right 
to cast their ballot by means of which legitimate the work of executives 
and legislatures, which are not, on the other hand restricted by any 
external influence 14; political and socio-economic rights including the 
fundamental rights such as freedom of speech and association are 
preserved.15 It has been recognized that even democratic regimes may, 
on occasion restrict these liberties but these do not amount to 
disrupting the balance and fairness where the same rules are applied to 
both government and opposition. 
The analysis that follows shows that we are in the presence of a hybrid 
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regime as defined by Juan Linz [a lesser] form of authoritarianism.16 
Indeed, I argue that Albanians live under a competitive 
authoritarianism.17 Democratic institutions - as I try to showcase 
throughout my analysis - may not be enough to resist an authoritarian 
turn. Indeed, competitive authoritarianism flourishes under the 
premises of this paradox. The use of legislative loopholes, enforcement 
of patronage, cooption and corruption are all means to an end, in the 
game of thrones of the Albanian political landscape. It all is skilfully 
managed so as not to inspire a violent domestic dissent or external 
condemnation.18 Yet, it is a fine line that poses a constant threat to 
stability. It results in a conundrum for autocratic incumbents, should 
they hold on to power in blatant violation of democratic rules, cause 
domestic unrest and face sanctions by international system or allow a 
change in power? 19 Albania will be holding its elections later this year 
in June 2017, but as Levitsky and Way remark “succession is not 
democratization”. 20   
There is no level playing field between government and opposition, yet 
the democratic institutions may be used by dissenting voices to 
confront the government is specific “arenas of contestation” that I do 
analyse below.21  
 
4.1.1 Elections 
In analyzing progress in the area of democracy, I evaluate the last 
parliamentary and local elections held in Albania in June 2013 and 
2015 respectively. The results are slightly positive as, on one hand, 
elections are “positively assessed by the international election 
                                                          
16 J. J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2000, p. 34. 
17 See Levitsky and Way, op.cit., pp. 53-54. 
18 These dilemmas are presented in an insightful way in Schedler, op. cit., pp.103–122.  
19 See Levitsky and Way, op.cit., pp. 58-59. 
20 Levitsky and Way, op.cit., p. 59. See as well Ministria e Puneve te Brendshme, “Takimi me 
Diasporen/Vota e emigranteve, paraprihet nga regjistrimi i tyre”, Tirane, 19 Nentor 2016. 
Albanians living outside the country to this day are not afforded the opportunity to cast their vote. 
Unless they travel to Albania during elections.  
21 Levitsky and Way, op.cit., p. 54. 
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observation mission”. 22 On the other hand, they are “bitterly fought” 
between the two main political parties that resort to “abus[e] of state 
power” to futher their interest and use media coverage to “violent[ly] 
haras[s] opposition”.23   
In June 2013, the parliamentary elections were regularly held, as 
Albanians elected 140 members of parliament “for a four-year term 
under a regional proportional system within 12 multi-member electoral 
districts”. 24 The political participation was wide as “[s]ixty-six political 
parties and two independent candidates were registered as 
contestants” and grouped around the two main political parties the 
Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Party (SP). 25 
The institutional rules and procedures prior to the elections where in 
place as the Constitution and the Electoral Code both amended in 2008 
and 2012 respectively hold provisions directed to upholding 
fundamental rights and freedoms laying the basis for democratically 
held elections.26 Nonetheless, the “implementation and enforcement by 
all main stakeholders fell short” hindering thus trust and “confidence in 
the electoral process”.27 
The political context had been heavy since the 2009 parliamentary 
elections where both Democratic Party (DP) lead by Sali Berisha and 
Socialist Party (SP) lead by Edi Rama had gathered nearly an equal 
support from the electorate. The government majority was obtained 
with the votes of the Socialist Movement for Integration (SMI) lead by 
Ilir Meta. The Central Elections’ Commission (CEC) was affected by the 
game of thrones as in March 2013, three months prior to the elections 
the DP lead governing coalition lost its ally, the Socialist Movement for 
Integration. The Republican Party became then the second largest 
                                                          
22 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2013 Progress Report, 
SWD (2013) 414 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013, p. 5. 
23 Levitsky and Way, op.cit., p. 55. See as well OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission 
Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 1. In comparison to the 2013 elections in the local 
election of June 2015 the tone of the political campaign had somewhat improved, however the 
main political parties did not refrain from personal attacks to discredit the opponents. See as well 
OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 8 September 2015, p. 2. 
24 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 5. 
25 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 1. 
26 Cf. OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 6. 
27 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 1. 
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political party in the governing coalition – and following the sacking of 
the representative of SMI -  after a vote in the Albanian Parliament, 
gained a seat in the CEC  
This subsequent change in composition of the CEC does not find any 
ground in the Electoral Code, whereby  Article 18 does not provide for a 
shift in the composition of the governing coalition nor that of the 
opposition to authorize the early termination of the mandate of a CEC 
member. In the parliamentary debate, however, the reason of the early 
termination was justified on the alleged ineligibility of the dismissed 
CEC member to hold office on the grounds of having been previously 
dismissed from another public office. Nonetheless, the argument of a 
political motivated manoeuvre holds, as SMI was never called to 
replace its member within CEC given its departure from the governing 
coalition. The three CEC members proposed by the opposition SP and 
the Human Rights Union Party (HRUP) were also terminated and the 
Parliament requested that the opposition proposed replacements so as 
to act on the resignation notice received from the CEC. The Electoral 
Code in Article 18.2 provides for the parliament to approve resignations 
of CEC members without specifying a term to do so, while Article 19.3 
provides the parliament should appoint new members within the term of 
48 hours. The opposition called the early termination of its CEC 
members unsubstantiated, hence the opposition would not comply with 
Parliament’s request and put forth new nominations for the positions. 
Following this political exchange starting from mid-April 2013, two 
months before the elections, the CEC was working with only four 
members.28 Thus, the Central Elections’ Commission  was hindered 
from functioning properly.  
Thus the Parliament, was called to determine the number of seats for 
each district. Instead of referring to 2013 population statistics, the 
Legislative body decided to use the 2009 population statistics.  
Article 75 of the Electoral Code states that - while the number of seats 
to be elected in each district ranges from 4 to 32 - the number of seats 
are allocated in proportion to the number of citizens of each district, so 
that each elected member in the Parliament to represent an equal 
number of constituents. The arbitrary decision taken by the Parliament 
                                                          
28 See OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 5.  
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undermined the principle of equal representation as under 2013 
population statistics the districts of Berat and Korçë should have been 
allocated one seat less and the districts of Durres and Tirana should 
have been allocated an additional seat. Moreover, this infringes on the 
provision of para. 7.3 of 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document in 
accordance with which States pledge to “guarantee universal and equal 
suffrage to adult citizens”.29  
The local elections, scheduled every four years, held on 21 June 2015 
were equally marked by a polarized atmosphere between the now 
opposition lead by DP and the government majority of SP and SMI.30 
Following the candidate status granted to Albania by the EC, the DP 
started a boycott of the works in the Parliament. The European 
Parliament, through two of its main parties EPP and S&D and their 
respective representatives, Eduard Kukan and Knut Fleckenstein, 
brokered an agreement centred on building a constructive political 
dialogue between political parties, including debates on thorny issues 
like barring from seeking a nomination or holding a public office any 
individual with criminal records.31 In this agreement the ruling majority 
committed to seek the opposition participation on important reforms 
and to work together in reviewing and aligning rules and procedures of 
parliamentary inquiry committees to best international standards.32 
 
4.1.1.1 Electoral campaign 
The political campaigns started with political parties and prominent 
politicians holding rallies to present their candidates. Nonetheless, 
there was limited political debate between contestants with no 
                                                          
29 See OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, pp. 
5-6. See also OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE, p. 6. 
30 These elections were the first for Albania after receiving the candidate status and the first 
following the 2014 revision of local government units where in the newly-formed 61 
municipalities Albanians elected majors and local councils.  
31 E. Kukan, K. Fleckenstein, “Press Statement by Knut Fleckenstein and Eduard Kukan on 
political dialogue and cooperation in Albania”, Brussels, 17 December 2014; E. Kukan, K. 
Fleckenstein, “Breakthrough in Tirana: Press Statement by Knut Fleckenstein and Eduard Kukan 
on political dialogue and cooperation in Albania”, Brussels, 23 December 2014; 
32 See Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Rezolute e marreveshjes politike mes Mazhorances 
Qeverisese dhe Opozites ne Kuvendin e Republikes se Shqiperise, 24.12.2014.  
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involvement of prominent career politicians. The agenda of most 
political parties was centred on economic development, employment, 
the fight against corruption, and EU integration. The heated and often 
personal, accusations between DP and SP political parties 
representatives during the campaign diverted the attention away from 
solid topic of concern for Albanian citizens.33 The government used 
official events such as opening of roads, schools and hospitals, 
inauguration of factories and opening of employment opportunities for 
campaign purposes. A do ut des practice was used in rallying events 
were the ruling coalition Socialist Party and the Socialist Movement for 
Integration during the local elections continued misuse state power for 
electoral purposes.34 Furthermore, the main political parties, resorted to 
politically motivated neglect in (failing to) implement the existing legal 
framework, which hindered the proper functioning of elections 
administration, thus allowing room for irregularities. 35 The members of 
the Central Election Commission (CEC) waivered under pressure, 
undermining public’s trust in having a free and fair system in place 
administering the elections.36 These were an infringement on para. 5.4 
of OSCE Copenhagen Document whereby “a clear separation between 
the State and political parties” shall be preserved and where 
participating states pledged that “political parties will not be merged 
with the State”.37 Furthermore there were widespread allegations that 
public-sector workers were pressured to attend rallies or gather support 
for the governing party or else face consequences such as termination 
of employment.38 In addition, the phenomenon of vote-buying, 
                                                          
33 See OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 
13. 
34 Examples include, Ilir Meta Chairman of the Albanian Parliament, and chair of SMI, handing 
out legalization certificates in Vore broadcasted on television (24 May); Erjon Veliaj Footage of 
Mr. Veliaj handing out legalization certificates broadcasted on television (23 and 26 May). 
Moreover, on 1st June, Mr. Veliaj together with Prime Minister Rama and Minister of Education 
Ms. Nikolla, appeared to the construction site of the Olympic Park in Tirana. On 2 June, together 
with Mr. Meta, Mr. Viktor Tusha, SMI candidate for mayor in Lezhe, visited the construction site 
for a new bridge in Lezhe. Both of them made another appearance together on 8 June, at the 
inauguration of a new ferry line from Shengjin to Brindisi.  
35 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 8 September 2015, p. 1. 
36 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 8 September 2015, p. 1. 
37 See also OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE, p. 6. 
38 See OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 
13. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM noted that schools would close during daytime rallies, with teachers 
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especially targeting vulnerable strata of the population, resurfaced 
leading up to the election day.39 Especially durign the local elections of 
June 2015, the EOM of OSCE/ODIHR observed many cases of group 
voting and proxy voting, notably with political party activists possibly 
exerting pressure on voters. 40 Following these instances of overt abuse 
of state power, blurring the lines of public good and particular party 
interests the Ombudsperson intervened establishing a working group 
and invited citizens victims of abuse to report these instances. Citizens 
may face various repercussion and lose their jobs should they decide to 
report these instances.41 Article 21 of the Electoral Code provides for  
the CEC to ensure there is no misuse of state power and resources, 
evaluate complaints and refer severe abuse mounting in criminal 
behaviour to law enforcement bodies.42 Nonetheless, the complaint 
mechanisms was hardly referred to.  
The media coverage of the political campaigns above was adequate in 
that constituents were informed on the stance of main political parties.43 
However, according to OSCE/ODIHR media did not provide coverage 
for smaller political parties nor abide by the limits imposed on paid 
                                                                                                                               
and students obliged to attend. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM noted schoolchildren amounted  to 30 per 
cent of those attending. 
39 See OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 
14. “The OSCE/ODIHR EOM received multiple reports of vote-buying from at least seven 
districts and was made aware of at least two arrests. A DP candidate was recorded buying votes in 
Tirana in a hidden camera TV show aired on 11 June, on which the SP filed a report to the 
Prosecutor of Tirana. On 21 June, the police in Tropoje arrested a man in Lekbibaj on charges of 
vote-buying and issued a press release asking local citizens to report attempts to buy their votes. 
OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs in Kukes confirmed an attempt of vote-buying of local university 
students.” Among the methods used were direct payments to secure votes and/or to hand over ID-s 
to political parties before the elections. See as well regarding the local elections of June 2015, 
OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 8 September 2015, pp. 2, 13. 
40 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 8 September 2015, p. 3. 
41 See Republika e Shqiperise, Avokati i Popullit, “Raport Vjetor: Per veprimtarine e Avokatit te 
Popullit: 1 Janar -31 Dhjetor 2013”, Tirane, Shkurt 2014. 
42 See OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 
20. 
43 There are 3 national television (TV) channels (public channel RTSH, TV Klan and TV Top 
Channel), 71 local TV channels, 113 cable TV channels and 71 radio stations. Print media are 
numerous, although circulation and impact are limited. Internet provides an open sphere for public 
discourse. According to the Postal and Electronic Communications Authority, as of early 2012, 
there were some 175,000 households with broadband subscription . TV has the highest share of 
advertising market and is considered the primary source of information due to its wide 
geographical coverage. 
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political advertising in favour of the two main parties.44 The public 
broadcaster while granting equal coverage to the main political parties, 
leaned favourably towards the DP.45 On the other hand the private 
broadcasters like TV Klan, notoriously DP partisan, to which granted a 
largely positive coverage. Others like Top Channel and Vizion Plus 
while more balanced reseved a more critical tone towards the DP. The 
news channels News 24 and Ora News provided a balanced coverage 
while print media took sides with Shqip and Shqiptarja.com aligning 
with SP and Mapo and Panorama with DP. 46 Article 84.1 of the 
Electoral Code sets as an obligation for broadcasters to feature tapes 
prepared by candidates in the news added to the affiliation of media 
owners that irreducibly brought about self-censorship and a single-
nuanced viewpoint on issues. 
“Private radios and televisions shall not allocate airtime to 
political subjects for their electoral campaign. Electoral 
campaign information prepared and transmitted during 
the news editions based on the materials made available 
by the electoral subjects should be clearly identifiable in 
compliance with the CEC instructions.”47 
The Internet remains the only media outlet free of interference and thus 
greatly contributes in providing additional viewpoints. The next 
elections in Albania are expected in June 2017, and already there have 
been attempts have been in the works on the part of the government 
majority to control dissenting internet pages. I expand more on freedom 
of speech on the section analysing media landscape. 
 
                                                          
44 The OSCE/ODIHR EOM media monitoring revealed that the DP exceeded the 90-minutes legal 
limit on TV Klan  (187 minutes), Vizion Plus  (235 minutes), News 24  (204 minutes), Ora News  
(226 minutes). SP exceeded the legal limit on Klan TV  (148 minutes), Top Channel  (148 
minutes), Vizion Plus  (161 minutes), News 24  (125 minutes), Ora News  (111 minutes). 
45 See OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, pp. 
2, 15, 17,18. 
46 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 18. 
See as well as a reference on media coverage of the local elections of June 2015, OSCE/ODIHR, 
Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 8 September 2015, p. 17. 
47 Article 84.1 OSCE, The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania, approved by Law no. 10019, 
dated 29 December 2008, amended by Law no. 74/2012, dated 19 July 2012 and Law no. 31/2015, 
dated 2 April 2015. 
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4.1.1.2 The turn against transparency 
Article 23.4 of the Electoral Code entrusted the CEC to adopting, 
implementing and/or amending regulation and thus ensure 
transparency where “no later than 60 days from the election date”.48 
The CEC was not fully functional thus did not adopt the normative acts 
with the required qualified majority vote as specified by the Electoral 
Code; it did not supervise the compilation of voters list in each district 
nor the establishment of the Counting Centres and Counting Teams, 
drafting of the ballots and any actions taken by the VCCs, failing as well 
to make use of the available information technology.49 Instead the CEC 
adopted decisions no. 426 of 17 May, no. 445 and 446 of 20 May and 
no. 621 of 21 June by simple majority and failed to amend outdated 
acts CEC Instruction no. 4 of 9 March 2009 on the organization and 
function of Voting Centre Commissions (VCCs) which is relevant only 
to the then 2009 parliamentary elections political landscape and legal 
framework. Moreover, the CEC could not respect deadlines in calling of 
sessions and in publishing the decisions on its website, in breach of 
what is provided for by the law. In addition, while the Electoral Code 
provided for testing of electronic counting and electronic voter 
verification systems – given that the necessary regulations were not in 
place - the tests of these electronic systems were aborted a week prior 
to the elections. 50  
Another issue that ammount on concerns regarding transparency is the 
campaign financing, which remains not fully regulated. It allows for 
loopholes and the possibility of vested interests’ involvement in policy-
making following the Election Day. A political party’s finances and 
expenditures are reported to CEC’s auditors only following the final 
                                                          
48 OSCE, The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania, approved by Law no. 10019, dated 29 
December 2008, amended by Law no. 74/2012, dated 19 July 2012 and Law no. 31/2015, dated 2 
April 2015. In Article 23. 4 “Normative acts of the CEC have a permanent nature, and, as a rule, 
they shall be applicable for all elections. These acts shall be reviewed in case the law is amended 
or for other reasons that legitimate their amendments. Acts on the preparation of elections, as a 
rule, shall be approved or amended no later than 60 days from the election date.” 
49 OSCE, The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania, approved by Law no. 10019, dated 29 
December 2008, amended by Law no. 74/2012, dated 19 July 2012 and Law no. 31/2015, dated 2 
April 2015. Art. 24 – CEC decision-making; Art. 61 – Supervision by the CEC of the voter lists 
compilation; Art. 62 – Establishment and location of polling units; Art. 94 – Location and 
preparation of the Ballot Counting Centres; Art. 95 – Establishment of Counting Teams (CT); Art. 
98 – Content of the ballot papers; Art. 101 – Preliminary actions of the VCC; Art. 103 – Stamping 
the ballot papers; Art. 179 – The Action Plan on the use of information technology in elections. 
50 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 2. 
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elections’ results. The CEC is required to publish these reports together 
with informations of any donor exceeding ALL 100 000 donation.51 The 
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) of the Council of Europe 
issued a report addressing the issue of political funding, and assessed 
in overall positive terms the efforts made by the Albanian authorities to 
enhance transparency in this area.52 However, the EC has noted that 
regarding financial support to political parties and financing of electoral 
campaigns “there is  no track record of effective control, or deterrent 
penalties for wrongdoing” leaving policy making vulnerable to 
corruption.53 The legal framework addressing corruption is in place, 
however, its application and “legal certainty ha[s] been undermined” by 
an inconsistent interpretation.54 Violations in the ethical conduct are 
frequent and unfortunately there are limited and inefficient mechanisms 
to seek remedy. The implemented reforms did not have the desired 
impact, with meagre results which in turn cemented the mistrust of the 
public opinion towards public administration.55 The Albanian 
government counts the fight to corruption among its key priorities for 
which reportedly a large consultation with the civil society has been 
undertaken.56  
 
4.1.1.3 Evaluation and recommendations 
The election days both in 2013 and 2015 were tainted by some 
tensions.57 Nonetheless this and other similar cases of violence were 
isolated and the elections generally were non-violent.58  
                                                          
51 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, pp. 2, 
15. 
52 Yves Marie Doublet, Political funding, Thematic Revies of GRECO’s Third Evaluation Round, 
Group of States Against Corruption, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France 2013. 
53  European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, 
SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p.16. 
54 Ibid. p. 17.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Republika e Shqiperise, Keshilli i Ministrave, “Strategjia ndersektoriale kunder korrupsionit 
2015-2020, Mars 2015.  The national anti-corruption strategy (2015-20) and action plan (2015-
17), with a budget of EUR 12 million. 
57 In 2013 parliamentary elections, a violent clash between political supporters outside the Laç 
Voting Centre resulted in one supporter’s death and two were injured; In 2014 tensions amounted 
before the counting centre of Vore. Protesters called for a re-count of the votes. 
58 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 22. 
See as well OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 8 September 
2015, p. 3. 
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Considering the issues identified in both parliamentary and local 
elections of 2013 and 2015 respectively there are a number of 
considerations to be made.  
• Electoral campaign should be free from pressures and or threat 
to attend events and/or vote a specific political party or 
coalition. Any infringement on the right of free and fair vote 
should be investigated by authorities and adjudicated. 
• Referring to article 84.1 of the Electoral Code, campaign 
material prepared by political subjects should not be imposed 
for broadcast, even more so if not specifically noted as political 
propaganda. To this end, the AMA should effectively conduct 
media monitoring and apply fines where broadcasters fail to 
comply with regulations.  
• Moreover, libel and defamation continue to be criminal 
offenses, upon which the right and freedom of expression 
hinges. Recommendations have been made included by 
OSCE/ODIHR to replace it with civil fines.59 
• The independence of the CEC as central election 
administration should be ensured. It takes an effort of all 
stakeholders to ensure that the decision making, administration 
and obedience to rules and procedures be a priority and not be 
overshadowed by political party affiliation and particularistic 
interests. 
• In the same vein, abuse of state power and resources should 
not be an ‘accepted issue’ to the point that is often overtly 
flaunted. Any abuse should be investigated and perpetrators be 
hold accountable.  
 
4.1.2 Legislature 
 
4.1.2.1 Meeting and organizing 
As showcased above, the political landscape in Albania is dominated 
by two main political parties SP and DP where the SMI often has been 
                                                          
59 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, p. 28; 
See as well OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 8 September 
2015, p. 25. 
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aligning itself on the left or right to form different governing coalitions. In 
the past elections, the legislature has seen indeed weak majority 
governments were the difference was made by a handful elected 
member of Parliaments of the SMI. In the analysis below, it is evident 
that the preferred means of opposition is boycott of the Parliament. 
Thus, the legislature does not serve “as a place for meeting and 
organizing and (to the extent that an independent media exists) as a 
public platform from which to denounce the regime.” 60  
The EU integration has been and remains at the very centre of 
government and parliamentary efforts.61 The majority of the Albanian 
people support the full membership of Albania in the EU. An inclusive 
and transparent political dialogue remains a primary condition for 
Albania’s progress in the EU integration process, which has been, ever 
since the fall of communism part of the national agenda and a strategic 
goal for the country. Indeed, EU integration – formally - has been seen 
as a mean to and end: consolidate democracy, rule of law and 
guarantee the independence of institutions, strengthening the 
functioning of market economy, ensuring respect of human and 
minority rights, all of which are core values on the basis of which the 
EU has been founded. The Parliament, has been invested with an 
important role in the process of EU integration, which includes 
prerogatives of oversight - crucial to ensure success of the process. 
Obtaining a cross-party  consensus, the Parliament adopted a 
Resolution on European Integration in support of the High Level 
Dialogue EU – Albania pledging for a comprehensive participation of all 
political forces, in satisfying the 5 key priorities identified by the EC as a 
condition  for opening the accession negotiations.62 The five key criteria 
concern the reform of judiciary and the public administration, fight 
against corruption and organized crime, protection of human rights and 
property rights.63 The Parliament commits, thus, to analyse as a priority 
- in a process of wide consultations - the existing legal framework with 
the aim of aligning the Albanian legislation with that of the EU, and 
ensure that all future legislative initiatives are in line with the Albanian 
                                                          
60 Levitsky and Way, op.cit., p. 56. 
61 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2013 Progress Report, 
SWD (2013) 414 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013, p. 6. 
62 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Rezolutë, Për procesin e integrimit europian të Shqipërisë, 
27.11.2013.   
63 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, 
SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 2014, p. 1. 
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Constitution and the acquis. It recognizes the importance of including 
the civil society in the integration process of the country, making it an 
integral part of the efforts put forward to fulfil the 5 priorities indicated 
above. In accordance, the High-Level Dialogue and Joint Working 
Groups EU-Albania have spearheaded efforts tailored after the 
country’s socio-economic needs towards fulfilling the political criteria.
  
These initiatives that have seen government and opposition work 
together. The opposition has had somewhat the opportunity to exercise 
its function of checking on the executive and in doing so has supported 
the reform process.64 However, in these past 25 years of transition, this 
has not always been the case. In July 2014, immediately after Albania 
received the candidate status to join the EU, the Democratic Party (DP) 
started a parliamentary boycott. It ended in December 2014 upon an 
agreement between government and opposition where the parties 
pledged to engage in a constructive political debate taking place in the 
parliament.65 This agreement was facilitated by the continuous support 
of the European Parliament and its two main political groups European 
People’s Party (EPP) and Socialists and Democrats (S&D).66 The 
governing majority and the opposition acknowledged the need of a 
stable and constructive political dialogue to fulfil Albania’s European 
ambitions. It is a common responsibility of both main political parties to 
create the conditions and ensure that such a dialogue is held in the 
Parliament. The parties agreed that the opposition would return to the 
Parliament and resume in full its participation in the parliamentary work, 
abandoning thus, the boycott of the Parliament as well as that of its 
committees. On its part the governing majority agreed not to sideline 
the opposition by using its qualified majority of 3/5 but whenever 
possible, seek its input on important reforms. All political parties 
pledged to work so that the political dialogue is held primarily in the 
Parliament, as well as respect the Constitution and the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court. More concretely, the governing majority and the 
opposition agreed to review the rules and regulation and align them to 
the best international practices, in order to improve the functioning of 
                                                          
64 Ibid.  
65 See Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Rezolute e marreveshjes politike mes Mazhorances 
Qeverisese dhe Opozites ne Kuvendin e Republikes se Shqiperise, 24.12.2014. 
66 See as well E. Kukan, K.  Fleckenstein, “Press Statement by Knut Fleckenstein and Eduard 
Kukan on political dialogue and cooperation in Albania”, Brussels, 17 December 2014; E. Kukan, 
K.  Fleckenstein, “Breakthrough in Tirana: Press Statement by Knut Fleckenstein and Eduard 
Kukan on political dialogue and cooperation in Albania”, Brussels, 23 December 2014. 
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the inquiry committees. Crucial in reaching this agreement was to find a 
consensual solution - with the support of the EU and the Venice 
Commission - on the issue of individuals with criminal records, who 
hold a public office or seek to be elected or nominated to one.67 The 
initial step taken in this direction was the establishment of two 
committees of inquiry entrusted with investigating any such person 
currently holding public office.68 In December 2015, constitutional 
amendments and a law on the integrity of officials appointed to public 
office, unequivocally assert the ineligibility of offenders with criminal 
record to run for or hold a public office.69 The desired impact was first 
and foremost restore people’s trust in the functioning of the elective 
offices, independent institutions and those of public administration by 
preventing the candidacy of individuals with criminal records and 
releasing from duty any individual that were sentenced or against 
whom precautionary measures are taken in accordance to the 
legislative act referred above. Inherently, these measures are taken to 
safeguard the democratic functioning of public institutions from 
influence or partaking in public policy and decision making of 
individuals with criminal records. It is, however, responsibility of elected 
officials at national and local level or 500 citizens with the right to vote, 
to request a vetting on an individual, and should the vetting result 
                                                          
67  Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 138/2015 Për garantimin e integritetit të personave që 
zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike, 17.12.2015; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, 
Vendim no. 17/2016 Për përcaktimin e rregullave të detajuara mbi zbatimin e ndalimeve të 
parashikuara në ligjin nr. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e integritetit të personave që zgjidhen, 
emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike” 04.03.2016; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 
38/2016 Për disa shtesa dhe ndryshime në ligjin nr. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e integritetit të 
personave që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike, 14.04.2016;  
68 Komisioni për Emërimet në Administratën Shtetërore, Entet Publike, Shoqërite Tregtare 
Shtetërore; Komisioni për Dekriminalizimin - Komisioni ka pasur për objekt të veprimtarisë së tij 
zbatimin e çështjeve të trajtuara në Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Rezolute e marreveshjes 
politike mes Mazhorances Qeverisese dhe Opozites ne Kuvendin e Republikes se Shqiperise, 
24.12.2014. 
69 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 138/2015 Për garantimin e integritetit të personave që 
zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike, 17.12.2015; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, 
Ligj no. 76/2016 Per disa shtesa dhe ndryshime ne ligjin nr. 8417, date 21.10.1998, “Kushtetuta e 
Republikes se Shqiperise”, te Ndryshuar, date 22.07.2016; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, 
Vendim no. 17/2016 Për përcaktimin e rregullave të detajuara mbi zbatimin e ndalimeve të 
parashikuara në ligjin nr. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e integritetit të personave që zgjidhen, 
emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike” 04.03.2016; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 
38/2016 Për disa shtesa dhe ndryshime në ligjin nr. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e integritetit të 
personave që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike, 14.04.2016;  
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inconclusive any proponent is fined with ALL 100 000.70 The immediate 
tangible results were voluntary resignations and several terminations 
especially at local level.71 Most recently, the CEC reported that it had 
voted to invalidate the mandates of Shkelqim Selami, MP elected from 
SMI and Dashamir Tahiri MP elected from DP as well as Elvis Roshi, 
Mayor of Kavaje as they had withheld information on their criminal 
record when running for office.72 
 
The Parliament, in addition, strengthened its role in the integration 
process of Albania, as it took on the responsibility of oversight related 
to the implementation of the legal framework, policies and financial 
assistance related to EU integration. It is now mainly on the Parliament 
to inform the public on the progress in the accession process and 
ensure cooperation with the civil society aiming thus at facilitating a 
more comprehensive integration process. 73 74  In practice, however, the 
parliament’s rules and procedures need to be aligned with the new 
                                                          
70 Art. 7 of Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 138/2015 Për garantimin e integritetit të 
personave që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike, 17.12.2015; Kuvendi 
Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 76/2016 Per disa shtesa dhe ndryshime ne ligjin nr. 8417, date 
21.10.1998, “Kushtetuta e Republikes se Shqiperise”, te Ndryshuar, date 22.07.2016;  Kuvendi 
Republika e Shqiperise, Vendim no. 17/2016 Për përcaktimin e rregullave të detajuara mbi 
zbatimin e ndalimeve të parashikuara në ligjin nr. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e integritetit të 
personave që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike” 04.03.2016; Kuvendi 
Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 38/2016 Për disa shtesa dhe ndryshime në ligjin nr. 138/2015 
“Për garantimin e integritetit të personave që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike, 
14.04.2016;  
71 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, 
SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016, pp. 6 – 7. 
72 Republika e Shqiperise, Vendim no. 174 date 29.12.2016 “ Per shqyrtimin e rezultatit te 
verifikimit te Prokurorise se Pergjithshme per funksionarin publik Z. Elvis Roshi, Kryetar i 
Bashkise Kavaje, ne zbatim te ligjit no. Ligj no. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e integritetit të 
personave që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike”, 17.12.2015; Republika e 
Shqiperise, Vendim no. 175 date 29.12.2016 “Per shqyrtimin e rezultatit te verifikimit te 
Prokurorise se Pergjithshme per funksionarin publik Z. Shkelqim Selami, Deputet i Kuvendit te 
Shqiperise, ne zbatim te  te ligjit no. Ligj no. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e integritetit të personave 
që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike”, 17.12.2015; Republika e Shqiperise, 
Vendim no. 176 date 29.12.2016 Per shqyrtimin e rezultatit te verifikimit te Prokurorise se 
Pergjithshme per funksionarin publik Z. Dashamir Tahiri, Deputet i Kuvendit te Shqiperise, ne 
zbatim te ligjit no. Ligj no. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e integritetit të personave që zgjidhen, 
emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike”, 17.12.2015; F. Mejdini, “Albania sacks MPs and 
Mayor for hiding convictions”, Balkan Insight, 29 December 2016. 
73 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 15/2015 Per rolin e Kuvendit ne procesin e pntegrimit 
te Republikes se Shqiperise ne Bashkimin Europian, date 05.3.2015.  
74 See Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Keshilli Kombetar i Integrimit Europian.  
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acquired role of the parliament. It is significant, that to this date, the 
capacity of the Parliament to verify the alignment of the existing 
legislation with the acquis and most importantly its implementation is at 
a low level.75  In the same legislative act, the Parliament established 
within its structure, the National Council for European Integration, the 
highest national structure for EU integration.76 The National Council for 
European Integration role is to  encourage and ensure an inclusive 
cooperation between political parties, state institutions and civil society, 
enhancing transparency in decision-making related to the EU 
integration. It is responsible to encourage the debate on policies of EU 
integration, implemented by the state institutions with civil society and 
other interested actors. Moreover, it analyses the existing practices and 
legal framework related to the process of EU integration, on issues 
under review, encouraging cooperation between permanent 
parliamentary commissions and other structures responsible for EU 
integration.77 It fosters partnership and exchange of information with the 
President of the Republic, Speaker of the Parliament and the Prime 
Minister, in the person of the Director of the National Council for 
European Integration and reports on its activities to the Parliament at 
least once a year. In addition, it monitors the implementation of the 
obligations for opening of and gives its informed opinion on the 
negotiations. The National Council for European Integration is chaired 
by the Chair of the European Integration Committee Ms. Majlinda 
Bregu DP and the Deputy-Chair is Mr. Taulant Balla, Chair of the 
Albanian Delegation of the Stabilization and Association Parliamentary 
Committee EU – Albania.78 Nonetheless, to date, the Council has not 
                                                          
75 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, 
SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 7; See as well European Commission, Commission 
Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016, p. 7. 
76 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 15/2015 Per rolin e Kuvendit ne procesin e pntegrimit 
te Republikes se Shqiperise ne Bashkimin Europian, date 05.3.2015. 
77 The Stabilization and Association Parliamentary Committee EU - Albania is a common structure 
of the Albanian Parliament and the European Parliament that functions in accordance to the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement; The European Integration Committee is a permanent 
structure within the Albanian Parliament, that has among its area of responsibility EU integration, 
alignment of Albanian legal framework to that of the acquis, monitoring and implementation of 
the commitments under the Stabilization and Association Agreement, as well as EU financial 
assistance for Albania. 
78 Refer to European Parliament, List of Albanian Delegation Members to the EU-Albania 
Stabilization and Association Parliamentary Committee. 
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obtained full capacity to exercise its prerogatives as a fulcrum of 
exchanges on the EU integration process.79   
 
4.1.2.2 Legislature and civil society 
An inclusive dialogue between decision makers and different 
stakeholders is crucial in improving the quality of the legislative 
process. In November 2015, the Parliament adopted a law n. 119/2015 
on the establishment of the National Council on Civil Society (NCCS).80 
Its purpose is to ensure institutional cooperation with civil society 
organizations in the Republic of Albania, in favour of consolidating 
democracy, good governance, and transparency in decision making for 
public good, by effectively including the civil society in this process. In 
this line it aims at establishing an institutional cooperation with civil 
society organizations in drafting and implementing the national strategy 
and roadmap on integration, for creating a facilitating framework for the 
sector of civil society and relations of cross-sectorial cooperation 
between state institutions and civil society organizations as well as for 
the development of social capital. This law defines the principles and 
procedures through which the process of dialogue and counsel is 
implemented.81 In this regard there has been some improvement 
however, there have been as well cases where draft legislation has not 
been published on the official website, and or shared with MPs at a 
short notice not providing the necessary time to allow for a thorough 
evaluation and inputs. Moreover, there is concern on the transparency 
and inclusiveness of public consultations, which do lack of a proper set 
of rules and regulations. 82 In addition, upon reviewing the NCCS 
composition, there is some concern on civil society organization 
representation and the independence of the Council since half of its 
                                                          
79 See as well European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, 
SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016, p. 7.   
80 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 119/2015 Për krijimin dhe funksionimin e Këshillit 
Kombëtar për Shoqërinë Civile 06.11.2015.  
81 Art. 4: “principle of counsel”; principle of transparency”; “principle of counsel with interest 
groups”.  
82 On the role of civil society see Western Balkans Summit Vienna 2015 Civil Society Forum 
Media Information, “Western Balkans Civil Society voices out its demands to Europe’s leaders: 
Securing freedom of expression, creating jobs and prosperity, enhancing regional cooperation”, 
Vienna, August 27 2015. 
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members are representatives selected among government institutions. 
More in detail, the NCCS is composed of 27 members of which 13 are 
representatives of state institutions and 13 representatives of civil 
society organizations of which only four on democratization, rule of law, 
human rights and EU integration, economic, territorial and 
environmental development, welfare and social services, healthcare 
and betterment of life quality.83 One representative is selected from the 
business community and should be as well member of the National 
Economic Council. The Chair of the National Council on Civil Society is 
the Minister of Social Welfare and Youth while the Deputy-Chair is 
selected by a majority vote of its members on a three years mandate. It 
is to show that politics should not weaken the potential of available 
processes on the contrary these must be “fully implemented in practice” 
including empowering CSOs by adjusting the fiscal framework which 
they are subjected to.84  
The independent institutions boards and directors remain very much 
dominated by the political parties, as the parliament continues to 
appoint and dismiss them by simple majority. High politicization of the 
public service remains, thus, a stigma from which even independent 
institutions cannot escape. In this way the parliament limits their 
independence whereby the existing legislation aiming to ensure an 
efficient system of policymaking is partially implemented.85 These 
shortcomings are clearly visible in the lack of manpower to monitor and 
report on the european integration coordination system and the results 
attained by the national plan on EU integration. Inconsistencies have 
been seen between the results attained in comparison to the 
government workplan, policy proposals and costs and funding available 
for cross-sectoral strategies.86 Indeed, the slow pace in implementing 
                                                          
83 The most prominent figures in the list include: Prime Minister Office, Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Interior, Ministry of EU Integration, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environment, 
Ministry of Healthcare, Ministry of Education and Sport, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Welfare 
and Youth, Ministry of Innovation and Public Administration, Ministry for the relations with the 
Parliament, Agency for the Support to Civil Society. 
84 See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, 
SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 8; See as well European Commission, Commission 
Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016, p. 9.  
85 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, 
SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 2014, p. 6. 
86 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, SWD(2015) 
213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 10. 
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key requirement can be observed in the case of the national strategy 
for development and integration for 2015-2020 that was approved by a 
decision of the Council of Ministers only last year. 87 Further efforts are 
needed on defining the criteria for transparency and merit based 
appointments for the members of independent institutions, including 
granting them the full autonomy to govern their internal structures and 
employ their budget.88 
 
4.1.3 Rule of law 
The Copenhagen criteria have underlined as a pre-requisite the 
guarantee of democratic, transparent, stable and accountable 
institutions that are centred around people’s exercise of power having 
as its fulcrum the national parliament.89 To this end there is still room 
for work to build a steady, constructive and reliable dialogue between 
decision makers and civil society. The rule of law remains a core value 
of the EU and as specified by the Council countries aspiring to join the 
Union should address from early on shortcomings in the “judiciary 
[…human] rights […] freedom and security”90 The commitment from 
early on in the negotiations is instrumental to putting in place the 
necessary legislation and attain a solid track record of implementation, 
facilitating a gradual and consolidated positive practice. Ms. Majlinda 
Bregu, Chairwoman of the Committee for EU Integration in the 
Albanian Parliament, during a Policy Dialogue in Brussels, underlined 
that chapters 23 and 24 are the heaviest reform that Albania should 
face. It would be beneficial for all to start the process with this - as Ms. 
Bregu calls it - “pre-screening” so that “to monitor day by day, it gives 
                                                          
87 Republika e Shqiperise, Ministria e Mbrojtjes, Strategjia Kombëtare për Zhvillim dhe Integrim 
2015 - 2020, aprovuar nga Këshilli i Ministrave, me VKM nr. 348, datë 11.5.2016. 
88 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, SWD(2015) 
213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 7.  
89 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, COM(2013) 
700 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013, p. 8.  
90 Council of the European Union, General Affairs, Press Release, Brussels, 5 December 
2011,18089/11, PRESSE 472, p. 11; See as well European Commission, Enlargement Strategy 
and Main Challenges 2013-2014, COM(2013) 700 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013, p. 7.  
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the government work and [incentives to] implement these reforms”.91 
As early as 2010 the Commission’s progress report on Albania 
underlined the main concern among the required key criteria for the 
country continued to be strengthening the rule of law.92 Indeed, the five 
key criteria where Albania’s effort must concentrate in order to open the 
accession negotiations remain reform of judiciary and the public 
administration, fight against corruption and organized crime, protection 
of human rights and property rights; a partial overlap on the conditions 
highlighted in 2010 for being granted the candidate status.93 One could 
argue that the conferral of the candidate status to Albania in 2014 was 
premature, without the 12 key criteria having been met in full, but on 
the other hand, interviews conducted confirm that the enlargement 
policy is largely affected by political considerations and that if 
conditions were to be followed strictly there would be a loss in 
momentum.94 Thus, conditionality may result at times as being too 
much, too soon and too little followed through, but this by no means 
entails that it is not to be abided by. 
In view of starting the accession negotiations it is crucial for the country 
to maintain a steady progress in ensuring a non-partisan professional 
public administration that is not subservient to a particular government 
coalition but is committed to public service; avail itself with the best 
international support and commit to successfully pursue the reform of 
judiciary aiming to guarantee a free, functioning and accountable 
judiciary that restores trust on equality before the law; to this end, 
                                                          
91 M. Bregu, Chairwoman of the European Integration Committee of the Parliament of Albania, 
EPC, Policy Dialogue, “EU Enlargement to the Balkans: The role of the member states”, Brussels, 
29 September 2015. 
92 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, COM(2013) 
700 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013, p. 7.  
93 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, 
SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 2014, p. 1.    
94 See Senior Official of the United States Department of Justice Criminal Division International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), interview, Tirane, 19 July 2016; 
EU Expert on organized crime, Albanian State Police Directorate, interview, Tirana, 19 July 
2016;High Official, Albanian State Police, interview, Tirana, 06 December 2016; Senior 
Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, Tirana, 12 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member 
State, interview, Tirana, 13 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of 
Embassies, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, 
Tirana, 19 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, 
Tirana, 02 February 2017. 
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fighting corruption and infiltration of organized crime in public 
administration remains a condicio sine qua non that requires not only to 
have in place legislation but secure its implementation delivering “a 
solid track record of proactive investigations, prosecutions and 
convictions”; equally important is ensure solid implementation of 
existing legislation against discrimination and strengthen the respect of 
human rights and property rights.95 
Having the principle of rule of law in place and having it respected, 
requires an independent and functioning public administration and 
judiciary, a challenge, that to be overcame requires concrete actions 
where decision makers are required to go beyond words.96 
Unfortunately, the judiciary is highly politicised and the law is not equal 
for all, as statistics on high level sentences for serious crimes remain 
low.97 
In an attempt to upholding the commitment toward fulfilling reforms, 
which as mentioned above are considered crucial for further steps 
toward the EU, the Albanian Parliament has discussed and approved a 
number of laws that, if fully reinforced could contribute to an headway 
toward the EU. Already in September 2014, Albania amended the 
protection of personal data law to further assists the Commissioner for 
the Right of Information and Protection of Personal Data in providing 
information, investigate and address cases of violations to the 
authorities.98 The role of the Ombudsman was strengthened, now able 
to directly address the Parliament on its own initiative, in order to 
present reports on human and constitutional rights conditions in the 
country and assist in compiling reports to be presented before 
international jurisdictions and organizations in which Albania is a 
member.99  
As far as it concerns de-politicization the adoption of the Civil Service 
Law, is instrumental to ensure accountability within the ranks of the 
                                                          
95 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, 
SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 2014, p. 1. 
96 Ibid., p. 11. 
97 See Levitsky and Way, op.cit., pp. 56-57. 
98 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 120/2014 Per disa ndryshime dhe shtesa ne ligjin no. 
9887, date 10.3.2008, “Per Mbrojtjen e te dhenave personale”, te ndryshuar, 18.9.2014. 
99 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 155/2014 Per disa shtesa dhe ndryshime ne ligjin no. 
8454, date 4.2.1999, “Per Avokatin e Popullit”, te ndryshuar, 27.11.2014. 
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public administration and was an integral part of the EU package for 
obtaining the candidate status. 100 Nonetheless, accountability both top 
– down and bottom – up, between different bodies of state 
administration remains blurry. While the existing legislation regulating 
the functioning of the state administration is adequate, it is unclear to 
which extent the recommendations of independent institutions like the 
Ombudsman and the High State Control bodies are headed as for the 
lack of monitoring.101 Another progress in this direction is to be found in 
the process for the appointment of high offices, whereby the President 
of the Republic, in consultation with the parliamentary groups, select 
the candidates for the positions of judges in the Highest Court of the 
Republic of Albania.102 In practice however, principles of impartiality 
and independence of the judiciary are tainted by the high level of 
politicization appointment, transfer and termination of judges and 
prosecutors. Indeed High Court and Constitutional Court members are 
appointed by the President of the Republic that shall obtain the simple 
majority from the parliament on candidates suggested by the High 
Council of Justice in charge of evaluating the candidatures, for new 
appointments, promotions and transfers.103 The need of the 
parliamentary consent has in practice led to stalls in the process and 
rejections of nominees.104 A remarkable example of this was the 
instance when the parliament voted on the appointments to the 
judiciary, where it endorsed one nomination to the High Council of 
                                                          
100 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 161/2013 Për miratimin e Aktit Normativ nr. 5, datë 
30.09.2013 “Për disa ndryshime në ligjin nr. 152/2013 “Për nëpunësin civil” 17.10.2013, 
retrieved 20 January 2015. 
101 See as well European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 
Report, SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 16; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, 
interview, Tirana, 12 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, Tirana, 13 
January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 19 
January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017; Senior 
Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 02 February 2017. 
102 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 177/2014 Per disa ndryshime dhe shtesa ne ligjin no. 
8588, date 15.3.2000, “Per Organizimin dhe Funksionimin e Gjykates se Larte te Republikes se 
Shqiperise”, te ndryshuar me date 18.12 2014. 
103 Ibid., Art. 4.2 
104 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, 
SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016, p.15. 
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Justice 105 but rejected the presidential nominations to the High 
Court.106  
Moreover, the General Prosecutor – himself appointed by the 
Parliament – advises the President of the Republic on appointments, 
transfers and releases from duty of prosecutors.107 These instances of 
political interference in the judiciary has led to cases of selective justice 
aggravated by a lack of thorough monitoring and evaluation of ethical 
standards in the selection, appointment and exercise of the 
responsibilities for judges and prosecutors.108 For instance, both judges 
and prosecutors despite the requirement - and failure - to declare 
annually their assets to date do not face any sanctions.109 
In an effort to assure transparency the law n. 138/2015 and its 
subsequent amendment on the integrity of those appointed to high 
offices aim at shielding the democratic institutions of the country from 
unlawful influence in policy and decision-making. 110 The law on the 
organization and functioning of the High Court111, together with the 
                                                          
105 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Vendim no. 86/2014 Për zgjedhjen e zonjës Albana Shtylla 
anëtare e Këshillit të Lartë të Drejtësisë, 30.10.2014; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Vendim 
no. 87/2014 Për zgjedhjen e zotit Vangjel Kosta anëtar i Këshillit të Lartë të Drejtësisë, 
30.10.2014; 
106 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Vendim no.  88/2014 “Për mosdhënien e pëlqimit për 
emërimin e zonjës Elona Stavri (Toro) anëtare e Gjykatës së Lartë” 30.10.2014; Kuvendi 
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Sokol Ngresi anëtar i Gjykatës së Lartë” 30.10.2014; 
107 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, 
SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 14.    
108 A code of ethics for judges has existed since 2000 but had no real impact on their 
accountability. In 2014, a code of conduct was adopted for the prosecution service. See as well 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, SWD(2015) 
213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, pp. 13,16; European Commission, Commission Staff Working 
Document, Albania 2016 Report, SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016, p.15. 
109 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, 
SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 13. 
110 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 138/2015 Për garantimin e integritetit të personave që 
zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike, 17.12.2015; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, 
Ligj no. 38/2016 Për disa shtesa dhe ndryshime në ligjin nr. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e 
integritetit të personave që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike, 14.04.2016. 
111 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 8588, date 15.3.2000 Per Organizimin dhe 
Funksionimin e Gjykates se Lartet e Republikes se Shqiperise”, (ndryshuar me ligjin nr. 151/2013) 
(ndryshyar me ligjin nr.177/2014). On transparency of income and assets, see Republika e 
Shqiperise, Gjykata e Larte. 
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much-needed amendments to the Criminal112 and Civil113 codes as well 
as the Code of Civil Procedure114 are key in laying the ground for the 
reform of the judiciary. In addition, the Law on Judicial Administration115 
defines the legal framework for the work of courts and its staff where 
independence and commitment to public service remains problematic. 
The memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Justice 
and the High Council of Justice  and the Ombudsman which seeks to 
limit overlapping of responsibilities and possible breach of conduct 
continues to be implemented.116 Nonetheless, one of the most 
important steps towards taking advantage of the gained momentum 
was entrusting an ad hoc Parliamentary Committee on Justice Reform 
to delivering, as the result of an inclusive process, a complete justice 
reform.117   
 
4.1.3.1 The judicial reform 
Albanian authorities have shown goodwill in working together with 
international bodies, such as the Council of Europe, European 
Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), to put 
                                                          
112 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no.  135/2015 Për disa ndryshime dhe shtesa në ligjin nr. 
7895, datë 27.1.1995, “Kodi Penal i Republikës së Shqipërisë”, të ndryshuar”, 5.12.2015. 
113 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 113/2016 Për disa shtesa në ligjin nr. 7850, datë 
29.7.1994, “Kodi Civil i Republikës së Shqipërisë”, të ndryshuar, 3.11.2016. 
114 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 114/2016 Për disa ndryshime dhe shtesa në ligjin nr. 
8116, datë 29.3.1996, “Kodi i Procedurës Civile i Republikës së Shqipërisë”, të ndryshuar, 
3.11.2016, retrieved 06 November 2016; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 160/2013 Për 
një ndryshim në ligjin nr. 8116, datë 29.3.1996, “Kodi i Procedurës Civile i Republikës së 
Shqipërisë”, të ndryshuar, 17.10.2013. 
115 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 98/2016, Për organizimin e pushtetit gjyqësor në 
Republikën e Shqipërisë, 06.10.2016. 
116 Reference is made to Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 8678, date 14.05.2001, “Per 
organizimin dhe funksionimin e Ministrise se Drejtesise”, i ndryshuar, ne ligjin nr. 8811 date 
17.05.2001 “Per organizimin dhe funksionimin e Keshillit te Larte te Drejtesise”, i ndryshuar, ne 
ligjin nr. 8454, date 04.02.1999 “Per Avokatin e Popullit”, i ndryshuar, ne aplikimin e  rezolutes: 
Rezoluta no. 2, date 14.06.2012, te Kuvendit te Shqiperise “Per vleresimin e veprimtarie se 
institucionit te Avokatit te Popullit, per vitin 2011” 
117 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Vendim no. 107/2015 Per nje ndryshim ne vendimin e 
Kuvendit Nr. 96/2014 “Per krijimin e Komisionit te Posaçem Parlamentar per reformen ne 
sistemin e drejtesise”, te ndryshuar, 17.12.2015; See as well Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj 
no. 115/2016 Për organet e qeverisjes së sistemit të drejtësisë, 3.11.2016; Kuvendi Republika e 
Shqiperise, Vendim no. 104/2014 Për miratimin e përbërjes së Komisionit të Posaçëm 
Parlamentar për Reformën në Sistemin e Drejtësisë, 04.12.2014. 
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forth the basis for a functioning and independent judiciary by adopting 
required constitutional amendments.118 Moreover, legislation regulating 
immunity rights and possible sanctions was put in place to ensure 
accountability of justice, prosecutors and other high officials. Most 
notably rules of suspension and termination of members of the High 
Council of Justice - which according to Art. 3 of law 177/2014, are 
drafted and adopted by its members - opens up to criticism of partiality 
as it does not involve all relevant stakeholders.119  
The judicial reform was approved on 22 July 2016, somewhat 
reluctantly by the Albanian political elites. It is the result of lengthy 18 
months of minutious work and negotiations. The reform was adopted by 
unanimity in the Albanian Parliament, a major success considering the 
ever-present conflict between government and opposition. In 
supporting the work of the three main political parties LSI, PD, and PS, 
the US ambassador Mr. Donald Lu and EU Head of Delegation Ms. 
Romana Vlahutin committed to mediate between the parties for 
reaching consensus on the reform. "The United States is proud to have 
supported the drafting and negotiation of this strong reform package 
and we look forward to continuing our enduring partnership, which is 
now much stronger" Ambassador Lu stated.120On the other hand, the 
EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and EU Enlargement 
Commissioner Johannes Hahn welcomed the reform as an  
"[…] unprecedented step [which] addresses a 
longstanding request by the overwhelming majority of the 
citizens […]. It is also a major contribution to the fight 
against corruption and organised crime. These are all key 
                                                          
118 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 76/2016 Per disa shtesa dhe ndryshime ne ligjin nr. 
8417, date 21.10.1998, “Kushtetuta e Republikes se Shqiperise”, te Ndryshuar, date 22.07.2016. 
See as well European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, 
SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016, p.13. 
119 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 177/2014 Per disa ndryshime dhe shtesa ne ligjin no. 
8588, date 15.3.2000, “Per Organizimin dhe Funksionimin e Gjykates se Larte te Republikes se 
Shqiperise”, te ndryshuar me date 18.12 2014.  Art. 3 “Mënyra e funksionimit të Këshillit për 
Emërimet rregullohet nëpërmjet një rregulloreje të hartuar dhe miratuar prej tij.” 
120 Embassy of the United States of America Tirana, Statement by U.S. Ambassador Donald Lu, 
Tirana 22 July 2016.  
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priorities for Albania on its path towards integration into 
the EU.” 121 
The judicial reform amends 46 articles of the Albanian constitution 
laying the ground for the creation of new justice institutions in an effort 
to fight corruption and political influence in the judiciary. In greater 
detail the newly established institutions are as follows. The High 
Judicial Council which guarantees the independence, responsibility […] 
of the Judiciary in the Republic of Albania and the High Prosecutorial 
Council which guarantees the independence, accountability, discipline, 
status and career advancement of prosecutors in the Republic of 
Albania and will be proposing to the Parliament the candidate for the 
position of General Prosecutor.122  
The High Council of Justice (HCJ) is effectively replaced by the High 
Judicial Council (HJC) which comes with less political strings attached 
and extends its competence of evaluation, appointment, promotion and 
transfer as well as any disciplinary measures to judges of the High 
Court. The Justice Appointment Council will evaluate the fulfilment of 
legal, professional and moral requirements for the candidates of the 
Constitutional Court and the newly instituted High Justice Inspector, 
which is entrusted with investigating any misconduct of the members of 
the higher courts.123 This measure aims at limiting politicization of the 
process and political interference in the judiciary. 
 In the same prospective, the Council of Prosecutors, advisory body to 
the General Prosecutor Office (GPO) will be acquiring further 
independence.  
                                                          
121 European Commission, Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini 
and Commissioneer Johannes Hahn on the adoption of judicial reform in Albania, Brussels, 22 
July 2016.  
122 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 76/2016 Per disa shtesa dhe ndryshime ne ligjin nr. 
8417, date 21.10.1998, “Kushtetuta e Republikes se Shqiperise”, te Ndryshuar, date 22.07.2016. 
The Parliament will approve the General Prosecutor with a 3/5 majority. The General Prosecutor 
mandate under the reform is reduced from 9 to 7 years with no possibility of reappointment. 
123 Magistrates are currently held accountable through inspections by both the Ministry of Justice 
and the HCJ. Despite the memorandum of understanding between these two bodies, the risk of 
overlapping inspections remained. See Republika e Shqiperise, Ministria e Drejtesise, 
“Memorandum Bashkepunimi ndermjet Ministrise se Drejtesise, Keshillit te Lartet e Drejtesise, 
dhe Avokatit te Popullit “Per referimin e rasteve dhe masave administrative ndaj funksionareve te 
drejtesise kur konstatohen shkelje te ligjit” Tirana, 12.02.2013; See as well European Commission, 
Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 
9.11.2016, pp. 15 – 16.  
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Both of the newly constituted institutions have 11 members, 6 of which 
are selected from judges and prosecutors, while the remaining 5 
members will be selected from the Parliament from non-judge, non-
prosecutor jurists.124These politically nominated members are 
appointed by a sub-commission of the Law Commission of the Albanian 
Parliament composed of 5 members 3 from the government and 2 from 
the opposition. The final approval of the selected 10 ‘political’ members 
is approved by the Parliament with a 3/5-majority vote. The Chair of the 
High Judicial Council will be elected among its members and only when 
matters of strategy and budget are to be considered the Minister of 
Justice will be sitting in the HJC. 
Moreover, through the appointment of the Commission for the vetting 
process the parliament will have a say on the appointment of all judges 
and prosecutors in the Republic of Albania.125 Once applying before the 
Office of the President of the Republic all the candidates for the 21 
positions authorize an annual asset control and limitation to their 
privacy. The International Monitoring Operation (IMO), a consultative 
body composed of foreign judges and prosecutors is the first selection 
step for the candidates, which then are referred to the Parliament. After 
the selection of the 21 proposed commissioners, it is the Parliament to 
appoint them with 3/5-majority vote.126 Worthy of note is the possibility, 
both in the case of 10 ‘political’ members - of the High Judicial Council 
and the High Council of Prosecution – and the 21 commissioners of the 
vetting process, that the Parliament may not find the needed votes to 
appoint them. In such case the process is resolved with a the ‘political’ 
members being chosen randomly while the list of 21 commissioners is 
approved en block – as it may fail to be approved with 3/5 voting 
majority but as well it may not find 2/3 majority (94 votes) to overthrow 
the proposed list as selected by the parliamentary committees.  
                                                          
124 Two lay members will be selected from the legal professions, two from among law professors 
and the School of Magistrates, and one member from civil society. 
125 A law on the re-evaluation of judges, prosecutors and legal advisors was adopted. As part of 
measures to fight corruption and re-establish public trust in the judiciary, the law provides for the 
re-evaluation (vetting) based on 3 criteria: integrity through assets assessment, background 
assessment (inappropriate links with organised crime) and professional competence. These 
commissioners are members of the Independent Qualification Commission - Komisionit të 
Pavarur të Kualifikimit, College of Appeal - Kolegjit të Apelimit and two public commissioners.  
126 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 76/2016 Per disa shtesa dhe ndryshime ne ligjin nr. 
8417, date 21.10.1998, “Kushtetuta e Republikes se Shqiperise”, te Ndryshuar, date 22.07.2016; 
Art. 11 provides for a vote in plenary session. See Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 
84/2016 Për rivlerësimin kalimtar të gjyqtarëve dhe prokurorëve në Republikën e Shqipërisë, 
30.08.2016. 
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The Serious Crimes Prosecutor - under the General Prosecutor – is 
renamed as Special Prosecution Office composed of 10 prosecutors. It 
exercises criminal prosecution and represents the prosecution before 
special courts, and the Supreme Court. Special courts try criminal 
offenses of corruption and organized crime, and criminal charges 
against the President, Speaker of Parliament, Prime Minister, member 
of the Council of Ministers, judges of the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court, Attorney General, member of the Supreme Judicial 
Council and the Supreme Council of the Prosecution, and the directors 
of central institutions as defined in the Constitution or the law, as well 
as charges against former officials of the foregoing. 
The law on vetting was adopted by the parliament at the end of August 
2016.127 It defines the rules and procedures for the re-evaluation of the 
office holders as specified in the art. 179/b of the Constitution and 
guarantee the functioning state institutions, independence of the 
judiciary, and restore people’s trust in institutions. The criteria on which 
this re-evaluation is carried out are that of wealth assessment, 
clearance, and professional assessment.128 The High Inspectorate of 
Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interests (HIDAACI) 
carries a thorough evaluation of assets based on the current legislation 
on asset declaration of public office holders, legislation relevant to 
preventing conflict of interest in the exercise of public functions and the 
Code of Administrative Procedure.129 
The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network in June 2016 released a 
study done on information provided by the High Inspectorate of 
Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interests (HIDAACI), 
where it was evident that there was reason to believe “indicators of 
hidden illegal income” were present when analyzed the “incoming and 
outgoing cash and asset flows”. 130 Indeed, as much as 80% of the 
                                                          
127 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 84/2016 Për rivlerësimin kalimtar të gjyqtarëve dhe 
prokurorëve në Republikën e Shqipërisë, 30.08.2016.   
128 Ibid., Art. 4.   
129 Ibid., Artt. 4 and 33.   
The HIDAACI functions according to the law Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 45.2014, 
Per disa ndryshime dhe shtesa ne lighin nr. 9049, date 10.04.2003, “Per deklarimin dhe kontrollin 
e pasurive, te detyrimeve financiare te te zgjedhurve dhe te disa nepunesve publike”, te ndryshuar, 
24.04.2014; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 44/2014 Per disa shtesa dhe ndryshime ne 
ligjin. Nr. 9367, date 7.4.2005, “Per parandalimin e konfliktit te interesave ne ushtrimin e 
funksioneve publike”, te ndryshuar, 24.04.2014;  
130 Reference made to Council of Europe, Practitioner manual on processing and analysing income 
and asset declaration of public officials, January 2014.  
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Appeal Court’s magistrates asset declarations had financial 
inconsistencies throughout their careers.131  
The Commission132 and the Appeal Panel133 decide on the final 
evaluations of office holders where priority in the process receive 
members of the Constitutional Court, High Court and General 
Prosecutor Office. Nonetheless, the same law provides for magistrates 
to resign with a written notice to the President of the Republic, within 
three months of entry in force of the law, and should there have started 
the re-evaluation procedure is terminated. This allows for all those 
concerned to elude possible sanctions.134 
The DP members of the parliament boycotted the works of the 
parliament after their 28 proposed amendments were not included in 
the adopted law 84/2016 above, thus the opposition and together with 
the Union of the Judges of Albania subsequently referred the law to the 
Constitutional Court claiming that the law was violating the constitution. 
The Constitutional Court deliberated on 22 December 2016 based on 
Artt. 131/a and 134/1/c of the Constitution and Artt. 49, 51, 51/a, 26, 72 
of Law n. 8577, dated 10.02.2000 on the functioning of the 
Constitutional Court, that the vetting law is not in violation of the 
Constitution, thus rejecting the application for suspending it. 135  
As a further step in putting in place the legislation to effectively 
implement the changes in the Constitution the ad hoc Parliamentary 
Committee on Justice Reform, in the second phase of the reform, 
identified a number of laws instrumental to the implementation of the 
justice reform. These regulate the office of the prosecutor, status and 
immunities of judges and prosecutors, as well as the organization of 
Constitutional Court, and other newly established institutions targeting 
organized crime and corruption.136 Currently, the political forces in the 
                                                          
131 B. Likmeta, “The Integrity Gap: Albania’s Appeals Court Judges Asset Disclosures Raise Red 
Flags”, Balkan Insight, 17 June 2016. 
132 It is an independent commission for evaluation, as foreseen by Art. 1797b para. 5 of the 
Constitution. 
133 It is an ad hoc appeal panel to the Constitutional Court. 
134 Art. 56, Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 84/2016  Për rivlerësimin kalimtar të 
gjyqtarëve dhe prokurorëve në Republikën e Shqipërisë, 30.08.2016.   
135 Republika e Shqiperise, Gjykata Kushtetuese, Press Release, 22 December, 2016. 
136 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 84/2016  Për rivlerësimin kalimtar të gjyqtarëve dhe 
prokurorëve në Republikën e Shqipërisë, 30.08.2016; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 
97/2016, Për organizimin dhe funksionimin e prokurorisë në Republikën e Shqipërisë, 06.10.2016; 
Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 96/2016 Për statusin e gjyqtarëve dhe prokurorëve në 
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parliament are continuing their efforts on another larger legislative 
package of 40 by-laws and laws that are part of the third phase of the 
reform.137 
 
4.1.3.2 Corruption and organized crime 
Corruption is a wide spread phenomenon that has permeated all 
sectors of public life including law enforcement. The Transparency 
International Corruption Perception index confirms that corruption is 
strongly felt in Albania.138 Crimes related to public sector corruption, 
active and passive corruption, abuse of duty, corruption at high levels 
and those related to the private sector like, conflict of interest and those 
of asset declaration are all specified within the Criminal Code. The 
Court of Serious Crimes is entitled to judge cases involving high 
government officials and local government officials, judges, prosecutors 
and other judiciary officials except those officials that are to be judged 
in first instance by the High Court and investigated by the General 
Prosecutor Office as specified by Art. 141 of the Constitution.139 
The strategies on public administration140 and anti-corruption141 aim to 
strengthen transparency in public service, these were a product of 
comprehensive and extensive consultation with private sector and civil 
                                                                                                                               
Republikën e Shqipërisë, 06.10.2016; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 99/2016 Për disa 
shtesa dhe ndryshime në ligjin nr. 8577, datë 10.2.2000, “Për organizimin dhe funksionimin e 
Gjykatës Kushtetuese të Republikës së Shqipërisë” 06.10.2016; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, 
Ligj no. 95/2016 Për organizimin dhe funksionimin e institucioneve për të luftuar korrupsionin 
dhe krimin e organizuar, 06.10.2016;  
137 See Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise Komisioni per çeshtjet Ligjore, Administraten Publike dhe 
te Drejtat e Njeriut; See as well European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, 
Albania 2016 Report, SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016, p. 13. 
138 The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 places Albania at no. 88 out 
of 168 countries with a score of 36 over 100 (where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean). See 
Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2016, Albania, rank 83/176, score 
39/100. 
139 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise Projektligj “Per disa shtesa dhe ndryshime ne Ligj no. 7905, 
date 21.3.1995, “Kodi i Procedures Penale i Republikes se Shqiperise”, te ndryshuar, 18.11.2013; 
Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise Projektligj “Per disa shtesa dhe ndryshime ne Ligj no. 7905, date 
21.3.1995, “Kodi i Procedures Penale i Republikes se Shqiperise”, te ndryshuar, 03.06.2014. 
140 Republika e Shqiperise, Minister per Inovacion dhe Administraten Publike, Departamenti i 
Administrates Publike, Strategjia Ndersektoriale e Reformes ne Administraten Publike 2015-2020 
141 Republika e Shqiperise, Keshilli i Ministrave, Ministri per çeshtjet Vendore, Strategjia 
Kombetare Kunder Korrupsionit 2015-2017. 
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society. Clear timeframes to achieve specific goals have been set with 
the relative budget for each single action for a total EUR 12 million. 
Recommendations have been put forth to improve impact indicators 
and thus results. 142 While overall action plans are in place, there are 
shortcomings in their implementation.  
Moreover, the past year some progress was made with the adoption of 
a number of laws directed at fighting corruption, like the law on whistle-
blower protection143 and the law on organization and functioning of 
institutions in order to successfully fight corruption and provide law 
enforcement agencies with access to national electronic public 
records.144 It cannot be denied that there are still challenges ahead in 
capacity building to effectively implement the existing legislation but as 
well update the existing legislation i.e on interception and surveillance, 
admissibility of the obtained evidence before court and other limits on 
investigations.145 As mentioned above, while legislation is in place, 
further efforts should be put forth to implement it. 
A reason for this lack of implementation may be found in the many and 
frequent changes to the legal framework that have been subject of 
nuanced interpretation, but not only, available mechanisms to address 
cases of corruption remain complex and inefficient and have so far 
yielded limited results in improving public perception regarding 
corruption and functioning of government administration.146 Indeed the 
officials who received a final sentencing for corruption related crimes 
are still very few.147  
                                                          
142 See as well European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 
Report, SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, pp. 10, 17. 
143 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 60/2016 “Për sinjalizimin dhe mbrojtjen e 
sinjalizuesve”, 02.06.2016. 
144 Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 95/2016 Për organizimin dhe funksionimin e 
institucioneve për të luftuar korrupsionin dhe krimin e organizuar, 06.10.2016.  
145 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, 
SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016, p. 17. 
146 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, 
SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 17.  
147 Statistical information from the Ministry of Interior indicate that for the criminal offence of 
corruption, the following were the sentences pronounced: in 2009 the individuals that were 
sentenced were 45; 2010 the individuals that were sentenced were 48; 2011, the individuals that 
were sentenced were 72; 2012, the individuals that were sentenced were 39; 2013, the individuals 
that were sentenced were 70. 
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The battle with the organized crime has been and remains critical to 
substantial headway in consolidating the rule of law. Organized crime 
has been allegedly infiltrating politics, judiciary and economy.148 
Albanian authorities and law enforcement agencies have to further 
concentrate their efforts to investigate, prosecute and sentence 
individuals and criminal networks operating in different areas and at all 
different levels.149 Financial investigations and possibly confiscation of 
assets remain at lower level and the EU in its latest progress report 
recommends for further investigation on possible infiltration of public 
and private sectors by organized crime.150 
The most recurrent cases of criminal investigation remain cultivation 
and trafficking of cannabis but as well human trafficking.151 
Nonetheless, a positive trend of increased efforts by law enforcement in 
these and other areas of organized crime has been witnessed.152 
However, the number of cases targeting money laundering and 
confiscation of assets remain low and efforts to proactively investigate 
                                                          
148 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, COM(2013) 
700 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013, p. 6. 
149 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, COM(2013) 
700 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013, pp. 6-7; European Commission, Commission Staff Working 
Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 2014, p. 
12. 
150 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report, 
SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p.16; See as well as European Commission, 
Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 
9.11.2016, p. 17.    
151 Albanian State Police Official, interview, Tirana, 16 December 2016.  
152 See as well European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2014 
Progress Report, SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 2014, p. 3; Republika e Shqiperise, 
Ministria e Puneve te Brendshme, Drejtoria e Policise se Shtetit, Informacion mbi disa operacione 
policore te zhvilluara ne te gjithe vendin nga data 1-10 Tetor 2016; Republika e Shqiperise, 
Ministria e Puneve te Brendshme, Drejtoria e Policise se Shtetit, Informacion mbi disa operacione 
policore te zhvilluara ne te gjithe vendin nga data 11-20 Tetor 2016; Republika e Shqiperise, 
Ministria e Puneve te Brendshme, Drejtoria e Policise se Shtetit, Informacion mbi disa operacione 
policore te zhvilluara ne te gjithe vendin nga data 21-30 Nentor 2016. Republika e Shqiperise, 
Ministria e Puneve te Brendshme, Drejtoria e Policise se Shtetit, Informacion mbi disa operacione 
policore te zhvilluara ne te gjithe vendin nga data 11-20 Dhjetor 2016. Republika e Shqiperise, 
Ministria e Puneve te Brendshme, Drejtoria e Policise se Shtetit, Informacion mbi disa operacione 
policore te zhvilluara ne te gjithe vendin nga data 11-20 Janar 2017; Republika e Shqiperise, 
Ministria e Puneve te Brendshme, Drejtoria e Policise se Shtetit, Informacion mbi disa operacione 
policore te zhvilluara ne te gjithe vendin nga data 21-31 Janar 2017. 
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such cases are being stepped up as well through international 
cooperation.153 
A crucial component in delivering on final sentences for criminal 
individuals and hitting criminal groups is a strong cooperation between 
police and prosecutors. Nonetheless, many of the registered cases to 
the Serious Crime Prosecution Office are then transmitted to local 
prosecutors and subsequently dropped on basis of poor evidence. 154 
The cases of convictions for drugs remain low especially if compared to 
the market scale of cultivation and trafficking of drugs in the Western 
Balkans region.155  
The threat of terrorism and extremism has touched the Western 
Balkans as well. A prevention-oriented cooperation with timely sharing 
of information and best practices to promote counter-terrorism 
initiatives and preparedness in responding to such threats, can make a 
difference. The EU has been proactive in not only enlisting the Western 
Balkans as partners against terrorism and terror motivated activities but 
is active in developing the Western Balkans Counter Terrorism 
Initiative.156  
In the Paris Western Balkans Summit the representatives of the region, 
confirmed their interest in cooperating with the Salzburg Forum and the 
Western Balkans counter-terrorism initiative.157 In addition, they 
pledged to make use of the Southeast European Law Enforcement 
Centre and implement the SEECP joint statement on terrorism of 
2015.158 Moreover, Albania has volunteered to host the NATO Centre 
on Foreign Fighters following a recommendation of the Obama 
administration given the geostrategic importance to NATO and the 
                                                          
153 Albanian State Police Official, interview, Tirana, 16 December 2016. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Albania has dropped 19 positions on WJP Rule of Law Index, see World Justice Project, Rule 
of Law Index 2016; See as well European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document 
Albania 2015 Report, SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 18.  
156 See Council of the European Union, Vienna Declaration – Tackling Violent Extremism and 
Terrorism, Brussels, 25 March 2015; Council of the European Union, EU Western Balkan 
counter-terrorism initiative: integrative plan of action Brussels, 4 December 2015.  
157 Western Balkan’s Heads of States and Governments, Final Declaration by the Chair of the 
Paris Western Balkans Summit, 4 July 2016. 
158 Ibid.; See as well Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre, www.selec.org; See as well 
SEECP Joint Statement on Terrorism, Tirana, 24.02.2015.  
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region.159 Michael Turner, President of the NATO Assembly underlined 
the good cooperation existing between the EU and NATO in the area of 
security and stability in the region. 160  
 
4.1.4 Media 
 
4.1.4.1 Freedom of speech in the Western Balkans 
One of the elements informing the readiness of a country to join the EU 
is the ability to safeguard the freedom of expression.161 It is enshrined 
in the values upon which the EU is founded and the capacity to uphold 
them is at the core of evaluating the readiness of a country, which goes 
hand in hand with promoting democracy, good governance and 
accountability.162 Indeed, if stripped of this fundamental human right, a 
society cannot enjoy reliable and objective information that contributes - 
by scrutinizing institutions - to dialogue, transparency encouraging thus 
good governance and ultimately thus is in service of democracy. 
Rightfully, Ulrike Lunacek, Member of the European Parliament 
reminds us that “freedom of expression starts with a freedom of 
thought: criticism and difference of opinion are part of life and daring to 
think different than you are told”.163 Those who have learnt to dare and 
think critically have the freedom of expression. 
In the negotiations’ talks freedom of expression is inherent within 
Chapters 10 Information Society and Media and Chapter 23 Judiciary 
and Fundamental Rights. Christian Danielsson, Director General for 
Enlargement at the European Commission, during Speak UP 3 
conference in Brussels, assured that the EC will put the accent in 
media professionalism and extend the aspect of social media in the 
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163 Ulrike Lunacek, Speak-Up! 3 Conference, Brussels, 4 November 2015. 
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context of democracy.164 Indeed, the Speak UP! 2 discussions in June 
2013 have inspired the EC to follow attentively developments in the 
area of media and information in the Western Balkans.165 Moreover, in 
recognizing the importance of freedom of expression the European 
Commission has established guidelines for supporting freedom of mass 
media in the enlargement countries.166 The Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA II) is invested in fostering a positive 
environment for exercising in full freedom of expression by supporting 
solid media professionals’ associations to safeguard media integrity 
that in turn may empower a healthy and robust internal governance 
immune from external pressures worthy of people’s trust and 
attention.167 It is however, the responsibility of State institutions to 
assess the degree of freedom of expression against the existing legal 
framework and its implementation taking as reference the principles 
that have inspired the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 
1636 (2008) on indicators for media in a democracy and existing EU 
directives.168 As prescribed by Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights “the exercise of […] freedoms [since it entails] duties 
and responsibilities, [may be restricted] by law” to the extent it is 
“necessary in a democratic society” abiding by the principle of 
proportionality. Judges should, thus, refrain thus from using the law to 
punish journalists only because they have been critical to government 
institutions. Any violation of its principles and attempt to restrict the 
exercise of freedom of media should be duly investigated and 
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perpetrators prosecuted.169 On their part, mass media should support 
the establishment of media professionals’ associations and pledge to 
uphold labour standards so that the working setting may not be a 
determinant of self-censorship and lower quality of information. These 
measures ultimately, if executed, may contribute to restore audience’s 
confidence in the media.  
The Western Balkans have much work ahead in order to overcome 
obstacles that stand in the way of fully enjoying freedom of expression 
and restoring confidence in media outlets. Politics continues to 
influence the editorial content of broadcasters resorting as well to 
(mis)using the legal framework.170 There are cases where governments 
“themselves contribute to a climate of fear which demonizes journalists 
critical of government policy as traitors”.171 Outlets, which reserve a 
more favourable coverage to government activities, are thought to 
receive the most public money and government advertisement.172 In 
addition, the media sector suffers from a lack of  “self-regulation” and it 
has not been unprecedented for political interest groups to use the 
justice system to harass and strongly limit “critical journalism”.173 Jeta 
Xharra, Journalist of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) 
notes that “there is a rise in campaigns and the investment on the part 
of the corrupt elites are forced to put forth to mud good journalists”.174 
There are three teams of investigative journalists in Kosovo, Albania 
and Serbia that have followed privatization deals and investigation on 
privatization of State companies. In the case of BIRN Serbia bully 
government officials have failed to scare off donors out of supporting 
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investigative journalism. 175 In Albania, BIRN - says Ms. Xharra - was 
threatened by the Prime Minister Rama.176 While in Kosovo, in the past 
six years has been involved in two legal battles among which 
requesting to the then Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi to provide access 
to public records related to the expenses sustained by public officials 
paid by the Kosovo taxpayers. The PM did not yet implement the 
decision of the court.177 Mr. Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations has 
expressed his disappointment, stressing that instances, like the ones 
described above, are in clear contrast with a non-partisan professional 
administration.178 For Commissioner Hahn, “[f]reedom of media is at the 
core of the EU integration process and is not negotiable!” 179 
Another issue of concern remain economic pressures, as mass media 
is regarded as a business and not as a public service, where journalists 
are mercenaries, hired pens in a competitive system for relevance and 
power. Moreover, employment conditions of journalist in the WB are 
difficult: journalists are dependent on their employer which resort to 
non-contractual hiring that leaves them vulnerable in front of powerful 
pressures.180 To date, the provisions of the labour code continues to go 
unheeded with delays in receiving their remuneration, non-paid social 
contribution checks are in in contrast with having in place a competitive 
and transparent market economy.181 There is a need for transperency 
in media ownership and limits to its concentration in the hands of few 
individuals or interest groups that may by doing so limit its 
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independence, pluralism and quality of information.182 Pluralism of 
information provides different point of views, which are essential for 
grasping the essence of the reality. The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in its Article 11 Freedom of expression and information, calls for 
“freedom and pluralism of the media”. In the Western Balkans, the first 
striking fact is the multitude of media in a small market and one might 
think that this oversupply is positive but in reality information is rather 
limited. 183 Nonetheless, more often than not in the Western Balkans we 
hear different media outlooks speak in unison raising little to no 
criticism on the work of the executive. It begs the question whether 
these societies are free from vices like corruption or organized crime or 
otherwise media has become complaisant. 184  
The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights Mr. Nils 
Muižnieks notes a longstanding concern stressing that “an investigation 
has to lead to the identification of those calling for attacks and violence 
against journalists”. On the other hand, Mr. Muižnieks invites media to 
look critically on themselves and how they report on themselves as 
“hate speech and its various reproductions remain”. 185 His office 
remains engaged in calling off efforts to reinstate defamation as a 
criminal offence. 186 
The Parliament should work to approve laws empowering specific 
institutions in upholding the freedom of expression should be enforced 
so that to ensure their independence and empower them to establish a 
track record instrumental in properly evaluating the readiness of a 
country in this domain. 187 Moreover, the legislature in complying with 
their responsibilities need to effectively seek civil society and media 
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advice when evaluating the state of implementation and strengthen 
legislation so to respond to the needs of ethical and free journalism.188  
Overall, the EC evaluates positively the existing legal framework for 
freedom of expression in the enlargement countries, however its 
enforcement and the practices in the area continue to raise concern.189 
 
4.1.4.2 Freedom of speech in Albania 
The Albanian Constitution and the pertinent laws adopted are in 
accordance with international law in assuring “individual liberties 
including the right to privacy, freedom of expression and sanctions 
against incitement of hatred”.190 Strives have been made to uphold 
freedom of expression whereby libel and defamation cannot ammount 
to prison sentences, nonetheless they remain criminal offences subject 
to maximum fine of ALL 3 million at odds with international 
standards.191 Edi Paloka and Arben Ristani, both DP Members of 
Parliament were sentenced by the Supreme Court ALL 200 000 in 
fines, following the law suit PM Edi Rama initiated for defamation. 
Pursuant of Art. 71.2 of the Constitution “[t]he mandate of a deputy 
ends […] when he is convicted by final court decision for the 
commission of a crime.” 192 
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The broadcast media is regulated by the law on Public and Private 
Radio and Television amended on 4 March 2013 whereby the 
Audiovisual Media Authority (AMA) serves as the national regulatory 
and licensing authority.193 The audiovisual transmission should be free, 
impartial and objective, respectful of political and religious beliefs, 
personality, dignity and rights of other fundamental freedoms of man. 
This is functional to the guarantee of the freedom of expression, right to 
information that preserves the secrecy of sources of information and 
safeguards privacy. Nonetheless, there are concerns related to political 
interference on media, it is note worthy that both management boards 
members of AMA and the public broadcaster RTSH are elected by the 
parliament.194 Indeed the law 97/2013 “falls short of requiring politically 
inclusive governing bodies […] therefore risking that both institutions 
would remain political instruments of the parliamentary majority”.195 
Reference is made to Artt. 9.4 and 94.4 regarding to the board 
members of both AMA and RTSH whereby “[i]n all cases the 
commission takes into account the preservation of the balance 
[whereby] the candidates for up for election as board members […] are 
submitted for approval to the Parliament’s plenary.” Indeed, the 
progress reports of the Commission have criticized the inability of the 
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government to act upon “identified priorities”.196 Moreover, AMA, 
actually is hindered from exercising in full its functions in practice, for 
which the EC calls for “its independence [be] guaranteed”. 197  
The parliamentary elections of June 2013 were “competitive” and in 
compliance with fundamental freedoms according to the electoral 
observation mission of OSCE/ODIHR.198 The media coverage of the 
campaign was adequate in that constituents were informed on the 
stance of main political parties.199 Article 84.1 of the Electoral Code 
sets as an obligation for broadcasters to feature “[e]lectoral campaign 
information prepared” by candidates in the news to this one should add 
the affiliation of media owners that engenders self-censorship and a 
single-nuanced viewpoint on issues.200 Indeed, OSCE/ODIHR noted 
that violations of the legal limit of paid political advertising in favour of 
the two main parties by certain media outlets were observed, as 
smaller political parties received no coverage.201 The RTSH, the public 
broadcaster granted equal coverage to the main political parties, but 
was observed to be lenient towards the DP, until then part of the 
governing coalition.202 On the other hand the private broadcasters like 
TV Klan, known to be a  DP supporter, granted to the later a largely 
positive coverage. Others like Top Channel and Vizion Plus while more 
balanced reserved a more critical tone towards the governing coalition 
lead by DP. The news channels News 24 and Ora News provided a 
                                                          
196 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, 
SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 2014, p. 1.  
197 Ibid.  
198 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, COM(2013) 
700 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013, p. 18. 
199 There are 3 national television (TV) channels (public channel RTSH, TV Klan and TV Top 
Channel), 71 local TV channels, 113 cable TV channels and 71 radio stations. The consumption of 
print media, that is equally numerous is limited. Internet remains largely an open platform for 
public debate. Nonetheless, the TV remains the main source of information. Please refer to AMA. 
200 Article 84.1 on Electoral campaign on private radio and television stations. The Electoral Code 
of the Republic of Albania, Approved by Law no. 10019, dated 29 December 2008, amended by 
Law no. 74/2012, dated 19 July 2012 and Law no. 31/2015, dated 2 April 2015; See as well 
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 8 September 2015, pp. 2, 15. 
201 The OSCE/ODIHR EOM media monitoring revealed that the DP exceeded the 90-minutes legal 
limit on TV Klan  (187 minutes), Vizion Plus  (235 minutes), News 24  (204 minutes), Ora News  
(226 minutes). SP exceeded the legal limit on Klan TV  (148 minutes), Top Channel  (148 
minutes), Vizion Plus  (161 minutes), News 24  (125 minutes), Ora News  (111 minutes). 
202 See OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, pp. 
2, 15, 17,18. 
166 
 
balanced coverage, all the while print media took sides with Shqip and 
Shqiptarja.com aligning with SP and Mapo and Panorama with DP. 203   
“New media”, including “social media” are more than ever before 
gaining momentum and traction in a market where the internet remains 
the only mass media outlet free of interference and thus greatly 
contributes in providing additional viewpoints and one would hope, 
serve to control exercise of power.204 However, recently the SP, 
through a draft bill has requested for mandatory registration of portals 
during electoral campaign. Those sites that fail to do so and engage in 
“electoral propaganda” will be shut down. 205 The draft bill states that 
“[t]he usage of web portals which are not controlled by the Media 
Monitoring Board for electoral propaganda is prohibited”. 206 
Nonetheless, experts in the field have warned against engaging is such 
initiative: Darian Pavli, Programme Director for the Soros Foundation in 
Tirana, along with dismissing as “confusing” the draft bill believes  “[t]he 
imposition of the model currently in use for audiovisual media in the 
online space is very problematic.” 207 
 
4.2 Public opinion 
 
4.2.1 Public opinion in Albania 
In an attempt to have an understanding of the perception on the current 
socio-economic and political situation in Albania and the understanding 
there is about the EU, during my field research in Albania that started 
on the 23rd June 2016 and is ongoing at the moment I am writing this 
thesis, I conducted an anonymous survey. The survey was conducted 
from the 5-19 of November 2016, one week prior and one week after 
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the release of the enlargement package by the European Commission. 
This survey has been conducted in a time where debates around the 
EU and reforms Albania is undertaking to get ever closer to accession 
were in the order of the day. The 14 questions selected were among 
the questions asked by the European Commission, Eurobarometer, 
some of which were asked at the last Eurobarometer on May 2016 to 
Europeans. The questions asked have a parallel to the Balkan 
Barometer 2016.208 These will serve to have a degree of comparison 
with the results both within the EU and the wider South East Europe 
(SEE) region. The questionnaire was conducted electronically, 
questions were submitted entirely in Albanian language.209 The sample 
was chosen randomly, to people whose usual place of residence is 
Albania, hence have a first-hand experience with the current situation in 
the country. There were 323 unique visits to the questionnaire of which 
208 submitted their answers. The question options were randomized 
and positioned vertically so that not to lead the respondent’s answers 
and thus affect the results. The analysis of the data was conducted 
both on Microsoft Excel and ‘R’ which has allowed me to merge the 
data and the answers in clusters such as society, economy and 
institutions.   
The majority of the respondents are in the age group 25-39 years old 
making 57,21% of respondents. The second most important age group 
is that of 15-24 years old making 37.5% of respondents. Among these, 
students make 48.57% of the respondents and 46.15% of the 
respondents are people presumably holding a university degree given 
as the end of their studies is ‘20+’. The sample, thus, portrays those 
who are likely to vote in the next elections and possible referendum to 
join the EU. Moreover, the sample predominantly portrays that fraction 
of the society who is educated, still studying or presumably holding a 
university degree.   
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Table 1 
Question 1 - Age of sample 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
15-24 78 37.5 
25-39 119 57.21 
40-54 9 4.33 
NA 2 0.96 
 
Table 2 
When asked about how much trust you have in certain institutions, and 
given the options as below, the results on the trust Albanians place in 
their political parties are clear-cut. A staggering 90.38% of the 
respondents say they tend not to trust political parties. In comparison 
72% of Europeans tend not to trust their national parliament.210  
 
Table 3 
Question 3.1 - Trust in Political Parties 
                                                          
210 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 14. 
Question 2 - End of Studies of Sample 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
15 2 0.96 
16-19 6 2.88 
20+ 96 46.15 
Student 101 48.57 
NA 3 1.44 
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Options No. Answers Percentage 
Tend to trust 11 5.29 
Tend not to trust 188 90.38 
Don't Know/No Answer 9 4.33 
 
Despite the acclaimed efforts in furthering reforms, most notably that of 
the judiciary, 80.29% of the respondents tend not to trust their 
government. In comparison 73% of Europeans tend not to trust their 
governments.211  
 
Table 4 
Question 3.2- Trust in Government 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Tend to trust 18 5.29 
Tend not to trust 167 80.29 
Don't Know/No Answer 23 11.06 
Reference is made to the Balkan Barometer data in SEE region 
corruption continues to affect nearly every realm of public life. In 
Albania politicians at the national level and the judiciary are perceived 
as the most corrupt gathering the 52% and 24% of respondents 
respectively.212 Indeed, 81% of the interviewed Albanians believe that 
law is not applied and enforced effectively.213 Among which 86% 
somewhat disagree that the law is applied to everyone equally.214 In 
2016 Balkan Barometer, 78% of Albanians believe that the judiciary is 
influenced by politics.215 It follows that 81% of interviewed Albanians do 
not have confidence in courts and judiciary.216 Participations of citizens 
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in decision making in Albania is low, civic involvement in affecting 
government decisions is left to private discussions for 39% of 
respondents and 37% of Albanians do not even discuss on possible 
actions to take in order to affect decision making. 217 The main reasons 
behind this civic apathy is for 38% total disengagement from public life 
and for 37% an utter belief of being unable to influence government 
decisions as an individual.218  
My survey sample seems equally split with regards to the trust they 
place in the EU. Among the respondents 49.04% tend to trust the EU 
against 28.85% that tend not to trust the EU and 22.12% who do not 
know or do not wish to answer. In comparison, 33% of the Europeans 
tend to trust the EU. 219 By comparison, we could argue that Albanians 
are more trusting to the EU than Europeans are.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Question 3.3 - Trust in the EU 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Tend to trust 102 49.04 
Tend not to trust 60 28.85 
Don't Know/No Answer 46 22.12 
 
When asked about the two most important issues facing the EU at the 
moment, in analysing all the answers provided, among which not all 
respondents selected the requested two options, it shows that 
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Albanians believe the three most important issues EU is facing at the 
moment are migration with 59.13% of the respondents, followed by 
terrorism with 50.47% of the respondents and the economic situation 
with 48.08% of the respondents. This is not far detached from the 
answers provided in the latest Eurobarometer of May 2016 where at 
EU level, migration is mentioned by 48% of the respondents and 
terrorism is a concern for 39% of them. The economic situation in EU 
level, much like in the conducted survey in Tirana, comes at third place 
with 19% of the respondents.220  
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Question 4 - Issues facing the EU (ALL) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Immigration 123 59.13 
Terrorism 105 50.48 
Economic Situat. 100 48.08 
Unemployment 44 21.15 
Brexit 34 16.35 
EU's Influence 46 22.12 
Even when adjusting the sample, and analysing the answers provided 
by 171 respondents who correctly indicated two options, 29.81% of 
them considers migration to be an issue the EU is facing, followed by 
25.32% answering terrorism and 24.36% pointing to the economic 
situation. It seems that even when comparing all sample versus the 
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adjusted sample the issues Albanians perceive as the most important 
for the EU remain migration and terrorism.  
Table 7 
Question 4 - Issues facing the EU (ADJ) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Immigration 93 29.81 
Terrorism 79 25.32 
Economic Situat. 76 24.36 
Unemployment 25 8.01 
Brexit 24 7.69 
EU's Influence 15 4.81 
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
When arranging all sample data in three clusters, where society 
comprises issues of migration and terrorism; economy comprising 
issues of economic situation and unemployment and institutions 
comprises Brexit and the EU influence in the world, the results indicate 
that 81.73% of the respondents believe the EU faces issues pertaining 
to society, followed by 59.13% that believe EU faces issues related to 
economy and only 27.4% consider institutions to be an issue. Referring 
to the results conducted on the sample as above, we can deduct that 
Albanians are not particularly alarmed by Brexit and the possibly 
undermined EU influence in the world.  
 
Table 8 
Question 4 - Issues facing the EU (ALL - merged) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Society 170 81.73 
Economy 123 59.13 
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Institutions 57 27.4 
 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
When we adjust our sample, and analyse the answers provided by the 
171 respondents who correctly indicated two options, yet again issues 
within society gather 64.42% of respondents, while 44.71% of them 
indicate issues pertaining to economy are an issue for the EU. Only 
18.27% of the surveyed maintain that Brexit and/or the EU influence in 
the world are an issue for the EU.  
 
Table 9 
Question 4 - Issues facing the EU (ADJ - merged) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Society 134 64.42 
Economy 93 44.71 
Institutions 38 18.27 
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Figure 5 
 
Figure 6 
When asked about the two most important issues facing at the moment 
Albania, 58.17% of all respondents consider unemployment to be an 
issue, followed by 51.92% that indicate economic situation. The third 
177 
 
most important issue for Albania according to 47.6% of respondents is 
crime. Unemployment is, as well, the top concern at national level for 
33% of Europeans.221 According to the Balkan Barometer, Albanians 
maintain that the two most important issues Albania faces are first, with 
69% of answers unemployment and second, for 60% of answers is the 
economic situation. 222 Corruption according to 35% of respondents is 
at the third place.223  
 
 
Table 10 
Question 5 - Issues facing Albania (ALL) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Crime 99 47.6 
Democracy 82 39.42 
Economic Situat. 108 51.92 
Unemployment 121 58.17 
Healthcare 76 36.54 
Education 62 29.81 
Other 46 22.12 
When adjusting the sample, and analysing the answers provided by 
147 respondents who correctly indicated two options, we observe that 
unemployment remains at the top of concerns for 24.56% of 
respondents. It is followed by the economic situation for 20.28% of 
respondents. Contrary from the results obtained by analysing all the 
sample as above, when adjusting the sample to those 147 respondents 
who correctly indicated two options, democracy and rule of law is the 
third most important issue the country faces. Crime is considered an 
issue by 18.86% of the respondents. 
                                                          
221 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 8. 
222 Regional Cooperation Council, Public Opinion Survey Balkan Barometer 2016, p. 42. 
223 Ibid. 
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Table 11 
Question 5 - Issues facing Albania (ADJ) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Crime 53 18.86 
Democracy 55 19.57 
Economic Situat. 57 20.28 
Unemployment 69 24.56 
Healthcare 23 8.19 
Education 22 7.83 
Other 2 0.71 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 8 
 
When arranging data of all respondents in four clusters, society 
comprising issues of crime, healthcare and education; economy 
comprising issues of economic situation and unemployment and 
institutions comprising issues such as democracy and rule of law and 
the fourth cluster called other, the results for all the sample indicate that 
82.69% of the respondents believe Albania faces issues pertaining to 
economy, followed by 70.67% that believe issues Albania faces are 
related to society and only 39.42.% consider institutions to be an issue. 
From the analysis of these data, the malaise Albanians have on the 
economic wellbeing of their society is evident.  
 
 
Table 12 
Question 5 - Issues facing Albania (ALL - merged) 
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Options No. Answers Percentage 
Society 147 70.67 
Economy 172 82.69 
Institutions 82 39.42 
Other 5 2.4 
 
 
Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
When analysing data of the 147 respondents that indicated correctly 
two options and arrange the data in four clusters, society comprising 
issues of crime, healthcare and education; economy comprising issues 
of economic situation and unemployment and institutions comprising 
issues such as democracy and rule of law and the fourth cluster called 
other, the results for the adjusted sample indicate that 54.81% of the 
respondents believe Albania faces issues pertaining to economy 
followed by 42.31% that believe the country faces issues related to 
society and 26.44% consider institutions to be an issue. Even when we 
adjust the sample, economy results the top concern in Albania.  
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Table 13 
Question 5 - Issues facing Albania (ADJ - merged) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Society 88 42.31 
Economy 114 54.81 
Institutions 55 26.44 
Other 2 0.96 
 
 
Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
When asked about the two most important issues Albanians are facing 
personally at the moment, 61.54% of all the respondents refer to 
inflation, followed by 40.38% that indicate unemployment. The third 
most important issue according to 34.62% of respondents is the 
education system. Europeans as well, place inflation at the top of their 
personal concerns with 26% of answers while unemployment gathers 
only 14% of answers.224 
 
 
Table 14 
Question 6 - Personal Issues (ALL) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
                                                          
224 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 13. 
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Inflation 128 61.54 
Healthcare 66 31.73 
Unemployment 84 40.38 
Education 72 34.62 
Work Condit. 49 23.56 
Other 28 13.46 
When adjusting the sample, and analysing the 179 respondents that 
correctly indicated two options, we observe that inflation remains the 
top concern as 31.04% of respondents consider it to be an issue. It is 
followed by 19.7% of respondents who consider unemployment as an 
issue. Similarly, the education system remains the third most important 
issue that Albanians face personally. 
Table 15 
Question 6 - Personal Issues (ADJ) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Inflation 104 31.04 
Healthcare 47 14.03 
Unemployment 66 19.7 
Education 53 15.82 
Work Condit. 42 12.54 
Other 23 6.87 
 
186 
 
 
Figure 13 
 
Figure 14 
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When arranging data of all respondents in three clusters where society 
comprises health and social security, education, working conditions; 
economy, comprises inflation and unemployment and the third cluster 
called other, the results for all the sample indicate that 69.23% of the 
respondents face issues pertaining to society, followed by 76.44% that 
are mostly concerned with issues related to economy.  
Table 16 
Question 6 - Personal Issues (ALL - merged) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Society 144 69.23 
Economy 159 76.44 
Other 28 13.46 
 
 
Figure 15 
188 
 
 
Figure 16 
When analysing data of the 179 respondents who correctly indicated 
two options and arrange said data in three clusters, were under society 
we find the options of health and social security, education, working 
conditions; under economy, we find inflation and unemployment and 
under the third cluster we find other, the results indicate that 63.46% of 
the respondents believe the issues Albanians face are those pertaining 
to economy followed by 55.77% that believe the issues are related to 
society and 11.06% have answered other. Even when we adjust the 
sample economy results as the top concern among respondents.  
 
 
 
Table 17 
 
Question 6 - Personal Issues (ADJ - merged) 
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Options No. Answers Percentage 
Society 116 55.77 
Economy 132 63.46 
Other 23 11.06 
 
 
Figure 17 
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Figure 18 
When asked about the feeling they personally associate with the EU, 
and where respondents could indicate more than an option, for 52.88% 
of answers the EU is hope, 22.12% trust the EU in comparison with 
21.15% of answers who associate the EU with indifference and 17.31% 
of answers associate the EU with mistrust.  
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Table 18 
Question 7 - Feeling EU 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Enthusiasm 28 13.46 
Hope 110 52.88 
Trust 46 22.12 
Indifference 44 21.15 
Anxiety 17 8.17 
Mistrust 36 17.31 
Reject  11 5.29 
DN/NA 25 12.02 
 
When arranging data of all responders and all given answers in four 
clusters were the first cluster named positive comprises enthusiasm, 
hope, trust; the second cluster is indifference, and the third cluster is 
named negative and comprises anxiety, mistrust, rejection towards the 
EU, the last cluster is no answer. The results indicate a majority of 
answers were positive with 60.1% followed by the negative answers 
reaching 24.04% and those of indifference and no answer making for a 
total of 33.17%.  
 
 
 
 
Table 19 
Question 7 - Feeling EU (merged) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Positive 125 60.1 
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Indifference 44 21.15 
Negative 50 24.04 
NA 25 12.02 
 
 
Figure 19 
193 
 
 
Figure 20 
When asked about the meaning the EU has for them personally, and 
where respondents could indicate more than an option, 70.19% of 
given answers associate the EU to cultural diversity, 51.92% of given 
answers indicate the EU means economic prosperity while for 37.02% 
of them associate the EU with anxiety. According to Balkan Barometer, 
Albanians do personally equate the meaning of EU membership for 
55% of the respondents with freedom to study and/or work in the EU 
and for 54% of them with economic prosperity.225  
 
 
 
Table 20 
Question 8 -Meaning EU 
                                                          
225 Regional Cooperation Council, Public Opinion Survey Balkan Barometer 2016, p. 52. 
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Options No. Answers Percentage 
Peace 26 12.5 
Economic prosperity 108 51.92 
Democracy 44 21.15 
Cultural diversity 146 70.19 
Anxiety 77 37.02 
Loss of cultural id. 16 7.69 
DN/NA 13 6.25 
 
When arranging data of all responders and all given answers in three 
clusters were the first cluster named positive comprises peace, 
economic prosperity, democracy and cultural diversity; the second 
cluster named negative comprises anxiety and loss of cultural diversity, 
and the third cluster named negative comprises anxiety, mistrust, 
rejection towards the EU, and the last cluster is named no answer. The 
results of all answers show the majority of answers were positive with 
89.42% followed by the negative answers reaching a 43.27%. 
Table 21 
Question 8 -Meaning EU (merged) 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Positive 186 89.42 
Negative 90 43.27 
NA 13 6.25 
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Figure 21 
 
Figure 22 
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When asked which among the given options they think is the most 
positive result of the EU, free movement obtains the majority of the 
consents with 62.02%. The Europeans believe as well free movement 
to be the most successful result of the EU with 56% of the 
respondents.226  
 
Table 22 
Question 9 - Most positive result of the EU 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Free mov. 129 62.02 
Peace 24 11.54 
Influence 19 9.13 
Economic power 36 17.31 
 
When asked how they would judge the current situation of the 
European economy, 48.07% of the respondents said assess the 
situation of the European economy positively. On the contrary, 43.75% 
of respondents assess the situation of the European economy 
negatively.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
226 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 39. 
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Table 23 
Question 10 -Situation of the European Economy 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Very good 5 2.4 
Rather good 95 45.67 
Rather bad 73 35.1 
Very bad 18 8.65 
DN/NA 17 8.17 
 
 
Figure 23 
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Figure 24 
When asked how respondents evaluate the impact of the crisis on 
employment, 50.96% of the respondents believe that the impact of the 
crisis on employment has reached its peak, followed by 30.29% of the 
responders believe that the worst is still to come. At the European level, 
41% of respondents believe that the impact of the crisis on jobs has 
reached its peak and for 47% of them the worst is still to come. 227 
 
 
 
 
Table 24 
Question 11 - Impact of the crisis on employment 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
                                                          
227 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 24. 
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Still to come 63 30.29 
Peak 106 50.96 
DN/NA  39 18.75 
 
Figure 25 
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Figure 26 
When asked about the future of the EU, 61.06% are somewhat 
optimistic, while 38.94% are somewhat pessimistic. The Europeans are 
somewhat less optimistic about the future of the EU with only 50% of 
European being on the optimistic spectrum, this has reached, by 
comparison, the lowest levels since 2013.228 
Table 25 
Question 12 -Future of the EU 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Very opt. 8 3.85 
Fairly opt. 119 57.21 
Fairly pes. 69 33.17 
Very pes. 12 5.77 
                                                          
228 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 19.  
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Figure 27 
 
Figure 28 
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When asked, all being considered, 71.15% of the respondents believe 
Albania would benefit from the EU membership. According to Balkan 
Barometer, 41% of the Albanians expect accession to be finalized by 
2020, while 29% of them believe that accession will be completed by 
2025. 229 In comparison at SEE regional level, 24% of respondents 
believe accession will happen by 2020, while 26% of the respondents 
do not hold any hope on actually ever acceding to the EU.230  
Table 26 
Question 13 - Albania would benefit from EU membership 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Would benefit 148 71.15 
Would not benefit 29 13.94 
DN/NA  31 14.9 
 
Figure 29 
                                                          
229 Regional Cooperation Council, Public Opinion Survey Balkan Barometer 2016, p. 51. 
230 Ibid.  
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Figure 30 
When asked about their nationality in the future, 65.87% of the 
responders believe will have some European elements in their identity.   
 
Table 27 
Question 14 - Nationality in the future 
Options No. Answers Percentage 
Nationality only 32 15.38 
Some EU elements 137 65.87 
DN/NA  39 18.75 
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Figure 31 
 
Figure 32 
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4.2.2 Eurobarometer – enlargement fatigue 
Following the overview Albanians make of the developments in their 
society, and their stance vis-à-vis EU, in order to come full circle and 
understand the European public opinion on enlargement and more 
specifically on enlargement to include Albania, I have referred to 
available data from the Eurobarometer in the years and talked to 
diplomats in Tirana regarding the public opinion at their national level 
on the enlargement towards the Western Balkans and thus as well 
Albania. Indeed, the EC in the enlargement strategy for 2014 notes that 
“[the] policy depends on the support of EU citizens […dependent on 
fostering] an informed debate” on the matter.231  
Since 1996 the European public opinion at the European level, has 
been reluctant in accepting Albania as an EU member garnering low 
approvals.232 In 2010 reaching only 28.95% of affirmative answers.233 
More generally, when in 2014 Europeans were asked about 
enlargement to include other countries in the future years, 49% of them 
are against and 37% are for enlargement.234  
In 2010, the countries which were mostly against Albania joining the EU 
were Germany (77%), Italy (65%), UK (59%) and France (57%).235  
In the same period, the champions of enlargement towards Albania are 
mostly from the CEECs with the exception of Sweden where 57% of 
public opinion is in favour of Albania joining the EU. In the same period 
Romanians support enlargement towards Albania by 52% of the 
respondents. It is followed by Poland with 46% and Hungary with 40% 
supporting enlargement towards Albania. With regard to the high level 
                                                          
231 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, COM(2013) 
700 final, Brussels, 16.10.2013, p. 16.  
232 European Commission, Public Opinion Table “For each of the following countries, are you in 
favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future? Albania”. 
233 European Commission, Public Opinion Table “For each of the following countries, are you in 
favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future? Albania”. 
234 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 81, Spring 2014, Public Opinion in the 
European Union, June 2014, p. 137; See as well European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 
81, Spring 2014, Public Opinion in the European Union, June 2014, pp. 143,144.   
235 European Commission, Public Opinion Table “For each of the following countries, are you in 
favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future? Albania”. 
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of support to enlargement in Sweden, still in 2014, 48% of the swedish 
public opinion is in favour of enlargement.236 Perhaps, as my 
interviewee in the Swedish Embassy in Tirana put it, enlargement is not 
a hot topic, something about which public opinion is much concerned 
about. Moreover, it is an understanding of the Swedish diplomat that 
more could be done to further communicate the benefits of EU 
enlargement. 237  
Still in 2014, Germany and France remain weary about a possible 
enlargement to include new countries, as 71% and 69% of respondents 
in these countries were against enlargement respectively.238   
For Germany, the enlargement policy is contended by two sides. On the 
one hand, Germany appreciates the strategic relevance for the 
Western Balkans of the European perspective; on the other hand, the 
resistance of public opinion towards enlargement has conditioned 
Germany’s engagement on enlargement. 239 While Germany supports 
enlargement towards the Western Balkans, there is a ‘but’ …  .240   
The public opinion in France remains largely uninformed about the 
Western Balkans, French people still associate the region with its 
infamous past of war and ethnic cleansing.241 My interviewee agrees 
that as demonstrated in the previous section much more needs to be 
done on fundamental rights and rule of law in Albania. 242 On the other 
hand, the EU membership of the countries in the region does not affect 
largely France due to its limited economic relations with the countries of 
the region. 243 
 
                                                          
236 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 81, Spring 2014, Public Opinion in the 
European Union, June 2014, p. 144. 
237 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, Tirana, 12 January 2017. 
238 European Commission, European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 81, Spring 2014, 
Public Opinion in the European Union, June 2014, p. 144.  
239 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 02 February 2017 
240 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 02 February 2017 
241 Senior Diplomat 1, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017 
242 Senior Diplomat 1, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017 
243 France is the 8th supplier of Albania, and is responsible for 2% of its imports. Albania is 
France’s 136th customer. Ambassade de France en Bulgarie, Service Economique Regional de 
Sofia Antenne du SER a Tirana. “Les echanges commerciaux entre la France et l’Albanie en 
2016”.  
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4.3 Conclusion 
The fundamentals first approach and political frontloading promoted by 
the EU through the European Commission is ultimately aiming and 
preserving democracy and rule of law. However, when analysing 
developments in Albania since obtaining the candidate status, the 
results we observe are not encouraging. Indeed, following the analysis 
above conducted by using the framework envisaged by Levitsky and 
Way, I conclude that Albania is past the strives of transition and it has 
tendencies of an hybrid regime, a competitive authoritarianism. 
Democratic institutions are an empty shell, manipulated and used to 
serve particularistic interests. Public life is highly politicised. In the 
parliamentary elections, political participation is extensive, in a country 
of barely 3 million inhabitants one can find as many as sixty-six political 
parties on the ballot. Yet, this political fragmentation provides a leeway 
to the main political parties, SP and DP that have in the past decade 
governed by garnering these different political voices under large 
coalitions. The electoral campaigns have been harshly fought and 
abuse of state power and resources has been evident.  Moreover, the 
partisan media groups have been used to cover a biased campaign 
directed to mud by means of personal attacks the opposition. 
Moreover, simple citizens have been threatened with serious 
repercussions for their life, like losing their employment, should they 
refuse to partake in political rallies. 
Moreover, the Central Electoral Commission entrusted with managing 
every aspect of the elections leading to the election day have been 
hindered from functioning properly. Most notably, for 2013 elections we 
observe political neglect in implementing the legal framework. 
Concerns of transparency have been raised, given that the financing of 
electoral campaings remains largely unregulated and reports of 
donations, including only larger donation over ALL 100 000, are 
delivered only after the election day.244 The elections results have been 
further tainted by a severe breach in “guarantee[ing] universal and 
                                                                                                                               
   
244 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, pp. 2, 
15. 
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equal suffrage to adult citizens”245 with an ad hoc and unlawful 
allocation of seats in electoral districts, and to this day not affording the 
right of vote to Albanians living abroad.246  
Following the election day, these governing coalitions have often 
marked the fragility of government majority. Especially in 2013 with the 
departure of SMI from the DP led majority coalition. These have 
pursued – at least formally – the EU integration. However, throughout 
the legislative works, even in presence of cross-party support, 
legislative acts are a mere lip-service to Europeanization. The results 
are measured as well through indicators of public opinion. Albanians 
remain concerned mostly to make ends meet, as the results for all the 
sample indicate that 82.69% of the respondents believe Albania faces 
issues pertaining to economy.247 This is further confirmed by the 
answers given regarding personal concerns where once again issues 
pertaining to economy garner 76.44% of the affirmative answers given 
by respondents.248 
The Parliament is in charge of oversight of the transposition of the 
acquis in the national legislation, but yet lacks the manpower to do 
so.249 Independent institutions that would be an asset in this regard, are 
as well dominated by political parties, emblematic is that within the 
                                                          
245 See OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, pp. 
5-6. See also Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the CSCE, p. 6.  
246 Ministria e Puneve te Brendshme, “Takimi me Diasporen/Vota e emigranteve, paraprihet nga 
regjistrimi i tyre”, Tirane, 19 Nentor 2016. 
247 Even the results of the adjusted sample indicate that 54.81% of the respondents believe Albania 
faces issues pertaining to economy. Compare it to the single options - for all sample - 58.17% is 
concerned with unemployment and 51.92% considers the economic situation a serious issue in 
their society. When adjusting the sample, unemployment remains at the top of concerns for 
24.56% of respondents, followed by the economic situation with 20.28% of respondents. 
248 Even the results of the adjusted sample indicate that 63.46% of the respondents believe the 
issues Albanians face are those pertaining to economy. Compare it to the single options - for all 
sample - 61.54% of all the respondents refer to inflation, followed by 40.38% that indicate 
unemployment. When adjusting the sample, inflation remains the top concern with 31.04% of 
respondents, followed by unemployment gathering 19.7% of respondents affirmative answers. 
249 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2014 Progress Report, 
SWD (2014) 304 final, Brussels, 8 October 2014, p.6; European Commission, Commission Staff 
Working Document Albania 2015 Report, SWD(2015) 213 final, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 7; See 
as well European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2016 Report, 
SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 9.11.2016, p. 7. 
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National Council on Civil Society there are more political members than 
those from the civil society.  
These concerns have been confirmed by all interviews conducted in 
Tirana. Senior diplomats of EU Member States do point out that the 
legislative framework is not the bigger problem; the legislations is in 
place - often approved with international institutions backing such as 
the Venice Commission- institutions are in place but there is no track 
record of implementation.  
Organized crime that has infiltrated politics, judiciary and economy 
although financial insvestigations remain low. Furthermore, the cases 
that land before a court are few and the sentences for serious crimes 
regarding corruption or organized crime remain low. The situation is 
further aggravated by the failure to comply with the ethical standards 
and have in place a system of monitoring and evaluation. Thus, 
connected to the organized crime, is the pervasive corruption which 
reports of Transparency International confirm to be strongly felt in 
Albania.250 While national strategies and legislation aimed at fighting 
corruption are in place the shortcomings in implementation persist.251 
This is an area indeed were legislation is abundant, and because of the 
frequent amendments and nuanced interpretations available 
mechanisms to address violations are not referred to and thus 
inefficient.  
The analysis of the data gathered from my survey, indicates that 47.6% 
of the respondents consider crime to be the third most important issue 
Albania faces at the moment.  
After, I have adjusted the sample to those respondents who correctly 
indicated two options, democracy and rule of law is the third most 
important issue the country faces for 19.57% of respondents. According 
to the latest Balkan Barometer, 35% of the respondents in Albania 
                                                          
250 The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 places Albania at no. 88 out 
of 168 countries with a score of 36 over 100 (where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean). See 
The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. 
251 Republika e Shqiperise, Keshilli i Ministrave, Ministri per çeshtjet Vendore, Strategjia 
Kombetare Kunder Korrupsionit 2015-2017; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 95/2016 
Për organizimin dhe funksionimin e institucioneve për të luftuar korrupsionin dhe krimin e 
organizuar, 06.10.2016. 
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enlisted corruption – in the third place following unemployment and 
economic situation - as an issue facing their society.252  
As illustrated, a stark 81% of the interviewed Albanians are not 
confident that the rule of law is enforced effectively.253 Among which 
86% are not confident that everyone is equal before the law.254 In 2016 
Balkan Barometer results, 78% of Albanians believe that the judiciary is 
influenced by politics.255 It follows that 81% of interviewed Albanians do 
not have confidence in courts and judiciary.256 The data above, is an 
addition to the analysis based on the critical overview of the adopted 
legislation and its implementation complemented by contrasting the 
findings with reports of international institutions especially those of the 
EU. It all indicates that there is an intrinsic link between politics and 
mistrust in functioning of institutions.  
These may be some of the compaunding reasons behind the deep 
mistrust Albanians have toward their political system both political 
parties and government.Indeed, in the survey above, only 9.62% of the 
respondents tend to trust political parties and only 19.71% tend to trust 
the government. The disillusion and disengagement from the public life 
and an overwhelming civic apathy is motivated by a deep seated 
conviction that the system is rigged beyond redemption and a single 
citizen cannot be able to make a difference.257 
As an example, the vetting of individuals holding public office is 
dependent on an initiative of peers or relative large number of 
constituents. Following which should the investigation on the individual 
result non-consequential then the initiator(s) is required to pay a hefty 
fine of ALL 100 000 effectively annihilating even the public attempt to 
call for accountability.258    
                                                          
252 Regional Cooperation Council, Public Opinion Survey Balkan Barometer 2016, p. 42. 
253 Ibid., p. 110. 
254 Ibid., p.111. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Ibid., p.112. 
257 Ibid., p.117 
258 Art. 7 of Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Vendim no. 17/2016 Për përcaktimin e rregullave të 
detajuara mbi zbatimin e ndalimeve të parashikuara në ligjin nr. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e 
integritetit të personave që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike” 04.03.2016; 
Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 76/2016 Per disa shtesa dhe ndryshime ne ligjin nr. 
8417, date 21.10.1998, “Kushtetuta e Republikes se Shqiperise”, te Ndryshuar, date 22.07.2016; 
Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Vendim no. 17/2016 Për përcaktimin e rregullave të detajuara 
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More than six months have passed since the reform of the judiciary 
was approved unanimously on the 22 July 2016, and yet there is no 
concrete sign of implementation starting with the vetting process.  
The freedom of speech is guaranteed in the Constitution and is part of 
EU negotiation chapters 10 Information Society and Media and 23 
Judiciary and Fundamental Rights. Nonetheless, politics and judiciary 
have been active to silence dissenting voices, governments themselves 
have contributed to a climate of fear that condemns journalism. The 
legal loopholes on libel for instance have been used to persecute 
journalists but not only. Economic pressures, in a field marred by 
informality are quite frequent. Often the network of media owners is not 
transparent nor there is a safeguard against monopoly for media 
shareholders. It all have caused a unison of voices in small markets 
that portray an abundance of media outlets. This is at least suspicious, 
as either that means that there is nothing opaque to investigate and 
report upon or that media has been domesticated autocratic powers.  
The EU interest remains stability along its borders, and including within 
its family the last open zone laying in middle of its territory, the Western 
Balkans. As confirmed by Albanian diplomats, the Western Balkans, 
specifically Albania, do not have other integration options, other than 
the EU. A senior official of the US Department of Justice in a recent 
interview underlined that “we support Albania in joining the EU, we 
cannot have the country become a 51st State of the USA”.259 On the 
other hand, the EU has no other option than keeping alive the 
enlargement process and for the sake of its identity and credibility.260 
 
                                                                                                                               
mbi zbatimin e ndalimeve të parashikuara në ligjin nr. 138/2015 “Për garantimin e integritetit të 
personave që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike” 04.03.2016; Kuvendi 
Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 38/2016 Për disa shtesa dhe ndryshime në ligjin nr. 138/2015 
“Për garantimin e integritetit të personave që zgjidhen, emërohen ose ushtrojnë funksione publike, 
14.04.2016;  
259 Senior Official of the United States Department of Justice Criminal Division International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), interview, Tirana, 19 July 2016.  
260 See Fierke, Wiener op.cit., p. 109. Interview with an official, Mission of the Republic of 
Albania to the European Union, Brussels, 31 March 2015. 
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Chapter 5  
A conclusion 
 
5.1 Review of the argument 
In the case study at hand, I have aimed to provide an answer to the 
main question, before a halt in enlargement, has Europeanization in 
Albania hit the break?  
I have argued that enlargement as a policy, from its inception has had a 
strong intergovernmental component, indeed the EU Member States 
have never renounced their prerogative of controlling the policy. The 
EU institutions involved in enlargement like the European Commission, 
European Parliament and the same Council have condensed powers 
delegated to them by Member States who by means of praxis do inform 
on the timing and content of the recommendations presented by the 
Commission on the developments of applicant countries.   
The political frontloading and fundamentals first approach has been 
aiming to support democracy and rule of law in the applicant countries. 
In Albania, the reforms and legislation to implement them have been 
adopted but effective implementation remains the bigger concern.  
Thus, it is unsurprising that the public opinion is deeply disillusioned by 
political parties and the government as Albanians struggle to make 
ends meet. In comparison, the EU is seen under a positive outlook, and 
Albanians still maintain that EU membership would benefit the country 
and seem unshaken in this conviction despite the internal challenges 
the EU faces, among which a possible Brexit.  
In light of a thorough analysis on the development of enlargement as a 
policy I investigate the EU modes of governance in delivering 
Europeanization. Specifically, in a shifting context such as that in which 
the EU foreign policy is exerted I argue that the mode of 
Europeanization vis-à-vis Albania as a candidate country is that of 
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socialization. The relationship between the EU and a candidate country 
is one between equals and it ever evolving throughout their interactions 
where both parties come to have a clear understanding of the direction 
taken by their relation.  Conditionality, on the other hand, cannot be 
effective as long as it is enforced to the extent of a non-consequential 
ticking the box exercise and especially when the EU has held a lesser 
degree of explicitness on the region’s enlargement possibility.  
Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty provides for a wide range of values, 
ideals shared by the Union and to which applicant countries should 
aspire to meet. However, it is unclear how compliance to such a range 
of values and ideals can be effectively measured.  
Moreover, absorption capacity and public opinion has been used to 
further burden the accession path of aspiring countries. Indeed, 
enlargement does not garner much consensus among Europeans. The 
EU caution in dealing with enlargement countries has been noticeable 
since the renewed consensus for enlargement.  
The Juncker’s political leadership of the European Commission has put 
in words the vague commitment on the part of the EU, and the Berlin 
Process as a relaunch and a double of enlargement has underlined the 
geopolitical and geo-economics relevance of the region for the EU. 
Indeed, among the three pillars of the Berlin Process connectivity 
agenda, comes to the fore, with projects on transport corridors and 
most importantly energy related investments.  
Internal concerns of the EU have confirmed the dependence within the 
European continent, especially as the relationship with the region is 
revived in times of need as the migration crisis has demonstrated. Yet, 
it seems like we are before a historic recurrence, before a conundrum 
similar to that in the ’90 where the - hard or lenient - stance the EU will 
take vis-à-vis the region will define the relationship with the region. 
To date the lip-service Europeanization, is to be traced to two root 
causes the gatekeeper elites keeping gates more closed than open, 
and the (mis)use of the EU power. The balance of this interaction is 
kept within a fine line that poses a constant threat to stability, the same 
that the EU is trying to maintain in the region.  
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Initiatives like the Berlin Process, while useful diplomatic exercises 
cannot make for a substitute of a lacking policy. Linkages with the 
region should be build, and strengthened, by means of empowering 
civil society, by means of international cooperation investments thus 
targeting the economic and civic empowerment of the people and 
ultimately facilitate that support for reforms from the grassroots.  
 
5.2 Implications and findings 
 
5.2.1 Empirical implications 
The European project originally was laid to be “open to the participation 
of the other countries of Europe”.1 Nonetheless, the EU has developed 
its own models and arrangements to enlargement where the 
‘unanimous action’ has kept EU member States in the driving seat of 
enlargement. Conditionality on enlargement can be traced back to 1978 
when the European Council underlined the importance of respect of 
democracy and human rights that were later to be spelled out  in 
Copenhagen and effectively applied since Seville European Council 
where applicants were tasked to strengthen their capabilities in 
administration and judiciary to effectively implement the acquis.2 The 
EU has taken increasingly a more proactive role, by means of a 
comprehensive strategy entailing detailed priorities, directed to 
countries aspiring to membership.3 In the negotiation phase as well, the 
unanimity rule affects the approval of benchmarks and closing of 
negotiating chapters, which is a lengthy politicised process.4  The path 
of the aspiring countries is further rendered burdensome by the 
application of a fourth Copenhagen criterion, the absorption capacity. 
Originally intended as an institutional arrangement aiming to 
                                                          
1 The European Union, “The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950”.  
2 Cf. European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen, 7–8 April 1978; Cf. 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, 21–22 June 1993.   
3 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Essen, 9–10 December 1994.; See European 
Council, Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, 12 and 13 December 1997. 
4 See European Court of Justice, Case 93/78 Lothar Mattheus v Doego Fruchtimport und 
Tiefkuhlkost eG. Judgment of the Court of 22 November 1978. ECLI:EU:C:1978:206. See 
European Commission, Turkey Negotiating Framework: Principles governing the negotiations, 03 
October 2005, pt. 5; European Commission, Iceland Negotiating Framework: Principles 
governing the negotiations, pt. 17.   
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accomodate all Member States and ensure the proper functioning of 
the Union, is now evaluated together with legitimacy and economic 
sustainability. These concerns are inherently evident in public opinion 
and in institutional safeguards implemented within EU Member States 
be that a referendum provision for enlargement or simply the 
democratic confrontation on the election day. The reluctancy of 
engaging in enlargement is thus dictated by the public opinion as 
enlargement does not garner much consensus.5 The EU engagement 
clings to geopolitical and geoeconomic calculations with regards to 
candidate countries in the Western Balkans.    
The political frontloading, and the fundamentals first approach is 
purportedly aiming and preserving democracy and rule of law. The 
developments in Albania, are all but encouraging. In the beginning of 
the ’90 there was a belief that Albania, a former communist country, 
had embarked on a transition path. Today however, what my analysis 
brought to the fore is a country engulfed in a hybrid regime of 
competitive authoritarianism. Democratic institutions remain 
subservient to particularistic interests. Elections may grant a 
succession in power, but that is not synonymous with democratization. 
Indeed, political campaigns are marred by irregularities, payoffs, threats 
and episodes of violent personal attacks to the opposition. Before this 
context, it is no surprise that the Central Electoral Commission in the 
last two elections has been annihilated, unable to carry out its duties. 
Resulting in a breach in “guarantee[ing] universal and equal suffrage to 
adult citizens”6. Indeed, the Albanian electorate remains to this day 
discriminated whereby Albanians living abroad have no institutional 
means to cast their ballot on the election day.7   
The deeply fragmented governing coalitions, follow the election day. 
These have legislature after legislature pursued - at least formally – the 
EU integration. Nonetheless, the results indicate that there is a mere 
lip-service to Europeanization in Albania.  
                                                          
5 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 81, Spring 2014, Public Opinion in the 
European Union, June 2014, p. 137.  
6 See OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 10 October 2013, pp. 
5-6. See also OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE, p. 6. 
7 Ministria e Puneve te Brendshme, “Takimi me Diasporen/Vota e emigranteve, paraprihet nga 
regjistrimi i tyre”, Tirane, 19 Nentor 2016.  Albanians living outside the country to this day are not 
afforded the opportunity to cast their vote. Unless they travel to Albania during elections. 
217 
 
Interviews conducted in Tirana, endorse the analysis and its conclusion 
as they do underline that the legislative framework is not the bigger 
problem; the legislations is in place - often approved with international 
institutions backing such as the Venice Commission- institutions are in 
place but there is no track record of implementation.  
The results of the public opinion survey I conducted in Tirana from the 
05 November to 19 November 2016, further underline the bleak socio-
economic and institutional situation in the country. Albanians remain 
mainly concerned to make ends meet.8 The results for all the sample 
indicate that 82.69% of the respondents believe Albania faces issues 
pertaining to economy. Even the results of the adjusted sample indicate 
that 54.81% of the respondents confirm Albania faces issues pertaining 
to economy. Compare it to the single options - for all sample - 58.17% 
is concerned with unemployment and 51.92% considers the economic 
situation a serious issue in their society. When adjusting the sample, 
unemployment remains at the top of concerns for 24.56% of 
respondents, followed by the economic situation with 20.28% of 
respondents.  Indeed, civil and political rights alone, do not serve to 
grant the wellbeing of citizens if the State is not invested in ensuring 
that socio-economic rights are as well respected.  
Following a comparison with the Balkan Barometer of 2016, these 
results in Albania hold true, 69% of answers is unemployment and for 
60% of answers economic situation are the two most important issues 
Albania faces at the moment.9   
Organized crime has infiltrated politics, judiciary and economy. 
Transparency International confirms corruption is strongly felt in 
Albania.10 While national strategies and legislation aimed at fighting 
corruption are in place, however, the shortcomings in implementation 
persist.11 Indeed, it comes as no surprise that 47.6% of the 
                                                          
8 See On social economic rights see A. Sinagra, Finiamola di prenderci in giro. Liberismo 
economico e mortificazione delle ragioni del lavoro, in Confronto-L’anima dell’Adriatico, n. 9, 
Edizioni “Confronto”, ottobre 2011, p. 10. 
9 Regional Cooperation Council, Public Opinion Survey Balkan Barometer 2016, p. 42. 
10 The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 places Albania at no. 88 out 
of 168 countries with a score of 36 over 100 (where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean). See 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. 
11 Republika e Shqiperise, Keshilli i Ministrave, Ministri per çeshtjet Vendore, Strategjia 
Kombetare Kunder Korrupsionit 2015-2017; Kuvendi Republika e Shqiperise, Ligj no. 95/2016 
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respondents in Tirana consider crime to be the third most important 
issue Albania faces at the moment. The figures of the adjusted sample 
taking into account those respondents who correctly indicated two 
options, democracy and rule of law is the third most important issue the 
country faces for 19.57% of respondents. Crime is considered an issue 
by 18.86% of the respondents. In the same line, according to Balkan 
Barometer, corruption in Albania - with 35% of respondents - is the third 
most important issue facing the country.12  
Media outlets have no power to denounce abuse of power, indeed in a 
small market there is a multitude of voices, which are worringly 
speaking in unison. Does it means that there is nothing to investigate 
and report? Or has the media fallen prey to autocratic powers? The 
analysis indicates that the latter is the case. 
Albanians harbour a deep mistrust toward their political system both 
political parties and government. In the conducted survey only 9.62% of 
the respondents tend to trust political parties and only 19.71% tend to 
trust the government. The data above, is an addition to the analysis 
based on the critical overview of the adopted legislation and its 
implementation complemented by contrasting the findings with reports 
of international institutions especially those of the EU. It all indicates 
that there is an intrinsic link between politics and mistrust in functioning 
of institutions. 
On the other hand, as regards the trust Albanians place in the EU, the 
results indicate that Albanians are equally split where 49.04% of 
respondents tend to trust the EU against 28.85% that tend not to trust it 
and 22.12% who do not know or do not wish to answer. In comparison, 
33% of the Europeans tend to trust the EU.13 Albanians, thus, trust the 
EU more than the Europeans do.  
When asked about the feeling they personally associate with the EU, 
the results indicate a majority of answers were positive with 60.1%14 
                                                                                                                               
Për organizimin dhe funksionimin e institucioneve për të luftuar korrupsionin dhe krimin e 
organizuar, 06.10.2016. 
12 Regional Cooperation Council, Public Opinion Survey Balkan Barometer 2016, p. 42.  
13 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 14. 
14 The cluster named positive comprises enthusiasm, hope, trust. 
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followed by the negative answers reaching 24.04%15 and those of 
indifference and no answer making for a total of 33.17%.  
When asked about the meaning the EU has for them personally, and 
where respondents could indicate more than an option, the results of all 
answers show the majority of answers were positive with 89.42%16 
followed by the negative answers reaching a 43.27%.17 These results 
are validated as well in comparison with the results of Balkan 
Barometer for Albania, where Albanians for 55% of the respondents do 
personally equate the meaning of EU membership with freedom to 
study and/or work in the EU and for 54% of them with economic 
prosperity.18  
Indeed, with 48.07% of the respondents, Albanians assess the situation 
of the European economy positively. On the contrary, 43.75% of 
respondents assess the situation of the European economy negatively.   
Albanians think the most positive result of the EU is free movement by 
62.02% of respondents.19 The Europeans believe as well free 
movement to be the most successful result of the EU with 56% of the 
respondents.20  
A large 71.15% of the respondents believe Albania would benefit from 
the EU membership. However, expectations on when it is going to 
happen may be over optimistic, as Balkan Barometer shows that 41% 
of the Albanians expect accession to be finalized by 2020, while 29% of 
them believe that accession will be completed by 2025. 21  
When asked about their nationality in the future, 65.87% of the 
responders believe will have some European elements in their identity.   
When asked about the future of the EU, 61.06% are somewhat 
optimistic, while 38.94% are somewhat pessimistic. The Europeans are 
                                                          
15 The cluster named negative comprises anxiety, mistrust, rejection towards the EU. 
16 The cluster named positive comprises peace, economic prosperity, democracy and cultural 
diversity. 
17 The cluster named negative comprises anxiety, mistrust, rejection towards the EU. 
18 Regional Cooperation Council, Public Opinion Survey Balkan Barometer 2016, p. 52. 
19 The options included free movement, peace, influence in the world economic power. 
20 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 39. 
21 Regional Cooperation Council, Public Opinion Survey Balkan Barometer 2016, p. 51. 
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somewhat less optimistic about the future of the EU with only 50% of 
European being on the optimistic spectrum, this has reached, by 
comparison, the lowest levels since 2013.22 
The findings above suggest a bleak picture on socio-economic and 
institutional level. The exchanges and interactions between the EU and 
gatekeeper elites, have largely resulted with the formal adoption of 
legislation but no effective implementation or track record has been to 
date inspired by EU level of engagement with the gatekeeper elites. 
Indeed, interviews conducted in Tirana confirm a prevailing of lip-
service Europeanization in the country. Arenas of contestation are 
largely numb and thus there is no room for effective push back on 
competitive authoritarian practices that engulf public life.  
The EU may be entrenched in its internal dimension and may have for 
now, lost its appetite for enlargement, but the Albanians do still largely 
consider EU positively both on political and economic level and are 
optimistic about its future. Membership of Albania in the EU is still 
regarded as beneficial for the country. Issues like Brexit or the 
purported weakening of EU influence in the world seem not to concern 
much Albanians. They are aware of issues the EU is facing, like the 
migrant crisis and terrorism as well as Albanians have an 
understanding of the economic crisis the EU economy has undergone. 
The Albanians seem realistic on the challenges the EU is undergoing, 
when compared to results in the EU level.  
The EU interest remains stability along its borders, and including within 
its family the last open zone laying in middle of its territory, the Western 
Balkans. As confirmed by Albanian diplomats, the Western Balkans, 
specifically Albania, do not have other integration options, other than 
the EU.23 A senior official of the US Department of Justice in a recent 
interview underlined that “we support Albania in joining the EU, we 
                                                          
22 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, Wave EB85.2, Spring 2016, Report 
European Citizenship, May 2016, p. 19. 
23 Senior official 1, Mission of the Republic of Albania to the European Union, interview, 
Brussels, 31 March 2015; Senior official 2, Mission of the Republic of Albania to the European 
Union, interview, Brussels, 31 March 2015; Senior official 1, The Permanent Delegation of 
Albania to NATO, interview, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 20 March 2015; Senior official 2, 
The Permanent Delegation of Albania to NATO, interview, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 20 
March 2015; Senior Official, NATO Headquarters, interview, Brussels, 15 April 2015.  
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cannot have the country become a 51st State of the USA”.24 On the 
other hand, the EU has no other option than keeping alive the 
enlargement process and for the sake of its identity and credibility.25 
Thus, Albanians understand that the Union is no heaven, will it, 
however, be(come) a saviour from hell?    
 
5.2.2 Theoretical implications 
The EU has projected its model to external actors dangling carrots as 
incentives of compliance. The sanctions, however possible, are as 
usual subject to political considerations. The initially hierarchical 
relationship formed throughout repeated interactions has - with time – 
shifted to a level playing field between equals. This because the logic of 
Europeanization is not anymore that of legal authority, through 
conditionality, but that of shaping beliefs of domestic actors. The 
domestic adaptation is not based on institutional compatibility or 
understood as ‘command’26 and ‘compulsion’27 that entail a 
hierarchical, asymmetric, top-down relation. Instead, the domestic 
adaptation is understood as a process to support mobilization for 
domestic reforms, that have to be initiated from within, at the domestic 
level.  
I have argued that in presence of lesser incentives on the part of the 
EU and a number of alternatives available to gatekeeper elites, which 
have lesser strings attached, conditionality does not serve as a mean of 
Europeanization. This study has confirmed that Europeanization, as a 
process, before a halt in enlargement, is dependent on socialization, a 
direct mode of Europeanization under the logic of appropriateness, 
shaped and developed by interactions where both parties come to have 
a clear understanding of the direction taken by their relation. 
                                                          
24 Senior Official of the United States Department of Justice Criminal Division International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), interview, Tirana, 19 July 2016.  
25 See Fierke, Wiener op.cit., p. 109. Interview with an official, Mission of the Republic of Albania 
to the European Union, Brussels, 31 March 2015. 
26 Cf. J. Nye, The Future of Power, New York, Public Affairs, 2011. 
27 Cf. M. Barnett, and R. Duvall, “Power in international politics”, International Organization, vol. 
59, no.1, 2005, pp. 39 - 75. 
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I see the Europeanization process in Albania through Putnam’s double-
level game, where I consider both levels where the European level - 
Level I – is where negotiators seek a “tentative agreement” and 
domestic level - Level II - which “is required to endorse or implement a 
Level I agreement.” 30  
                                                          
28 Cf. J. Nye, The Future of Power, New York, Public Affairs, 2011. 
29 Cf. M. Barnett, and R. Duvall, “Power in international politics”, International Organization, vol. 
59, no.1, 2005, pp. 39 - 75. 
30 Putnam,  op.cit., p.  436. 
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In level II the “win-set” is “the set of all possible Level I agreements” 
that would be ratified by constituents “when simply voted up or down.”31 
In evaluating the impact and outcome of Europeanization in Albania, I 
pay attention to the “strategies” behind a Level I agreement, conditions 
under which “preferences and coalitions” are formed at the domestic 
level - Level II - and implemented by their “institutions”.32  
The empirical findings in Albania are analysed against the framework 
on determining regime type and analysing arenas of contestation 
provided by Levitsky and Way.33 While there are democratic 
institutions, they are subservient to particularistic interests and often 
hindered from functioning effectively. The results indicate that all areas 
of public life are highly politicised. 
These findings are informative for deducting strategies, or choices 
behind the Level I - EU level – agreements, for which I make use of the 
valuable input of Snyder.34 Ultimately analysing the Level II preferences 
by viewing decision makers under the lines provided by Tolstrup.35  
The findings of the thorough analysis of normative output of the 
legislatures and comparing and contrasting results with the findings 
obtained in the public opinion survey yielded as an outcome theory 
building on Europeanization in Albania as a candidate country, 
‘whether’ and ‘to which extent’ occurs.  
The findings corroborate the causal mechanism. In presence of an 
inward-looking EU, marred by internal challenges that have imposed a 
halt, a wait and see approach, on considering enlargement an EU 
policy priority has defined a weaker relative dependence between the 
Union and countries in the region. The vague commitment on 
enlargement, serves as an amplifier to strategic calculations on Level II, 
gatekeeper elites. At the same time, in the case study in hand, 
alternative flows of investments and/or money coupled with the security 
shield of NATO commands only a formal adoption of the acquis on the 
part of gatekeeper elites but no implementation.  
                                                          
31 Ibid., p. 437. 
32 Ibid., p. 442. 
33  Levitsky and Way, op.cit. 
34 Snyder, op.cit.,p. 472. 
35 Tolstrup, op.cit. 
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The EU however, will – within the limits of its toolbox – maintain a 
lenient policy to maintain gatekeeper elites on the negotiation table. 
The EU has a high level of strategic interest conditioned by geography 
and geopolitical calculations ever more evident before the ongoing 
migration crisis.36 Stability or the status quo, is a common interest of 
both gatekeeper elites and the EU. Stability within the country, is 
paramount for gatekeeper elites to execute beneficial gatekeeping 
strategies by resorting to patronage. The EU on the other hand, favors 
the status quo in order to minimize consequences of foreign 
developments. These choices are determined by the recognition of 
relevant support levels in the domestic level. In the EU public opinion is 
wary about enlargement; the Albanian public opinion largely trusts the 
EU, far more than it trusts the national government or political parties, 
and believes EU accession would be beneficial for the country. These 
audience balance is instrumental for gatekeeper elites to maintain 
formally EU integration as their political priority and thus hold a shred of 
legitimacy before their constituency. Even more so, when it is clear that 
on the part of the EU there are political and policy calculations dictated 
by those same audience calculations that have put on hold any more 
forceful and serious foreign policy engagement. All of which ultimately 
contributes to the degree of Europeanization in Albania.  
I conclude that the root causes of the degree of – lip-service – 
Europeanization in Albania are found in the gatekeeper elites and the 
(mis)use of the EU power. On the one hand, the EU continues to be 
challenged internally and restricted by an unfavourable public opinion in 
matters of enlargement thus its main interest remains on maintaining 
stability. On the other hand, the gatekeeper elites resort to patronage 
and effectively paralyze the ‘arenas of contestation’, where elections 
result in mere succession, legislatures are largely paralyzed or 
inefficient to check on government, the judiciary is unable to enforce 
the rule of law, and the media are a tool of the incumbents more than a 
platform to denounce misconduct.37 Thus, the resulting political regime 
is that of competitive authoritarianism.  
The gatekeeper elites make use of legislative loopholes, enforcement 
of patronage, co-option and corruption are all means to an end, skilfully 
                                                          
36 Snyder, op.cit., p. 472. 
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managed so as not to inspire a violent domestic dissent or external 
condemnation.38 The conundrum before the autocratic incumbents, is 
to either hold on to power in open violation of democratic rules and risk 
domestic unrest together with international sanctions or allow a change 
in power?39 The balance is kept within a fine line that poses a constant 
threat to stability, the same that the EU is trying to maintain in the 
region.  
The EU credibility in enlargement has suffered. The Union has a larger 
toolset and ability “to make concessions” to put to use vis-à-vis 
candidate countries such as Albania, and thus a large win-set on one 
hand; 40 and on the other hand, there is its inability to “deliver” the final 
objective for domestic level that of membership. 41 
The vague commitment, the European perspective and past behaviour 
towards candidate countries, i.e Turkey, reassures candidate countries, 
like Albania that in business as usual fashion the enlargement process 
will be kept – at least formally – before calculations dictated from 
geography – geopolitics and geo-economics.42 The ‘strict but fair’ 
approach is yet another confirmation of the socialization mode of 
Europeanization as mentioned above where the EU encourages 
reforms but is in no position to legally or politically sanction non-
compliance.43 The gatekeeper elites will continue to engage in reforms 
at least formally, and implement just enough to get ahead of the curve. 
In the next section I will argue the policy implications of these findings. 
 
 
5.2.3 Policy implications 
The EU enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans has been 
motivated by strategic interests. The costs of engagement have always 
                                                                                                                               
37 Levitsky and Way, op.cit. p. 54. 
38 These dilemmas are presented in an insightful way in Schedler, op.cit.  
39 See Levitsky and Way, op.cit. pp. 58-59. 
40 Putnam,  op.cit., p. 439. 
41 Ibid., p.  439. 
42 Snyder, op.cit., p. 474. See as well R. Youngs, The Uncertain Legacy of Crisis: European 
Foreign Policy Faces the Future, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2014. 
43 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 02 February 2017. 
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been outweighed by the costs of a resulting instability. Nonetheless, a 
decade of ambiguity in the EU policy toward the Western Balkans – 
traced back to the renewed consensus for enlargement – has been 
spelled out in Juncker’s political leadership of the European 
Commission. Maintaining momentum is certainly less costly than facing 
instability or hostile interests in the EU doorstep, especially before new 
studies arguing a regress in the region.44 Disengagement from the 
region is not an option for the EU, however Europeanization relies on 
interactions between the parties by means of socialization, and not on 
concrete leverage or linkages the EU has. These interactions, as I 
illustrate in the previous section, have informed the choices and policy 
decisions of the parties. 
The gatekeeper elites have acknowledged the halt in enlargement as 
the EU battles with the migrant crisis and that of Brexit which raise the 
most concerns among European citizens. Its inward looking approach 
and the vague commitment toward supporting europeanization in the 
region leave an opened question on the perspectives and future for the 
Western Balkans people.  
Yet, it seems that once again we are living in a conundrum similar to 
the end of the ’90 when the then President of the EC Prodi warned 
against maintaining a “hard line” or else be ready to see these 
countries “turn their backs on [the EU]”.45 In Albania alone the spike in 
Chinese investment has raised some concerns as it presents a threat 
to the EU project of forming an economic block in the continent.46  
The new domestic and - as a result - foreign policy developments of 
allies like the US and raising populist demands in European countries 
that threaten regime changes across Europe do on one hand, pose the 
                                                          
44 See Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2016; See as well World Justice 
Project, Rule of Law Index 2016. 
45 R. Prodi President of the European Commission on Enlargement, 
SPEECH/99/130, 13 October 1999. 
46 M. Tanner, “Russia Never Went Away from the Balkans”, Balkan Insight, 
08 February 2017; F. Mejdini “Chinese Buy Rights to Oil Fields in Albania”, 
Balkan Insight, 21 March 2016; G. Erebara “Chinese to Builld Albanian 
Highway to Macedonia”, Balkan Insight, 17 March 2015; Senior Diplomat, 
EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017; 
Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of Embassies, interview, Tirana, 02 
February 2017.  
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risk of undoing “decades of European integration” and on the other, 
reaffirm the importance of the region before the changing 
multilateralism. 47  
The rules of negotiation in Brussels have been adapted throughout 
these two decades and there is clarity on all parties involved that the 
EU is forcefully inward looking and the countries of the region know that 
there is no simple automatism in the enlargement process where public 
opinion limits the course of action.48 There is a growing understanding, 
that the ambiguous relationship is being revived in times of need like 
the migration crisis when the Western Balkans countries acquired 
newfound attention on the part of the EU.  
Before these warning signes of a U-turn in democratization in the 
region and before the risk of loosing momentum and risking instability 
the EU embarked in a public diplomacy exercise the Berlin Process. 
Envisioned as a process to start on the symbolic 2014, centenary of the 
start of the WWI and end by 2018, hundreed years after the end of 
WWI.  
The Berlin Process has been a pragmatic reminder for both the EU and 
the Western Balkans about the importance of cooperation and its 
ultimate goal was to serve as a reassurance of the regions’ European 
perspective. The pillars informing the Berlin Process agenda hint to the 
geo-economic value the region has for the EU, be that in inviting 
cooperation for forming a regional market, with particular attention 
given to connectivity and energy projects. The upcoming Summit in 
Trieste focuses on small and medium enterprises, underlining the 
attention towards instilling growth in the region.    
The Berlin Process, is yet another example that confirms the Member 
States, especially the founders and most prominent ones like Germany 
and France continue to provide guidance and direction to the Union 
and shape its policies.49 
The initiative ambitions, if realized would certainly facilitate the 
attainment of stability in the region. In the eve of the fourth Summit 
                                                          
47 J.C., Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, 
Fairness and Democratic Change, 2014, p. 3. 
48 See Putnam, op.cit. 
49 Bickerton et al. op.cit., p. 717. 
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there have been some agreements on lingering bilateral disputes most 
notably between Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. 
The Regional Youth Cooperation Office, seen as a long-term tool for 
educating the young generations with a culture of peace and 
cooperation was conceived in the first Western Balkans summit in 
Berlin 2014 but it is yet to start its activities. In a heavy context 
burdened by raising socio-economic concerns and weak democratic 
traditions. The gatekeeper elites have plunged the trust Albanians have 
in democratic institutions and risks to encourage the rise to power of 
those that by means of populism offer a quick fix to complex socio-
economic and political issues. Indeed, the Berlin Process has been 
criticised for not bringing to the political will as well an economic 
backing. Interviews conducted in Tirana have concurred with this 
criticism, however it was clear that these meagre economic support is 
not for lack of trying. Investors are not willing to put their money in the 
region. This is why the connectivity agenda, largely relies on pre-
existing IPA funds.50 However, a public diplomacy exercise cannot be a 
good enough substitute of lacking in policy engagement. More should 
be done as the linkages of the EU in the region are ever weaker, the 
threat of democratic backsliding within the Union – with elections in 
France, Germany and the Netherlands - plus the vagueness of the 
accession perspective may put into question the EU role in 
championing democracy in the wider region.51  
The EU has a wide toolbox that can be used in the region, but it has to 
be used strategically, coherently and effectively, measuring steps 
towards the path of accession, not to slow and not too fast. Postponing 
accession sine die, may undermine achievements in these past two 
decades and threaten stability in the region. 
The root cause analysis, suggest that high leverage points to address 
Europeanization predicaments in the country remain to better the 
economic situation through international cooperation so that people are 
not concerned with making ends meet. This could support a larger 
involvement of citizens in decision making processes. Thus, 
                                                          
50 Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, interview, Tirana, 12 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU 
Member State, interview, Tirana, 19 January 2017; Senior Diplomat, EU Member State, Block of 
Embassies, interview, Tirana, 02 February 2017. 
51 See as well Western Balkans Summit, Citizens for Europe, Civil Society Forum Paris – Key 
Policy Proposals from Civil Society Actors. 
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empowering civil society remains an imperative if the EU wants to 
inspire change from the grassroots. Moreover, the EU itself has to start 
engaging in the region with an innovative enlargement process, 
meeting demands of its public opinion but as well inspire progress in 
issues of concern for Albanians.  
In doing so, clarity on the next policy steps to be undertaken is 
necessary for a headway. The EU should set short and medium term 
goals so that to afford to domestic actors the opportunity to confront 
their constituency with results. The evaluation of the progress attained 
should aim to full transparency, adopt of shift in turning a technical 
exercise to a politically accountable one. This is attainable by putting in 
place a diligent, credible process which by setting and holding its 
ground may inspire reforms domestically and most importantly ensure 
support for their application and yield thus a concrete progress in the 
society. 
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Appendix 
Survey conducted in Tirana, 05-19 November 2016 
Original questions with Englisht translation 
 
1. Grupmosha juaj: 
15-24 vjeç 
25-39 vjeç 
40-54 vjeç 
55+ vjeç 
*Age group: 
15-24 old 
25-39 old 
40-54 old 
55+ old 
 
2. Shkollimi (Fundi i shkollimit) 
15 vjeç 
16-19 vjeç 
20+ vjeç 
Akoma me studime 
*Education (End of) 
15 y.o 
16-19 y.o 
20+ y.o  
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Still studying 
 
3. Do te doja t’iu pyesja lidhur me besimin qe keni ndaj disa 
institucioneve. Per secilin nga istitucionet ne vijim, ju lutem te me 
thoni nese keni tendence ti zini bese, te mos i zini bese, apo nuk 
dini. 
3.1 Partite politike 
3.2 Qeverine 
3.3 Bashkimin Evropian 
* I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in 
certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me 
if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it, or don’t know. 
3.1 Political Parties 
3.2 The nationality government 
3.3 The EU 
- Tend to trust 
- Tend not to trust 
- Don’t know/No Answer 
4. Cilat mendoni te jene dy nga çeshtjet me te rendesishme me te cilat 
perballet Bashkimi Evropian ne kete moment? 
- Migracioni  
- Terrorizmi 
- Situata ekonomike 
- Papunesia 
- Dalja e Britanise se Madhe nga Bashkimi Evropian 
- Ndikimi i Bashkimit Evropian ne bote 
 
*What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at 
the moment? 
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- Immigration 
- Terrorism 
- Economic situation 
- Unemployment  
- Brexit 
- EU’s Influence in the World 
5. Cilat mendoni te jene dy çeshtjet me te rendesishme me te cilat 
perballet vendi yne ne kete moment? 
- Kriminaliteti 
- Demokracia dhe sundimi e ligjit 
- Situata ekonomike 
- Papunesia 
- Sistemi i shendetesise 
- Sistemi arsimor 
- Tjeter 
*What do you think are the two most important issues facing our 
country at the moment? 
- Crime  
- Democracy and Rule of Law 
- Economic situation 
- Unemployment 
- Healthcare system 
- The Educational System 
- Other 
6. Personalisht cilat jane dy nga çeshtjet me te rendesishme me te cilat 
ju perballeni ne kete moment?  
- Rritja e çmimeve/inflacion/kosto e jeteses 
- Shendeti dhe sigurimet shoqerore 
- Papunesia 
- Sistemi arsimor 
- Kushtet e punes 
- Tjeter 
*Personally what are the two most important issues you are facing at 
the moment? 
- Rising prices/inflation/cost of living 
- Health and social security 
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- Unemployment  
- The education system 
- Working conditions 
- Other 
7. Bashkimi Evropian ju jep personalisht ndjesine e ____?  (Me 
shume se nje pergjigje e mundur) 
- Entuziazem 
- Shprese 
- Besim 
- Indiference 
- Angeshti 
- Mosbesim 
- Refuzimi ndaj tij 
- Nuk e di/pa pergjigje 
 
*Does the EU give you personally the feeling of _____? (Multiple 
answers possible) 
- Enthusiasm 
- Hope 
- Trust 
- Indifference 
- Anxiety 
- Mistrust 
- Rejecting it 
- Don’t know/No Answer 
8. Çfare do te thote Bashkimi Evropian per ju personalisht? (Me 
shume se nje pergjigje e mundur) 
- Paqe 
- Zhvillim ekonomik 
- Demokraci 
- Liri udhetimi, studimi dhe pune kudo ne Bashkimin Evropian 
- Diversitet kulturor 
- Humbja e identitetit kulturor 
- Nuk e di/ Tjeter 
*What does the EU mean to you personally? (Multiple answers 
possible) 
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- Peace 
- Economic Prosperity 
- Democracy 
- Freedom to travel, study, work anywhere in the EU  
- Cultural diversity 
- Loss of cultural identity 
- Don’t know/ Other 
9. Cili nga me poshte mendoni te jete rezultati me pozitiv i 
Bashkimit Evropian? 
 
- Levizja e lire e njerezve, te te mirave dhe sherbimeve 
brenda Bashkimit Evropian 
- Paqe mes Vendeve Anetare te Bashkimit Evropian 
- Ndikimi politik dhe dipllomatik i Bashkimit Evropian ne bote 
- Fuqia ekonomike e Bashkimit Evropian 
 
*Which of the following do you think is the most positive result of 
the EU ? 
- The free movement of people, goods and services within the 
EU 
- Peace among the Member States of the EU 
- The political and diplomatic influence of the EU in the rest of 
the world 
- The Economic power of the EU 
10. Si e vleresoni situaten aktuale te ekonomise evropiane? 
- Shume mire 
- Mire 
- Te perkeqesuar se tepermi 
- Shume keq 
- Nuk e di 
 
*How would you judge the current situation in each of the following?  
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The situation of the European Economy? 
- Very good 
- Rather Good 
- Rather Bad 
- Very Bad 
- Don’t know 
11. Si e vleresoni ndikimin e krizes ne punesim?  
- Me e keqja ende do te vije 
- Ndikimi i krizës në vendet e punës tashmë ka arritur kulmin 
- Nuk e di/Asnje pergjigje 
*Impact of the crisis on employment? 
- The worst is still to come 
- The impact of the crisis on jobs has already reached its peak 
- Don’t know/No Answer 
12. Do te thoje se je _____ mbi te ardhmen e Bashkimit Evropian? 
- Shume optimist 
- Mjaft optimist 
- Mjaft pesimist 
- Shume pesimist 
* Would you say that you are _____ about the future of the EU? 
- Very optimistic 
- Fairly optimistic 
- Fairly pessimistic 
- Very pessimistic 
13. Duke patur parasysh sa me siper, do te thoje se Shqiperia do 
te perfitonte apo jo nga te qenurit anetare e Bashkimit Evropian? 
- Do te perfitonte 
- Nuk do te perfitonte 
- Nuk e di/Asnje pergjigje 
* Taking everything into account, would you say that Albania 
would benefit or not from being a member of the European Union? 
- Would benefit 
- Would not benefit 
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- Don’t know/No Answer 
14. Ne te ardhmen e afert e shihni veten si …. 
- Kombesia vetem 
- Disa elemente evropiane ne identitet 
- Nuk e di/Asnje pergjigje 
* In the near future do you see yourself as… 
- Nationality only 
- Some European element in identity 
- Don’t know/No Answer 
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